저자: HowardMarks · 외국인
요약 보기
하워드 막스는 2008년 위기 때 리먼 파산 후 시장이 비이성적 공포에 빠졌다고 보고 하락을 매수 기회로 삼아 약 15주간 주당 5억달러씩 분할 매수했다고 회상한다. 가격 하락이 매도 신호가 될 수 없으며, 자신의 분석이 틀릴 수 있다는 겸손과 감정 통제가 중요하다고 강조한다. 당시 매수 대상은 LBO 직후 기업의 선순위 채권으로, 가격이 극단적으로 낮았기 때문이라고 설명한다. 미래 예측은 불가능하나 최악을 대비한 매수 결정이 합리적이었다는 취지다.
다듬은 글
Howard Marx a seasoned investor with a remarkable track record shares his insights and experiences from the tumultuous year of 2008 in this conversation we delve into his mindset during that challenging period when the financial world was on the brink of collapse so let's just dwell on the 2008 experience because that was remarkable actually what o Tre did so Lima just collapsed you had 10 or 11li on the Shelf ready to deploy and you did deploy at the rate of half a billion dollars a week 15 weeks right um and you weren't immediately looking it wasn't immediately looking like you were right because markets were still falling so that was a difficult period And I think you even perhaps had to go back to co-investors to convince them that you should continue perhaps raise more money did you ever have a crisis of confidence and think that perhaps you weren't getting it right um what was what was the the mindset at that time well I Max I I I don't remember having a crisis of confidence uh of course if you buy and then the price goes down and you buy more and the price goes down further if you're not questioning and a little scared then you're a uh but but but uh you know I I think that one of the important things that I have realized and incorporate it into my thinking is that you're never going to get it exactly right sometimes if we're lucky we know what's going to happen we never know when MH and so if you accept that then it kind of gets you off the hook that means you buy today at nine it goes to eight you buy more it go you eight you buy at eight it goes to seven you buy more you don't say oh my God I bought at 9 it went to 8 I must be a and I must be wrong you you you understand the the nature of this and you know Warren Buffett says I like hamburgers uh and when hamburgers go on sale I eat more hamburgers so you know if you if you did an analysis at 9: and if the analysis was sound and it goes to eight you should buy more Howard marks during the 2008 experience maintained a resilient mindset despite facing challenges he acknowledged the uncertainty of Market timing and the inevitability of occasional price declines his approach was to continuously reassess and adjust his Investments based on sound analysis rather than being deterred by short-term fluctuations this pragmatic perspective is in line with war Buffett's analogy of buying more hamburgers when they go on sale uh now of course in our business there's always the question of when does uh resolve uh turn into huus and there's no easy answer uh but it always goes back to it always go back to rechecking your analysis and ultimately to your analysis being correct uh which of course I mean it's your analysis you always think it's correct uh but you have to you have to have be very Vigilant and and you have to believe that it's correct for a good reason uh but you know I wrote a memo you probably since you know them all uh you know I wrote One in I think it was February of 16 called what does the market know and see what what happened is in 16 the market got off to its worst start in history and it was really collapsing old markets and uh so I wrote a memo called on the couch because I I said said that every once in a while the market needs a trip to the shrink and that it was really uh the victim of uh irrational fear so I went on Bloomberg the next day usually when I put out a memo I go on Bloomberg the next morning and uh the hosts kept peppering me and saying well stocks are collapsing isn't that a sell signal isn't that a sell sign so I ran went back to my office and I wrote a memo that day called what does the market know and that this is really a very important concept the market is supposed to be efficient know everything we know it doesn't know everything and I believe there are times when it doesn't know anything and and uh so uh you know I said you can't let falling prices be a sell signal because falling prices are the equivalent of Investments being put on sale how can they be a sale signal if anything they're a Buy Signal uh Etc um so I went through this whole business on that subject and then uh I said and you know what however when we you know uh bought high yield bonds in 1990 when they were collapsing and when we uh sold into the tech bubble in 99 and when we bought uh in the period you're describing Etc uh I I never want to give anybody the impression that we don't do it with trepidation you know you can have if you're if you have great advantages you can have a strong intellect and you can act on the basis of your uh intellectual analysis and you can control your emotion uh but that doesn't make you right and there's always the possibility that you're wrong and we must bear that in mind and and uh so you know and since we're only human when we do these things when we buy in October 08 it terrifies us but if you think about it buying at the low Point has to terrify you Howard Marx emphasizes the importance of staying grounded in rational analysis even when facing extreme Market volatility he highlights the fallacy of considering falling prices as sell signals as they can often indicate buying opportunities he acknowledges that making contrarian investment decisions requires intellectual rigor but doesn't guarantee being right urging caution and humility in decision making his Insight underscores the psychological challenges of buying at Market lows which can be intimidating despite their potential for significant returns I guess there's a sense of and I think you you you said this that having raised the money seeing the valuations that you saw it was a case of if not now then when yeah and that that that well look a couple days at Lima went bankrupt on the 15th and as I recall I put out a memo on something like the 18th in or 19th entitled what now or maybe it was now what but but but uh you know what I said in there by the way believe me if you weren't there it was impossible to figure out what was going to happen it was impossible to prove that the financial system of the world either would or would not collapse you in in general we can't prove anything about the system uh in the future and that's particularly true when we're going through an an event that's never occurred before so there was nothing intelligent to say about the future of the financial system at that time so how what made us buy well number one objectively Speaking the things we were buying were extremely low prices we were buying the senior debt of companies that had been the subject of lbo one or 2 years earlier and we were buying the senior most debt at prices where if the companies turned out to be worth a third or a quarter or a fifth of what these great buyout firms had paid a year earlier we would have broken e and we figured out well and you know who I'm talking about but we said well sometimes like when you go to buy a car and you negotiate with the car salesman you know you say wellow I I probably could have gotten another 5% off right I do you negotiate car prices in this country okay good so so so sometimes you come away and you say I I probably got could could have gotten another 5% off but did you ever say well I probably paid Too High by a factor of four you know I bought that car for 60,000 if IID only negotiated a little I probably could have paid 15 you know so similarly we concluded that the great private Equity firms who had done all that due diligence probably did not overpay by a factor of 3 four or five uh but then the other thing is we reached the conclusion that what I said what I wrote is if we buy today and the financial system falls apart doesn't matter what we did but if we don't buy and the financial system doesn't fall apart then we didn't do our our job so we should buy and that was it it's that's about as profound as it got and reflecting on his actions during the 2008 financial crisis Howard Marx emphasizes the importance of intellectual analysis emotional control and the acknowledgement of uncertainty in investment decisions his perspective serves as a valuable reminder that sometimes in the face of adversity calculated risks can yield significant rewards in the long run
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