저자: HowardMarks · 외국인
요약 보기
결론: 현재 시장은 구조적 비효율이 거의 사라져 초과수익(공짜 점심)을 찾기 어렵고, 가끔 발생하는 경기순환적 비효율(심리로 인한 과대·과소평가)을 활용하는 것이 현실적이다. 과거 사례: 하이일드 채권(1978년 부실채권), 1988년 디스트레스드 자산, 1998년 신흥시장에 투자한 경험이 소개됐다. 당시 기관 편향(무디스가 B등급 채권을 투자 부적격으로 규정)으로 아무도 사지 않는 자산에서 기회가 생겼다. 구조적 비효율의 원천: 무지, 데이터 부족, 인프라·제도 부재, 편향이 비효율을 만든다. 이것이 'efficientization'(시장 효율화) 개념이며 그의 2014년 메모 'Getting Lucky'에서 다뤘다. 현재 상황: 정보가 과잉 공개되어 대부분 자산군이 효율적이라 구조적 비효율은 거의 없다. 누구나 어떤 자산이든 투자하려 해서 기존의 편향 기반 기회도 사라졌다. 완전시장 조건: 지식, 객관성, 대체 의지(예: 석유와 가스 간 차익거래)가 충족되면 가격이 균형을 이룬다. 경기순환적 비효율: 시장 참여자가 심리적으로 자산을 지나치게 싸게 또는 비싸게 평가할 때가 있으며, 이때 심리 편향에 저항하면 매수 또는 공매도 기회가 생긴다. 다만 그 경계선은 매번 다르다. 경쟁자 사례: 약 4년 전 동료가 'Q-SIP(공개 증권) 전부 고평가'라고 주장했는데, 이는 공개시장이 투자하기 쉬워 과도하게 비싸다는 의미였다. 역설: 사적 투자가 초과수익의 비결이라는 믿음이 확산되어 자금이 몰리면 사적 투자도 고평가되고 공개시장은 저평가될 수 있다. 어떤 투자 원칙도 모두가 믿으면 무력화된다. 출연자 전망: 구조적 초과수익은 희박하며, 심리에 따른 순환적 기회를 포착하는 것이 핵심이라는 견해다. 구체적 자산에 대한 단기 방향성 발언은 없다.
다듬은 글
well i described my history which was high-yield bonds in 78 distressed death in 88 emerging markets in 98. so the key is that there were people things people would do and things people wouldn't do there were markets that people didn't understand didn't have full data on maybe there wasn't any performance history the markets were not fully they didn't have the infrastructure and the institutions um and of course there were biases as i described there were people who said no it's you know moody's venerable credit rating institution if you took down the 1978 edition of the moody's manual off your shelf and you looked up the definition of a b rated bond it said fails to possess the characteristics of a desirable investment in other words you cannot prudently invest in a b rated bond that's a bias and when if there's an asset and 99 percent of people will not buy it at any price then it makes sense that the people who will buy it might get a bargain so these things not knowing about it not understanding about it not being willing to buy it not thinking it's it's a professional fiduciary these are the kinds of things that create inefficiency what i call structural inefficiency where are they today almost negligible today you know the believe me 40 50 years ago for those of you who were not practicing this profession then the world was a stupid place nobody knew anything i mean there was all this data and maybe the data existed or maybe it didn't exist but if it existed maybe it was over there maybe you were over there and you had no idea where it was or how to get it or the people had it wouldn't give it to you and today everybody knows everything you know you're out to dinner with your date or your spouse and you have an argument about when a certain movie came out you google it you find out everybody there's no such thing anymore it's not knowing anything and so if today everybody knows about every asset class has data on it and feels they understand it and feels comfortable with it then where are you going to find structural inefficiencies and the answer is it's tough it's really tough and so in my opinion i wrote a memo in january of 14 called getting lucky by the way all the memos unlike the book the the memos are available free i highly recommend that and they're all available at www.oaktreecapital.com under click on insights and you'll see a thing there about the chairman's memos or maybe it says memos from howard marks but so i wrote this memo called getting lucky and i talked about a process i call efficientization which is if inefficiency is really the to sum it up and oversimplify it inefficiency is the result of ignorance and today there's much less ignorance so markets become more efficient over time and i believe most markets have become more efficient over time and it's very hard to find anything that is about which there is ignorance and by the way back in 1978 people would say to me well young man and i was a young man at the time i'm sure you can make a lot of money doing that but it wouldn't be proper it wouldn't be fiduciary now look around this room today anybody will do anything to make a buck so that bias does not exist and that's the bias that gave people like me opportunity 40 years ago and if nobody's if everybody's willing to you know the economist we talk about efficient markets the economy talks about perfect markets economists talk about it and there are certain criteria for perfect markets which are obviously the same and one is knowledge one is objectivity and one is the willingness to substitute so in other words oil and gas will be priced in a standard relationship to each other as long as everybody is willing and able to go from oil to gas and gas to oil they will equilibrate their prices that's what efficient markets do and today people are willing to invest in any market so it's really hard to think of of where you're going to get a free lunch however i do go on in the memo to say that while structural inefficiency is hard to locate from time to time we get cyclical inefficiency which is to say from time to time people lose their objectivity and they value assets too low in which case we can get bargains if we resist the error of their psychology and sometimes they like assets too much the prices are too high and we can make easy money by shorting them if we can resist the error of of the common psychology so i think it's really hard to get find structural inefficiency today from time to time we find cyclical inefficiency and i can't tell you where the dividing line is and it's it's never the same and by the way one of my i'll say competitors uh came out with a very clever statement about four years ago he said everything with the q-sip is overpriced today so what he was saying is that all public securities are overpriced because they're too easy to invest in so but but but by implication private investments are not overpriced but if everybody hears that and everybody responds and everybody dumps their public securities and buys in the private markets then maybe the inflow of capital from the private markets makes the private inves to the private markets makes private investments too expensive and their desertion of the public market makes those two cheap so these there's no uh rule that always stands and when everybody says the secret to getting rich the secret to superior risk adjusted returns is to make private investments if everybody believes it and all the money flows to private investments then it will no longer be underpriced and attractive you
Comments 0