저자: 미상 · 외국인
요약 보기
영상은 마이클 버리가 2026년 5월 초 메르카도리브레, 조에티스, 몰리나헬스케어, 하이얼스마트홈 등 4개 비AI 종목을 매수했다고 전하며 이를 AI 버블 장세의 대안 투자처로 제시한다. 필라델피아반도체지수는 90일 유예 이후 약 224% 상승했고, 나스닥 상위 10개 종목 평균 상승률 784%는 닷컴 고점(622%)을 넘는다고 주장한다. 버리의 회계 분석으로 나스닥100 PER은 30배가 아닌 42.6배라고 주장한다. 골드만삭스는 향후 10년 S&P500 연 3% 수익률을 전망한 것으로 소개된다. 영상 말미에는 투자 조언이 아니라는 면책 문구가 있다.
다듬은 글
While everyone on financial Twitter was busy screenshotting Michael Burry's latest crash warning, the man himself spent the same week doing something almost nobody is talking about. He was buying. Full positions. Four trades across three consecutive trading days. Four companies, four sectors. Zero AI exposure.
These four stocks are the actual answer to the question every investor watching this market is asking right now. Where do you hide when valuations are at the highest level since the dot-com bubble and the most famous bear on Wall Street is screaming for the exit? Here is the part most coverage of Burry gets wrong.
People remember him for the shorts, the housing trade in 2008, the Nvidia and Palantir puts, the Tesla short in 2021. But Burry's actual money has never been made on what he sold. It has been made on what he bought right after everyone else panicked. Between Scion Capital's 2000 launch and June 2008, his fund returned 489.34% net of fees, while the S&P 500 returned roughly 2% over the same stretch.
The big short was a small piece of that. The rest came from buying the right companies at the right valuations in the wreckage that followed his short calls. And here is the thing that should genuinely stop you in your tracks. In November 2025, Burry deregistered Scion Asset Management. He shut down the fund for outside investors.
Then he nd started publishing his exact trades in real time in plain English. The trades used to take 45 days to surface in a 13F filing. Now they show up the same week he places them. He has never operated like this before. A guy who spent 25 years behind a curtain just opened it. And in the first 10 days of May, what he chose to show the world was four specific buy orders.
Before we get to the four stocks, you need to see what Burry is staring at. Because if you do not understand the backdrop, the buys do not make sense. As of last Friday, the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index was up roughly 224% since the 90-day pause. Over the same window, the S&P 500 was up 48% and the Nasdaq 100 was up 69%.
The semiconductor space alone is up more than three times the broad market. That is not a rally. That is a vertical line. And it is happening in front of macroeconomic data that does not support it at all. The April jobs print was a measly 115,000 new payrolls. Consumer sentiment is sitting at a fresh record low.
Burry himself notes the disconnect. Every minute on CNBC, every Bloomberg segment, every headline, it is just two letters, A I. That is the entire thesis the market is trading on. On May 6th, his analyst Jonathan Krinsky at BTIG ran the historical comparison Burry kept circling back to. The top 10 stocks in the Nasdaq over the last year are up an average of 784%.
Going into the March 2000 dot-com peak, that same metric topped out at 622%. We are not approaching the dot-com bubble. We have lapped it. On May 6th alone, the Nasdaq 100 was up over 500 points to another all-time high. And the valuations are worse than they look. Burry's own forensic accounting work, published in March under the name The Tragic Algebra Recurrence, tears apart the standard 30 times forward earnings multiple Wall Street quotes for the Nasdaq 100.
Adjust for stock-based compensation. Adjust for aggressive depreciation. Adjust for the construction in progress lines that hide CapEx. Adjust for capital leases masquerading as operating expenses. The number he ends up with is not 30 times. It is 42.6 times. Investors are paying roughly 42% more than they think they are paying.
So, the setup is this, a market priced for perfection, concentration that has now exceeded the dot-com peak, earnings that are mathematically overstated, and the Federal Reserve still pinning rates high enough that bonds are competitive with stocks for the first time in 15 years. This is the backdrop.
Now, let us talk about what he is actually buying inside that backdrop. On May 8th, after Mercado Libre stock fell 12.7% in a single session, Burry walked in and bought it. He purchased a new full position in the $1,600. This was the day after the company reported Q1 2026 earnings, and the market hated them.
Earnings per share came in at $8.23, missing the $9.37 consensus forecast by about 12%. The stock got hammered. Here is what the market missed. Revenue grew 49% year-over-year to 8.8 billion dollars, the fastest growth rate since Q2 2022. Fintech monthly active users hit 83 million, up 29% year-over-year.
The credit portfolio increased 87% year-over-year to 14.6 billion dollars, the largest nominal quarterly increase the company has ever printed. The reason the bottom line missed was not because the business is breaking. It is because the business is investing aggressively in a credit book that is producing 87% growth.
Margin compression today, compounding earnings tomorrow, but the detail that genuinely matters, the one Burry called out specifically, is this. Mercado Libre does not pay its employees in stock. The company uses cash-settled awards, no stock-based compensation. Now, think about what this means in the context of his tragic algebra thesis.
Every US tech company on his short list is overstating earnings by adding back the cost of giving stock to employees as if those shares appeared out of thin air. Mercado Libre cannot play that game. What you see on the income statement is what you get. Burry expects sales to approach $40 in 2026, roughly 30% above 2025.
And he is buying it at a price that sits well below what he calls his IV 15 threshold, the price at which he expects to earn at least 15% annualized for at least 15 years. He is not trying to time the bottom. He is buying a quality compounder with no accounting tricks at a price that mathematically guarantees a 15-year return floor.
The day before he bought Mercado Libre on May 7th, Burry sold his positions in Salesforce and Autodesk at small profits and rotated the proceeds into Zoetis at about $86 per share. The setup was identical. Zoetis had just reported Q1 2026 earnings, lowered its full year guidance, and the stock got crushed.
Specifically, management revised 2026 revenue guidance to $9.68 billion to $9.96 billion, down from the previous $9.83 billion to $10.03 billion range, citing weaker US pet owner spending. US companion animal sales fell 11%. Q1 revenue came in at $2.3 billion, growing only 3% and flat on an organic basis.
The headlines were brutal. And the rest of the business? International growth surged. The livestock segment, cattle, poultry, swine, the agricultural side of animal medicine, delivered 12% growth across species and geographies. Veterinary care for the food supply chain is genuinely inelastic. Cows do not stop needing vaccines because US dog owners are cutting back on grooming appointments.
Zoetis is the world's largest pure-play animal health company. It was spun out of Pfizer in 2013. It has a stellar long-term track record on return on invested capital. It runs with a conservative balance sheet. At $86, it was trading at a price to sales ratio around 4.0. A multiple it had not seen in years.
The dividend yield clocked in around 2%. The company is aggressively buying back shares at these levels. Burry's read is that the market is treating a temporary cyclical guidance cut like a structural one. Pet owners pulling back on discretionary veterinary visits in 2026 does not change the long-term economics of being the dominant player in a near monopoly category.
He bought it because it cleared his IV 15 threshold. And because it is the textbook example of a boring non-AI company that did extremely well in the aftermath of 2000. And is now offered at a price that mathematically locks in long-term returns. Molina Healthcare is the position Burry says he is holding and forgetting.
It is currently his third largest position. And it is the most defensive of the four buys because Molina is not really a stock market business. It is a government-funded healthcare business. Molina specializes in Medicaid, Medicare Advantage, and the state insurance marketplace. Programs where the revenue is set by state and federal contracts, not by consumer discretionary spending.
On May 8th, Molina held its investor day. The stock dropped 4.7% the same day. The reason is almost comical. The management team's headline financial targets were not for 2026 or 2027. They were for 2029. Algorithmic models that demand quarterly earnings beats hate that timeline. Long-term value investors do not.
The 2029 targets themselves are genuinely massive. Molina laid out a roadmap to $64 billion in total premium revenue, a 15% compound annual growth rate from 2026, and an adjusted EPS target of $25. To put that in context, Molina's 2026 guidance floor is around $5 per share. Going from $5 to $25 in 3 years is roughly a 70% annualized earnings growth rate.
The current Wall Street consensus for 2029 sits around $17. Mizuho immediately raised its price target on the stock to $200 after the investor day. And here is the subtle thing about Molina that fits the broader thesis. If the bubble Burry is warning about actually breaks, unemployment rises. When unemployment rises, Medicaid enrollment rises.
Molina has a counter-cyclical revenue model embedded inside it. While the S&P 500 is taking a 30 or 40% drawdown, Molina's membership base may actually be growing. So, you have a business with a long-term roadmap that targets $25 of EPS by 2029, government-funded revenue that doesn't evaporate in a recession, and a stock that just got cheaper because the market is impatient.
This is exactly the hide here while the bubble breaks type of asset. The fourth name is the one most US retail investors have never heard of, and the one Burry probably had the easiest time stomaching. On May 6th, he started a new position in Haier Smart Home, the Hong Kong listing, ticker 6690, in the mid-20s Hong Kong dollars.
And he was very specific about why he chose the H share listing. He bought the direct Hong Kong listing, no variable interest entity, no legal structure that could get pulled out from under him if US-China relations deteriorate further. Direct ownership. Most Western investors think of Haier as a Chinese appliance company.
That framing is wrong. Roughly 50% of Haier's revenue comes from outside China. The company operates around 100 manufacturing facilities globally and is the entity that acquired GE Appliances from General Electric in 2016 for 5.4 billion dollars. If you walk into a Home Depot or a Lowe's in the United States and you buy a GE refrigerator, you are buying a Haier product.
It is the textbook definition of a global business with a misleading domicile. Q1 2026 was rough on the headline. Revenue came in at 73.69 billion RMB, down 6.86% year-over-year. Net profit was 4.65 billion yuan, down 15.2%. But the story under the surface is a different story. Excluding the North American segment, combined operating profit grew more than 10% year-over-year.
China operating profit grew, Europe, South Asia, and Southeast Asia all delivered steady growth. The North American segment specifically was hit by trade policy headwinds and a brutal winter. Those are not structural problems. Those are macroeconomic and weather problems. At today's price, Haier trades at a PE around 9.8, meaningfully below its historical median of 14.3.
This is a company that doubled net income over the last five years through high return on invested capital, operates 100 factories worldwide, owns one of America's most iconic appliance brands, and is being priced like it is a struggling regional Chinese manufacturer. The disconnect is enormous. And refrigerators, washing machines, and air conditioners do not care about an AI bubble.
People replace them when they break. That is what makes this a crash-proof asset. Step back from the individual names and look at the pattern. Mercado Libre, Zoetis, Molina Healthcare, Haier. What is the common thread? None of them are AI plays. None of them are even technology plays in any meaningful sense.
None of them have inflated valuations sitting at the 90th percentile of historical multiples. None of them are paying their employees in inflated stock. All four were bought after the market punished them for short-term non-structural reasons. And all four cleared what Burry calls his IV 15 framework.
The proprietary price threshold at which he calculates a minimum 15% annualized return over a 15-year holding period is mathematically defensible. And here is the macroeconomic context that ties it all together. Goldman Sachs published a forecast that the S&P 500 will deliver just a 3% annualized nominal total return over the next 10 years.
A return that would rank in the seventh percentile of all 10-year periods since 1930. The entire S&P 500 for a decade. 3%. If Goldman is anywhere close to right, the only way to make real money over the next 10 years is stock picking. Not indexing, not riding the AI wave, picking specific, fundamentally cheap, fundamentally durable businesses that are decoupled from the bubble.
Which is exactly what Burry just did four times in 3 days. The four stocks are the answer Burry is giving. The question worth sitting with is whether the question itself is right. Burry called the dot-com bubble. He called the housing crisis. He called the meme stock unwind. He called the bank run. He has spent 25 years being publicly mocked between every correct call.
And on May 10th, 2026 the man who got those four right wrote the words "Today, however, I am telling." And then quietly bought Mercado Libre, Zoetis, Molina, and Hyer with what looks like a long-term commitment. Maybe he is wrong this time. Maybe the AI build-out justifies a 42 times multiple. Maybe the top 10 stocks in the Nasdaq being up 784% in a year is a permanently higher equilibrium and not a bubble.
Maybe Goldman is wrong about the next decade returning 3%. Maybe. Or maybe Burry is doing what he has always done taking a position before the rest of the world notices the floor is gone. The trades are public. The thesis is published. The picks are named. You now have to decide what you do with that. .
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