저자: HowardMarks · 외국인
요약 보기
결론: 신용 사이클과 경기 사이클은 과잉과 조정의 반복이며, 현재는 경기 회복기 후반부로 과거 사례상 사이클 종료가 가까워졌을 수 있으나 예측보다 현 위치 파악이 중요하다. 신용시장의 중요성: 거의 모든 정부·기업·개인은 부채를 갚지 않고 롤오버하며 살아가므로, 신용 창구의 개폐가 차입자의 생사를 결정한다. 신용 창구의 위험 민감도: 신용 공급자가 위험을 기피해 창구를 닫는 공황기에는 만기 부채를 상환하지 못하는 기업이 파산할 수 있다. 디스트레스 부채 투자 사례: Oaktree는 1988년부터 디스트레스 부채 투자를 해왔으며, 1991년 하이일드 채권 위기, 2002년 통신 붕괴·엔론 사태, 2008년 금융위기에서 저가 매수 기회를 얻었다. 과잉 자본의 위험: 2008년 9월 메모 'The Seven Worst Words in the World'에서 '너무 많은 돈이 너무 적은 거래를 쫓는 것'을 최악의 신호로 꼽았으며, 이 경우 가격이 상승하고 기대수익은 낮아지며 위험은 커진다. 사이클의 본질: 사이클의 길이와 진폭은 이전 사건의 결과이며, 위험 태도와 자본 가용성에 좌우되는 연쇄 반응이다. 현재 경기 위치: 미국은 현재 경기 회복 10년차 후반으로, 미국 역사상 10년을 넘긴 회복기는 없었다. 다만 그것이 반드시 깨지지 않는다는 뜻은 아니며, 2차대전 이후 가장 느린 회복이었다는 점도 언급된다. 사이클 해석 관점: 경제 성장률과 주식 수익률의 평균은 정상(norm)이 아니며, 실제 다수 연도는 평균보다 높거나 낮다. 이는 감정에 따른 과잉 투자와 이후 조정의 결과이므로, 상승·하락보다 과잉과 조정의 관점으로 사이클을 보는 것이 유용하다. 출연자 전망: 마크스는 자신이 미래 예측보다 과거 분석에 더 능하다고 밝혔고, 예측을 믿지 않으며 '어디로 갈지는 모르지만 지금 어디에 있는지는 알아야 한다'는 입장이다. 구체적 자산 방향 예측은 없다.
다듬은 글
most people are not not aware of the importance of the credit market cycle but it is really really influential and it starts really with the fact that most people don't think about enough which is that nobody pays their debts governments never pay off their debts you ever you think that you think that the uk government will ever in the future have a day when it pay when it owes less money than it owes today i know the us government will not most companies never reduce their debt and most individuals don't reduce their debt you know they just put it on the credit card and then they paid the minimum payment to to get through but they owe more money every month nobody pays a debts they rely on the ability to roll their debts over so you you you you know the the u.s government bought issues some five-year notes the five years pass they assume that when they mature they'll be able to go back to the credit window and say i'd like to borrow that money for another five years and the credit person behind the credit window will say that's fine and that's the way it usually goes but what happens if a company has some bonds the bonds are outstanding the bonds mature they go to the credit window they say we'd like to raise borrow that money roll it over for 10 years and credit windows close that day what if it's a day of panic what if it's a day when people are so terrified of risk that they will not renew the debts then that debtor is bankrupt so the availability of credit the openness of the credit window determines life or death for borrowers and if its openness is dependent on the mindset of of uh of providers of capital uh with regard to risk on that day and it's extremely important and you know one of our outstanding businesses at oaktree is called distress debt investing and basically there have been uh three times in our we started that in 88 so we're now in our 31st year there have been three times that we had exceptional opportunities to buy distressed debt at very low prices because other people were panic and refusing credit 1991 the first crisis in high yield bonds o102 when we had the telecoms meltdown that had over borrowed to build fiber and the scandal companies of enron and so forth and then 0 8 the global financial crisis you know my i wrote a memo in september called the seven worst words in the world and what are the seven worst words in the world for an investor too much money chasing too few deals when there's too much money chasing too few deals the prices get bit up so that the prospective returns are low and the risk is high and and uh you want to know that and again that's a function of attitudes towards risk availability of capital so you describe cycles as being chain reactions that the um the the length or the amplitude of the cycle is a function of what's happened before right um what do you think the seeds are that are being sown now in this current cycle that will have an impact in the future well i'm much better at predicting the past than the future but but let's talk about you know and one of the things i say i don't believe in forecasts and uh like like galbraith said and one of the things uh that i uh say is we never know where we're going but we sure as hell ought to know where we are so where are we we're in the second half of the 10th year of an economic recovery and there's never been a recovery in the united states that went more than 10 years so based on the data we're we're coming to the end now this the process doesn't work like clockwork the fact that there's never been a a recovery of more than 10 years doesn't mean there never will be and there's every chance that this will go on beyond ten years it's been a long recovery but a slow one well and that's the other thing it has been the slowest recovery since world war two so why is that important and the answer is well i saw i was writing this book called mastering the market cycles an indispensable uh resource and uh and you know i believe in cycles i think cycles are one of the most important things for us to study and i believe that they have you know i've lived through about a half a dozen really important cycles in my career and they have given me a lot of opportunity to make money they've given other people a lot of opportunity to lose money and so i believe there always have been i believe there always will be i believe they're very important and i believe that they are understandable cycles but as i got about two-thirds of the way through the book i said i had a revelation i said why are there cycles u.s economy grows on average about two percent a year right now why doesn't it always grow two percent why sometimes three and sometimes one sometimes four and sometimes negative sometimes recession why not just two every year stock market your s p uh return you mentioned earlier returns about 10 on average but not only does it not return 10 every year but it rarely returns between 8 and 12.
so the norm is is is the average is not the norm why why do we have mostly above average years and below armed years rather than average years all the time and the answer in my opinion is excesses and corrections so people get excited they commit errors of emotion and so if something has a u.s economy has a two percent underlying trend line they get excited they make decisions to invest and to purchase and to produce and to hire which causes it to grow more than two for a little while but then it turns out that everybody made decisions that were too positive and that has to be corrected and so they they stop investing and they stop producing and they stop hiring and then you have a below average year excess and correction so i think that when you think about cycles rather than think about ups and downs i think it's much more helpful to think about excesses and corrections
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