저자: JeremyGrantham · 외국인
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그랜섬은 과거 역사상 모든 버블은 결국 터졌다고 주장하며, 현재 주식·주택·채권 등 '모든 자산 버블'이 형성되어 있어 고통스러운 조정이 불가피하다고 본다. 미국 은행 미실현 손실 약 6000억 달러, 금리 인상의 신용 시스템 스트레스를 경고한다. 주택 시장은 금리 충격이 느리게 전파되며 장기간 하락할 수 있다고 봤다. 주가는 2000년 수준의 장기 평가 지표에 근접해 있다고 지적한다. 다만 2009년 저점에서는 적극 매수를 권했던 점을 언급하며 과도한 비관만 있는 것은 아니라는 입장이다.
다듬은 글
all I do is look at the history and say the best guess is that a bubble will behave like a bubble and the more remarkable meta level question is how come people can get away with saying nobody saw it coming each time nobody saw it coming when the data is screaming that you can't possibly miss it you first semester course of Statistics you could not miss 1929 you could not miss 1972 you absolutely categorically could not miss 2000 when it went to 35 times earnings the previous high PE had been 21 it went to 35 For Heaven's Sake in Japan it went to 65 no you cannot miss these Bubbles and you could not miss the one in 2021 it went to a a peak that rivaled 2000 and in some ways it was cheaper some ways it was more expensive but it was a very very obvious bubble do not tell me that you can't see these things and they all break no exceptions and uh if you say that you'll be called a per be but history is quite clear there are clear bubbles they have always broken this one is breaking what is the average consequence if you're lucky 3,000 it always happened in every bubble because you start with such Euphoria and such Perfection fundamentally that deterioration is a heartbreaker if you really believed that good times would roll forever then you're not only dealing with bad information you're dealing with a heartbreak you know you're disappointed you have been let down by the system and once again the the stresses are very high and something will break I never yes I'm surprised it was Silicon Valley Bank but I am not surprised that there was something surprising like Silicon Valley Bank I would have been surprised if if nothing had cracked um and maybe next month maybe early next year but when you keep up a pressure we have more debt now than we have ever had we probably have more debt than we realize it is well argued by some people and consequently when you put the interest rates up you have in the banking system $600 billion of unrealized losses but in the system r large you you have a lot of pain already quite a few trillion dollars and uh and quite a few trillion more likely to come and everything has consequences when you write down perceived value by many trillions of dollars and it will be more than 10 by the end for sure uh collectively and you've got multiple asset classes contributing they all have consequen and you should not be surprised if a chunk of the credit system comes under stress and maybe you shouldn't be surprised if we get lucky this time and muddle through but these are the kind of things that have happened in each of the prior cycles and uh as a general principle the bigger and broader the bubble the longer and more painful the downside Japan uh the biggest of all is not back to the high of 1989 in the stock market it's not back to the high in land or real estate that's getting be quite a long time that's 30 34 years and counting uh and and it still hasn't reached the old high in nominal terms so you know the biggest lag getting back to a high ever and the biggest pain but it was the biggest bubble it it's perfectly symmetrical and this one is pretty damn big and it's bigger than 2000 because it includes real estate and bonds and that one did not so go and have a look at what happened in 2000 and the pain and why why was there so much pain you know all of the things that they're hoping would happen this time happened that time it was pretty painless the economy had a gentle recession it had no problem with real estate it had no problem with markdown of debt and yet the NASDAQ went down 82% not an insignificant decline Amazon actually went down 92 and um and the S&P went down 50 so be advised this is not a gentile uh setback like 2000 NASDAQ went down 40% in 2000 who be it's all over that was quick that wasn't too bad I I survived it barly but I survived it the point is 2001 uh I'm sorry yeah 2001 was down 20% 2002 was down 30 so you had minus 40 - 20-3 that's how you get to minus 82 it was pretty painful but everyone thought it was over after the first 40% decline I have to I have to brag here a little bit that on the day the market hit the hit the low in 2009 I posted one of only two papers I've ever written outside of a quarterly cycle now I've I've quit that I I do uh special papers but in those days only quarterly letters and I posted one called reinvesting when terrified and it was only one page for once and it said you are not going to call the bottom but get together a battle plan this is the cheapest prices for 20 years we have double digit imputed Returns on gmo's forecast for the next seven years go to your committee get your battle plan together and start getting your money back in the market of course you're terrified of course you're practically in terminal paralysis we used to call it in the 70s but that's what you have to deal with uh so I I have not always been bearish and uh there will come a time probably when we reach another level but uh that was a very very handsome opportunity to buy stocks economic unraveling can take a long time and why just think about housing housing is one of the most Dependable things that happen uh as a result of interest rate if you had a mortgage at 2.8 and then a new mortgage is five or 5 and a half or six or 6 and a half for a while this is a dramatic shift it changes the housing markets all over the world turns out that the housing market is more elevated unlike the stock market stock market is mainly a u us event like it was in 2000 housing market is yes it's in the US we actually were selling in December at a higher multiple of family income which is the best long-term measure we were selling slightly higher than the peak of the quote housing bubble of of 2006 but we were still in December way below Canada Australia the UK China they they are having real humdingers they are not going from three and a half times family income to seven times they have gone to double digit multiples of family income in most of the districts of London and and and Toronto and Vancouver and Sydney and so on and and they are floating rate so the cost flows immediately through and uh has a crippling effect but it doesn't it doesn't work overnight it has a slow effect on on building new houses which is not that big a component of GDP but it if you throw in furniture sales and improvements and so on it's quite a bit that goes down steadily the housing declines typically go at half or a third of the speed of the stock market stock market is always kind of on speed in comparison and you can't count the last housing bubble peaked in 2006 and trough in in in 2012 it took six years and the stock market that time took a year and a half but um sometimes it takes up to three years a bare Market in stocks but housing can be much slower so it it it slows the economic effect way down it filters through very slowly some of the initial impacts are counterintuitive people don't want to sell because they can't afford to pay a new mortgage so they don't they're very reluctant quite reasonably to give up their three and a quarter mortgage and replace it at twice the cost so the housing supply curatively drops off and can create artificially reasonably high prices for a while and that gradually flows through the system however people get normalized they have to move eventually and so they do and the prices weaken but the economy moves very slowly and uh and then you look around in general to see where the stress points are I was in a podcast two days before the crash and I was making the same point that the stresses build up like a huge pressure behind a dam and you can't really work out which brick is going to go uh in the DAP first you you can be pretty confident that sooner or later the great Bubbles as they break will find a pressure point and you can also be pretty confident that you will probably be surprised exactly where it occurs so we have just recently seen some unexpected pressure points which you could say are unexpected but I would say from 60,000 ft they're totally predictable it is predictable that something will fail and you will be surprised at what particular piece it is I have been saying this for years and I feel totally Vindicated that something has gone and something that went is unexpected that is the nature of the Beast the trouble with this bubble is is the troubles are actually manyfold one of which is as many people have said it's an everything bubble so we have bubbled the important and dangerous housing market not not as crazy crazily as we did in in the housing bubble but uh in sheer price we boosted it up to records we bubbled the the bond market to levels that have never been seen in the history of man uh with the lowest rates every recorded of course Fine Arts and every other asset through the roof and equities particularly in the US at U at or close to the highest points ever reached in the most Dependable forms of long-term evaluation where you smooth the earnings Schiller style or one could say husman style the most reliable ones are at or close uh to the level of uh of 2000
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