저자: HowardMarks · 외국인
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하워드 막스는 2차대전 이후 80년간의 세계화 기반 저물가 질서가 관세로 무너지며 영구적 인플레이션 시대로 진입한다고 주장한다. 세계화로 내구재 가격이 25년간 40% 하락해 물가를 억제했으나 관세(예: 25%)는 비용을 다시 올린다. 주식은 PE 19배로 역사적 평균(16배) 대비 비싸 과거 10% 수익률 기대는 무리이며, 리스크 조정 후 약 6.2% 수준의 회사채가 더 명확하다고 본다. 또한 예측 가능성이 사라진 '스노우글로브' 불확실성 시대에 공포 매도 대신 하락을 할인 기회로 봐야 한다고 강조한다.
다듬은 글
This is this is the biggest change in the environment that I've seen probably in my career. These are the words of Howard Marx, the founder of the multi-billion dollar firm Oak Tree Capital and a man whose insights investors wait for like prophecy. And if he is saying that he is witnessing the biggest change of his half ccentury career, we all need to stop and listen because this isn't just a warning about the stock market.
This is an alarm about the fundamental collapse of the 80-year economic world order we have lived in. So what is this great change that Mark sees? Why does he believe the era of cheap goods brought by globalization is over and we are entering an age of permanent inflation? Which investment does he now believe is safer than stocks?
And most importantly, what is the single most critical psychological secret you need to know to survive financially in this new world that has been shaken up like a snow globe? By the end of this video, you will not only understand this great change, but also learn how to use Marx's mental toolkit to protect your portfolio.
Now, let's take a closer look at how Markx defines this new era. I believe that the last 80 years since World War II have been the best economic period in the history of mankind. uh and one of the major reasons was the the growth of trade and I think that it we have truly had a a rising tide that lifted all boats and and trade was a big part of that and everybody in the audience should understand the role of of trade.
Every country, for example, does some things better and worse. And worldwide welfare is maximized when every country does the things it does best and cheapest and then sells them to the countries that need them, which do other things and sell them to other people. That's how trade works. And uh well, I don't know if it's politically correct, but the good news is that the Italians make the pasta and the Swiss make the watches.
But if we stop world trade and and the Swiss have to make their own pasta and the Italians have to make their own watches, the world will probably be well maybe arguably people in both countries will be a little worse off. That's what we're talking about here. and and and uh we should not underestimate the benefits that we've gotten from globalization.
And among other things, there was a 25-y year period which I cited in one of my memos 10 years ago in which the the the cost of durables in the US went down by 40% in in in in uh risk in in inflation adjusted terms that kept a lid on inflation. Here to understand this paradigm shift and its consequences we need to examine the three great reversals that Markx has identified.
First the reversal of disinflation brought by globalization into permanent inflation fueled by tariffs. Second the end of the decadesl long reign of equities with credit becoming the smarter investment. And third the end of predictability replaced by a radical uncertainty where everything has been shaken up like a snow globe.
Let's break down these three great changes step by step. The first reversal, the end of falling prices, the return of inflation. As Markx noted, thanks to globalization, the price of durable goods in the US fell by 40% over a 25-year period. This was the most powerful force suppressing inflation as it allowed companies to use the most efficient resources from around the world to lower their production costs.
This wasn't just about cheaper labor. It meant hyper specialized factories, more advanced technology, and more efficient logistics networks. Let's illustrate this with a detailed example. Consider a modern passenger car. Let's assume that if you were to produce this vehicle entirely within one country, say the United States, the costs would be as follows.
First, the component breakdown. An engine block and crankshaft forged in Germany for $2,000. A sophisticated transmission system from a specialist in Japan for $1,500. An advanced infotainment and electronic suite from South Korea for $1,000. Highquality leather for the seats from Italy for $500. These are just the main components.
When you add the hundreds of other parts, the chassis, glass, and tires, the component cost easily reaches $15,000. Assembling these parts in a US factory with high labor costs and factory overhead could bring the total production cost to $40,000. However, through globalization, you can source these same highquality parts from their most efficient producers and assemble the car in a factory in Mexico where labor is more affordable.
The total cost of the same car, including logistics, could drop to $25,000. This massive $15,000 difference is what allowed you to buy a cheaper car and allowed companies to make more profit to invest in new technologies. But now, when a 25% tariff is placed on this $25,000 car, it adds $6,250 to its cost, suddenly making the final cost $31,250.
This means it's not cheaper anymore. This doesn't just mean the consumer pays more. It forces the automaker to re-evaluate its entire multi-billion dollar supply chain. Should they build a new factory in the US? That takes years and billions of dollars. Should they absorb the cost? That crushes their already razor thin profit margins and leaves less money for R&D.
Should they raise prices? That makes them uncompetitive against rivals who may not be subject to the same tariffs. There are no easy answers, and this uncertainty paralyzes business decisions. So, how will this situation, the reversal of globalization affect inflation? Here is the answer Howard Marks gave when this question was asked.
If that's the case, does that mean that you see the inflationary regime as being something that is more persistent, a reversal of what we saw the disinflation of the globalization? Well, I think so. There were financial benefits from globalization, including keeping a lid on inflation. And you know, if if we hadn't bought our uh TV sets and appliances from abroad in that 25- year period at declining prices, what would inflation have been?
And the answer is considerably more. Maybe not two, but maybe three, four, five. And so, you know, tariffs are an increased cost. Somebody has to pay them. and uh you know most people think the consumer will pay them. The second reversal, the end of equities, the rise of credit. This new inflationary environment is rewriting the rules of investment.
Traditionally, the key to long-term wealth was equities. They have returned an average of 10% per year for the last century. But Markx warns that this number is dangerously misleading because everything depends on the price you pay. The most common metric for valuing stocks is the price to earnings or PE ratio.
This ratio is found by dividing a company's total market value by its annual net profit. Historically, the average PE ratio for the S&P 500 is 16 and the famous 10% return was achieved when buying at these levels. MarkX notes that today the PE ratio is 19. This means stocks are about 20% more expensive than their historical average and expecting historical returns from these levels is illogical.
The return from a stock comes from two things. The growth of the company's earnings and the change in the PE multiple investors are willing to pay. In the past, a significant part of the returns came from the expansion of PE multiples thanks to falling interest rates. Today with rising interest rates, we face the risk of multiple contraction.
This could be a major headwind for stock prices even if earnings grow. In contrast, Mark says the credit market, meaning corporate bonds, offers a much clearer picture. You know what you're getting from the start. A high yield bond today offers a yield of nearly 8%. Of course, there's the risk of default, but we can analyze that risk.
For example, let's assume a B-rated bond has a historical annual default probability of 3%. And in the case of a default, you can recover 40% of your investment. In this case, your expected annual loss is 3% probability of default time 60% the amount you lose, which equals 1.8%. When you subtract this expected loss from your 8% gross yield, you are left with a risk adjusted potential return of about 6.2%.
This is a far more concrete figure compared to the uncertain future of stocks. So in this complex environment, how should the riskreward balance between stocks and credit be evaluated? This exact topic came up in the interview. When you're measuring how to decide the risk and reward of given asset classes in this type of environment, they could go in a multitude of different ways.
How do you understand where there's value, what a return is that would justify a risk at a time when you know potentially you could get 7 8% 9% with credit with stocks they have delivered more than 10% for the past number of decades but going forward I want to respond first to your last sentence stocks have uh delivered an average of 10% a year for the last hundred years but not when the PE PE ratio was 19 and the PE ratio today is probably 19.
The average return has been 16. So we can say that when the PE r average when the PE ratio averages 16, the return average is 10. But when the PE ratio is 19, my guess is if you look at history, if you bought the P the S&P when the PE ratio is 19, historically you probably made let's say 1 to 6% a year or 2 to 7% a year, something like that, but certainly not 10.
And and so uh you know what you pay matters and the price of the S&P is elevated relative to historic levels. So you shouldn't expect historic returns. Whereas in credit, one of your arguments is you can expect to get that return because the default risk isn't as great as some of the excess spreads and what you're getting in all yield.
Well, you know, with with credit is a a new fangled word for fixed income or which was a new fangled word for bonds. In 1978, uh I was moved at City Bank from the equities department to the bond department. Nobody talked about fixed income or credit. But um with debt or bonds or fixed income or credit, what you see is what you get.
You you can read on the piece of paper what the promised return is. And then the only thing you have to wonder about is will I get it? That is to say, will the issuer default or will they keep their promises? The third reversal, the end of predictability, the age of the snow globe. Perhaps most importantly, Mark says this period is not just a financial shift, but a philosophical one.
The stable days when we could predict the future by looking at the past are over. He likens the current situation to a snow globe being shaken, the global order, geopolitics, and international relations have been so violently disrupted that no one knows what the landscape will look like when the flakes settle.
This is what the economist Frank Knight called Nitian uncertainty. An environment where risks are not just unknown but unknowable. Risk is like a game of poker. You don't know which cards will be dealt but you can calculate the probability of every outcome. Uncertainty is like playing a game where you don't even know the rules or if the rules might change mid-and.
Your mathematical models become useless. So, why do investors consistently buy high and sell low? The answer lies in behavioral finance. Two powerful biases are at work. Hurting, our instinct to follow the crowd, and loss aversion, the fact that the pain of a loss is twice as powerful as the pleasure of a gain.
When the market falls, the herd is selling, and our brains scream at us to avoid the pain of further losses. This creates a powerful instinctual urge to sell even when logic dictates it's the best time to buy. So in a period of so much uncertainty, should an investor be fearful or greedy? Is this a time to be fearful or greedy?
Um, you know what you have to say? Bloomberg's offices, uh, you have to think in terms of your neighbor. Um uh the department store Bloomingdales Bloomingdales Bloomingdales just put everything on sale. Prices have come down on for the S&P uh 8% in the last two days and uh much more in the last six weeks.
It's on sale. That should encourage people to think about buying. Will they go down further? Nobody knows. Will are the prices fair? Nobody knows. But everybody runs from the market when prices go down because they think it conotes risk. It's just stuff going on sale. And uh of course it takes uh well I was going to say a pro but it takes a precient pro of which there aren't many to know whether as I keep saying the the the discounts are adequate or appropriate.
But certainly you have to look and and and it doesn't make any sense to say just a minute I did XYZ when the price was 100 today the price is 90 so I'm going to boycott it. That doesn't make any sense on its face. You have to take a hard look. In summary, Howard Marx's warning is clear. As an 80-year economic order comes to an end, investors face three great reversals: rising prices, the ascent of credit over stocks, and radical uncertainty.
But within this chaos, the greatest wisdom is the simplest. Instead of selling in a panic, viewing price drops as an opportunity, a sale may be what allows you to be one of the ones left standing in this new era. To become a better investor by learning from analyses like this, make sure to subscribe to our channel.
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