저자: 미상 · 외국인
요약 보기
하워드 막스의 1997년 메모 「투자자인가, 투기자인가」를 해설한다. 자산의 좋고 나쁨이 아니라 가격과 가치의 관계가 투자 성과를 결정하며, 시장은 탐욕/과열과 비관/저평가 사이를 진자처럼 오간다. 니프티50 붕괴(1970년대 말 70%+ 하락)와 1990년대 부실채권 기회를 대비시킨다. 케인스식 구분(투기자는 위험을 알고 감수, 투자자는 모를 수 있음)을 소개하고, 과열기에는 규율과 상대가치, 분산과 장기 시야가 중요하다고 정리한다. 현재 AI·바이오 밸류에이션 과열과 저금리 종료 위험을 유사 사례로 언급하나 구체적 시장 예측은 없다.
다듬은 글
[ are you an investor or a Speculator written on the 3rd of September 1997 welcome back everybody today we're doing a deep dive into uh investing and I guess more specifically figuring out if you're an investor or if you're a Speculator oh interesting we'll be looking at a memo by Howard Marx the classic yeah Howard markx of course is the co-founder of oak tree Capital Management and this memo that we're looking at is from September of 1997 so quite a while ago yeah that was uh right in the heart of the do com bubble exactly so very interesting times yeah so this memo is called are you an investor or a specul calor and as we were just saying it's from a time when the stock market was absolutely booming and you know a lot of the things that he talked about then seemed very relevant to what we're seeing now yeah I think that's why Mark's memos are so popular he's got this way of looking at the markets it just seems to transcend specific time periods yeah he gets to those core ideas that are kind of always relevant exactly so right off the bat he starts with this idea that investment success isn't about the type of asset that you own okay it's about the relationship between its price and its value interesting so he's saying that no asset is inherently good or bad right it all depends on what you pay for it makes sense I feel like that's such a simple idea but it's something that we often forget when we're caught up in you know the excitement of the market it's really easy to get caught up in like the stories and the narratives around a particular asset especially if everyone around you seems to be making money from it totally but marks is really emphasizing here the need to always come back to those fundamentals you always have to be asking yourself am I paying a price that's justified by the underlying value of what I'm buying I think one of the things that I really like about this memo is that he brings up this analogy of a pendulum to describe Market Cycles right so he says the market is swinging back and forth between these two extremes Euphoria and overvaluation on the one hand yeah and then pessimism and undervaluation on the other which I guess makes sense if you think about like human psychology and crowd Behavior right it's like we go from you know being super greedy to being super fearful and it just keeps yeah it's like a cycle it's a cycle yeah but the million dollar question is like how do you actually figure out where we are in that cycle yeah how can you tell where that pendulum is swinging what are some of the signs well markx points to a few things okay first you got to look at investor Behavior so like M are people being driven by fear of missing out fomo fomo or are they actually being cautious and selective with their in yeah makes sense and then the second thing he says you have to look at is valuations yeah so are those valuations justified by some realistic expectation of future growth uh or are they just totally inflated by speculative fervor you know right so if everyone's throwing money at any deal that comes their way maybe that's a sign that we're closer to that Euphoria exactly and if everyone is super skeptical and prices are really depressed maybe that's a sign that we're yeah that we're swinging more towards the pessimism side yeah okay interesting and to kind of illustrate this he takes us back to two very different periods the first one is the nifty50 craze of the 1970s oh yeah I've heard that yeah and then the second one is the distressed debt opportunities that were around in the 1990s so those are two very contrasting Market environment yeah totally so tell me a little bit more about that nifty50 craze what exactly happened there so basically you had this group of like 50 blue chip stocks that became the absolute Darlings of the market in the early' 70s okay and these were like you know big well-known companies with supposedly like guaranteed growth right so investors just piled in right yeah they believed that these companies were Unstoppable and had huge potential so they just kept driving those prices up to astronomical levels so it was just pure hype yeah pretty much and what happened well by the mid-70s the bubble burst oh and a lot of those nifty50 darling saw their stock prices absolutely plummet like 70% or more in some cases yeah it was a pretty harsh reminder that no company no matter how great it is is immune to Market forces right and even the most like beloved stocks can fall from grace if the price gets too far ahead of the fundamentals so is a classic example of buying into hype exactly and paying a price that's just completely disconnected from reality yeah but then you contrast that with the 1990s right which was a totally different environment so in the '90s you had like this period marked by econ IC distress and widespread pessimism okay and companies that were facing even like minor difficulties were practically considered worthless by the market oh wow so you had this opportunity right for investors who specialized in distressed assets they were able to come in and buy these assets at bargain prices betting on their ability to turn things around so the pendulum had swung from like irrational exuberance to yeah to excessive pessimism wow so it seems like that would be really risky though to buy like a distressed asset what if it really is worthless that's where the distinction between an investor and a Speculator comes in okay markx actually borrows a definition from the economist John Maynard kees to explain this okay so Keane said that a Speculator knowingly takes risks okay while an investor may be unaware of the risks that they're taking interesting someone who's just piling into a hot stock just because everyone else is doing it right they might actually be an unwitting investor yeah even if they think they're being this like Savvy Speculator that's a really interesting distinction yeah and what Marx is saying is that intelligent speculation where you actually understand and accept the risks you're taking can be a sound strategy yeah especially when everyone else is Running Scared and prices are depressed so it's about like having that cleare eyed view of the situation ex and knowing what you're getting into and then making those calculated decisions right and I think a great example of this is the story that he tells about the risky commercial paper oh yeah that's a good word so he talks about how oak tree bought commercial paper of this company that was having some trouble and they knew that it might not be repaid at maturity right so they were taking a calculated risk right but betting on their ability to navigate that situation right and maybe profit in other ways but then there was also this money market fund that that bought the same commercial paper at full price when it was considered safe yeah they were just looking at the rating and not really thinking about the underlying fundamentals yeah and then of course that fund ended up selling the paper at a loss gig yikes just to avoid reporting that to their investors I mean that's a perfect example of how perceived risk can be just as powerful as actual risk right the fundamentals of that commercial paper didn't really change but as soon as that company showed any signs of trouble the market just panicked everyone's focused on those short-term headlines instead of the underlying value so all that being said what was the market sentiment like back in 1997 when Marx wrote this memo well it was pretty frothy back then frothy yeah you know kind of like what we were just talking about there was this widespread belief that the good times would just keep rolling forever oh like the market could just defy gravity exactly like there was no limit to how high stocks could go and people were thinking that because we had low inflation and stable interest rates right and Marx pushes back on that pretty hard in this memo really he says that even in a benign macro environment like that there's a right level for stock prices okay and that level might be below what the market is currently pricing in so just because things are good in the economy doesn't mean that stocks are automatically a good buy right exactly I actually remember reading this one part in the memo that really stuck with me oh yeah he talks about this period at the start of the bull market in the 1980s where you could buy companies from for Less through the stock market than it would cost to like build them from scratch oh and that was what really fueled the whole leverag buyout boom Oh interesting but by 1997 things had totally flipped how so companies were trading at these prices that no rational entrepreneur would ever pay to buy the entire business so it sounds like valuations had gotten way ahead of themselves exactly and it's a good reminder that just because something worked in the past yeah doesn't mean it'll keep working for ever right past performance is not indicative of future returns as they say exactly so if investors can't just rely on a good macro environment to keep the market going up uhhuh what should they be focusing on Mark says it's all about finding relative value okay so even in a bull market there are going to be some assets that are more attractively priced than others okay so give me an example well he points out that in 1997 small cap stocks were lagging behind large cap Stocks by a historically wide margin so maybe that was like a potential opportunity right exactly for investors who are willing to look beyond the hottest sectors so even when the overall Market seems expensive there might be these little pockets of value hiding in plain sight exactly you just got to know where to look but it's got to be so easy to get caught up in the hype right especially when everyone around you seems to be making money oh yeah for sure so are there any like safeguards against that like how do you avoid getting swept up in all of that excitement one thing that Marx emphasizes is that unexpected events what he calls surprises are really what Drive Market movements okay and we can't predict the surprises of course right nobody has a crystal ball but we can be prepared for them okay so how do we do that well he quotes Warren Buffett in this memo oh I love a good Buffett quote so Buffett said the less Prudence with which others conduct their Affairs the greater the Prudence with which we should conduct our own Affairs wow I love that quote so basically when everyone else is getting Reckless that's when we need to be extra disciplined it's such a simple idea but it's so hard to do in practice that's because you just see everyone else making all this money and you think oh I'm missing out I got to get in on that right you get that fomo exctly and that's when you make the biggest mistakes so in 1997 how is Oak Tree managing risk in that environment well markx walks through some of their strategies in the memo okay so they were focusing on things like undervalued convertible Securities okay high quality High bom and distressed debt with really strong asset backing so basically a mix of strategies that offered some downside protection but still had the potential for upside right it's about finding that balance not being too greedy but also not being too afraid to miss out on opportunities makes sense and I think markx also shares this analogy from another famous investor Julian Robertson oh yeah I love that analogy The Phoenician SE Captain analogy yeah so Robertson compared fund managers to these ancient sea captains okay and he said that they were incentivized to prioritize speed over safety okay how so well they got paid based on the value of the goods that they transported so like faster ships meant more profits at least in cm Seas yeah that makes sense but then the storms inevitably hit yeah and those flimsy fast ships were the first to sink oh no only the 30 ships the ones that were built for resilience could survive those Rough Waters so it's like a metaphor for the investment World exactly in a bull market it's so tempting to chase those quick returns yeah and you take on huge risks in the process but then when the market turns yeah it's the disciplined investors the ones who are focused on value and risk management right who are best positioned to weather the storm exactly and Marx is making it clear that oak tree like those sturdy ships is built for resilience they're willing to maybe sacrifice some gains in the short term to ensure their survival over the long term right it's that long-term perspective that really matters Okay so we've talked about the dangers of Market Euphoria the importance of relative value and the inevitability of surprises but how do we actually apply all of this to our own investment decisions well yeah I mean some of what markx was describing back in 97 sounds kind of eerily familiar to what we're seeing now oh for sure there are definitely some parallels yeah so what are some of the things that jump out of you well take the whole narrative around technology and Innovation for example okay it feels very similar to the late '90s right we're seeing these incredible advancements in Ai and biotech all these different fields yeah and it creates this feeling that maybe valuations don't matter as much anymore right like the old rules no longer apply like we see these companies with crazy high valuations even if their current earnings don't seem to justify it yeah because the market is basically betting on their future potential right but how can you be sure that that potential isn't already baked into the price exactly and that's the challenge yeah and just like Marx was saying back in 97 we have to be careful about just assuming that recent Trends will continue forever right so just because Tech has been doing really well for the past few years right doesn't mean that it's going to continue to outperform Forever exactly and we also have to remember that we're still in this environment with historically low interest rates oh yeah that's a good point which makes it easier for companies to borrow money and grow right and it also makes it easier for investors to justify those higher valuations yeah because the cost of capital is so low exactly but what happens when interest rates finally do start to rise that's a big risk right yeah because higher interest rates can squeeze corporate profits they can make it harder for companies to service their debt yeah and it can also make bonds more attractive relative to stocks oh interesting so we could see a shift in capital away from stocks and into bonds yeah so it sounds like there are definitely some Echoes of that euphoria that Marx was seeing back in 1997 for sure but I guess the big question is does that mean a crash is imminent not necessarily remember Marx isn't trying to predict crashes he's all about understanding value and managing risk and that's what's really important for investors today yeah regardless of what happens in the market those principles are always going to be relevant so what does it actually mean to be a discipline investor in this kind of market like what are some actionable takeaways that we can get from this memo well first of all I think we need to be really honest with ourselves about the risks we're taking are we chasing hot stocks just because they're going up right or are we investing in companies with solid fundamentals and a clear path to profitability yeah I think it's really easy to get caught up in that momentum and excitement yeah for sure but we can't forget that price and value aren't always the same thing absolutely and we also Al have to accept that volatility and uncertainty are just part of the game yeah the market doesn't move in a straight line right unexpected things happen all the time so how do we deal with that well having a diversified portfolio and a long-term investment Horizon can definitely help yeah that makes sense because it allows you to kind of ride out those inevitable storms right and I think maybe most importantly we need to remember that quote from Buffett oh yeah about Prudence right the less Prudence other people are showing the more prudent we need to be so when everyone else is getting greedy yeah that's when we need to be fearful exactly and when everyone else is fearful that might be a good time to start getting greedy it's about being contrarian right thinking for yourself yeah not letting the crowd dictate your decisions so as we wrap up this deep dive into Howard marks are you an investor or a Speculator yeah I think the big takeaway for me is that it's not about timing the market perfectly or avoiding every downturn right it's about understanding value managing risk intelligently yeah and just having the discipline to stick to your principles even when it's hard even when it's really hard especially when it's hard yeah and especially when the market is tempting you to do otherwise totally so it really comes down to knowing which game you're playing right are you an investor are you a Speculator yeah and being aware of the implications of that the choice is yours but Choose Wisely and with that we'll leave you with a final thought inspired by Marx's memo okay the market offers opportunities for both investors and speculators M but it's crucial to know which hat you're wearing for sure and to act accordingly don't let the Allure of easy money blind you to potential risks words to live by until next time
Comments 0