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I am a value-oriented investor. I'm trying to determine the intrinsic value of the situation. I like to buy if the price is low relative to the intrinsic value . I like to sell if the price is high relative to intrinsic value . What is the main factor in this relationship? These are emotions, psychology, and investor mood.
If people are excited, bullish, and optimistic about an asset, its price is likely to be higher than its intrinsic value. And, of course, this is a source of danger and a reason for low profitability. But if investors are pessimistic, indifferent, and disillusioned with the asset, then the price is likely to be low relative to intrinsic value , and this opens up great opportunities.
So, we want to buy when people are depressed and pessimistic, and sell when they are optimistic and enthusiastic. The difficulty is that many people's emotions or psychology —I use these terms interchangeably—have the same oscillations, and it 's hard to say why. We are all subject to the same influences.
We all read the same headlines. We all hear the same news on television. We all see the same economic reports. So the things that make other people happy and optimistic usually make us feel that way too. So the forces that force people to raise rates and inflate prices usually encourage us to buy high and, when prices fall, to sell.
So the bottom line is that if you think and feel the same as everyone else, you won't be able to get ahead of them. And this is what I call second- level thinking, which is necessary to act contrary to the crowd. This is usually called " counter-investing": selling at high prices that have risen due to general optimism, and buying cheaply when everyone is depressed.
We should be aggressive when people are depressed and cautious when they are enthusiastic. In other words, we must think and feel differently than others. And it's not easy. We must either be dispassionate people or learn emotional restraint, and this is not easy at all. Therefore, most people are not capable of it.
You know, there's evidence that most people are optimistic at the peak, and that evidence is the peak itself. The proof is that prices are higher than ever before. This can only happen when optimism outweighs pessimism. There is evidence that people are depressed during market bottoms. And the low price level is proof of that.
Prices can only be so low relative to intrinsic value when most people are depressed. So we should be happy when they're depressed, and we should be, uh, careful when they're , uh, excited. And that's just hard to do. And, and, and, and, let me, I know you're ready to talk, but, but, uh , uh, let me say one more thing.
One of the reasons it's hard to do is that there are few opportunities to do it well. I talked to my son. Those of you who read my notes know that I occasionally mention my son Andrew in them. And we work together on investments. And I said I was working on a book, and, uh, I told him, you know, I really think that basically my market predictions were right.
And he says: “Yes, Dad. "That's because you've made five market predictions in 50 years ." And this is true if you wait for the market to reach an extreme, when it is very high or very low, and make your predictions only at those moments. I believe that in times like these, the error of the cycle becomes apparent.
And if you come to the right conclusion, it will most likely work. If you are impatient and try to make market predictions outside of extreme moments, I think the logic will be complicated and you are unlikely to be able to do it often. So what I recommend in the book won't work every week, every month, or every year.
This will only work in moments of extremes. And if, you know, most people don't have that patience and try to make predictions more often, and when you're not near the extreme, uh, it's not going to work. Those of you who read the first book know that there's a section where it says that the most important thing is patient opportunism , and, uh, I think the last sentence says that, um, when there's nothing smart to do, the mistake is to try to be smart.
So trying to make these predictions outside of market extremes is a mistake. You won't be able to do it often, but if you do it in moments of real extremes, uh, it's extremely profitable, and you don't have to do it often for it to be a real contribution to your investing experience.
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