저자: BillAckman · 외국인
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공매도와 투자 정보 공개의 필요성을 주장하는 영상. 결론: 공매도 등 반대 의견 공개는 시장 효율성과 투명성에 필수적이며, 이를 억누르는 규제는 문제가 크다. 공매도 발언의 자유와 시장 효율성: 표현의 자유는 가장 중요한 원칙이며, 리스크를 걸고 높은 품질의 분석을 공유하는 것이 효율적인 시장을 만든다. 리먼브라더스 사례: 2008년 David Einhorn이 리먼의 위험을 지적했을 당시 주가는 60달러대였으며, 리먼이 이에 대응해 유상증자를 했다면 투자자 손실을 줄일 수 있었다고 주장. 미디어와 규제 대응: 롱 포지션 투자자의 낙관론은 허용되지만 공매도 측의 비판은 뉴욕타임스의 비판 기사 등으로 이어진다는 불균형을 지적. 정부 당국도 공매도 커뮤니티와 열린 소통 창구를 가져야 한다고 주장. 허위 루머와 정당한 분석의 구분: 허위 루머를 퍼뜨려 이익을 얻는 행위는 처벌해야 하지만, 공개 자료를 분석해 발표하는 것은 정당하다고 봄. 시스템 리스크와 버블: 공매도가 불가능했던 주택시장에서 버블이 생겼고 ABX 지수로 공매도가 가능해지자 버블이 터졌다는 사례 제시. 40:1 레버리지 금융기관은 신뢰에 민감해 취약하다는 경고. 본인 사례와 규제 문제: Ackman은 66페이지 백서를 공개하고 포지션을 밝혔음에도 Eliot Spitzer 및 SEC의 조사를 받았다고 언급. David Einhorn도 2002년 Allied Capital 비판 후 SEC 조사를 받았다고 회고. 경영진과 공매도 세력의 인센티브 비교: 경영진은 자사 주식을 띄우려는 유인이 강하고 롱 포지션을 고를 수 없는 반면, 공매도 투자자는 어떤 기업을 공매도할지 선택할 수 있으므로 정보 제공자의 인센티브를 살펴야 한다고 강조.
다듬은 글
why do we have bubbles why do we have financial institutions that with 40 to 1 leveraged balance sheets we have them because the people who uh because because you couldn't short single-family home prices rising okay right that's why there was a bubble in single family home prices we're seeing the argument in lehman right now about what dangers potentially might exist in very public short selling advocacy against that firm arguably that same could be said for for the bond insurance you you view it as a as a warning sign as opposed to a a takedown can you maybe and you talked a little bit about it publicly but maybe state a little more broadly your views on the necessity of of disclosure or or advocacy on the short side of uh given stocks sure look i think uh free speech is a fairly it's about the most important principle of our country it's kind of number one number two the markets are well served by people who have money at risk who do high quality work frankly sharing that information as widely as possible that's that's what creates efficient markets you know david einhorn i think in november gave a speech in which he talked about his concerns about lehman and lehman stock at the time was in the 60s and had people listen to david when the stock was in the 60s or had lehman listen to david and said you know what this is not a bad time for us to raise some equity at this price and position ourselves better for for perhaps some losses in the portfolio that would have been good for lehman uh wouldn't have been so good for david as a short seller frankly um but it would have protected some investors from from what's happened to those who investors who've owned own stock in the company if you know if you're long and you own a stock you can go into barons you can get on a rooftop you can pump how great your company is and no one for a second looks at you askance but if the same person gets on cnbc not the same person or even you know david einhorn is mostly along as opposed to a short he gets on cnbc he talks about why he thinks mdc home building company is a great company no one thinks twice but if he gets on he says you know look i have some concerns about lima's balance sheet i have some concerns about how they're marking their assets um this is something where the the new york times writes a scathing article about david einhorn doing this and i would think the media of all places the media which is the the force for you know digging up the dirt about what's going on in washington should be very interested and and short should be the best source for the media and frankly they should be if i were i would have given a slightly different answer than bob steele if i were treasury secretary i would say instead of meeting with jim chinos twice a year i would meet with jim channels once a month uh or at least i would have an open door to the short selling community if you have concerns about companies the economy balance sheets et cetera and we want to hear about them and if it's even if it's just simply you know what here's an email box where you can send your submission we'll take it seriously to you know what the ones that are serious but is a subs a substantive danger and a substantive distinction between advocating on the up and advocating on the short side take lehman brothers right you can quibble well right quibble but that might be the right you can argue with the way they presented the information about their assets where they're marking them and so on but you also run the risk of putting that company into serious financial crisis which which has all sorts of effects that you just don't know what's going to end i mean bear stearns is a perfect example so isn't there a substantive distinction that is just more dangerous to the economy at large i'll only distinguish between different types of short selling and disclosure i think if someone spreads rumors that are false right a person should be prosecuted in order to make an investment gain that person should be prosecuted uh if a person goes on cnbc and says based on my analysis of the 10-q on page 12 you know they said that we've got six and a half billion of cdos and before they said this was mortgage-backed securities what's the substantive difference i think that's that's totally acceptable if no legitimate business in my view will go out of business because someone spreads a false rumor about it i think that uh you know if lehman is so vulnerable to the criticisms of a short seller i think it has to think about whether it's it's capitalized correctly you know can you is there a room in the world for a 40 to 1 leverage institution which is so confidence sensitive that a 38 year old short seller can get on cnbc and raise a few concerns and it goes out of business it's a dangerous game to play though especially especially especially when it comes to financially centered stocks where confidence is the coin of the realm here's what i would say what i would say is why do we have bubbles why do we have financial institutions that with 40 to 1 leveraged balance sheets we have them because the people who because because you couldn't short single-family home prices rising okay right that's why there was a bubble in single-family home prices and interestingly only when there was a mechanism to go short housing basically the abx index did the bubble finally burst and so if the whole country is only long on margin we're going to have bubbles after bubbles okay um and systemic risk is created when we have institutions with and i'm not i don't mean to pick on lehman and i'm not i'm not short lehman and i'm not long lehman but uh we want businesses that can withstand the critique of of any investor right uh that's that should you know whether it's a bank or otherwise so by the ackman plan what what are the other means of injecting the short seller ethos or vibe into the markets are there ways we can institutionalize it to create a corrective uh force on look at what happened to me you know i wrote a 66-page white paper it was reviewed by some of the best law firms in the city uh i released it in the most public way i possibly could i disclosed my position it's very important to disclose your position you can't claim to be independent and put out a piece of paper that's where you're not um and then i had to go withstand a six-month investigation by elliot spitzer in a several month investigation by the sec david einhorn criticized allied capital publicly in 2002 and in turn he was investigated by the sec um you know it's okay you know i've got a thick skin but if if this is the regulatory response to someone criticizing a public company particularly an influential one i mean mbia largest guarantor of new york state and city bonds it was a very easy call for them to the treasurer and the call from the treasurer to spencer's office what you want is what you should be thinking about as an investor is what are the incentives of the person giving me the information and the incentives of a management team of a public company are in some sense stronger to promote their stock than the incentives of a short seller you know the short seller is short and management is long the short sale has a choice in which companies he shorts management doesn't have a choice in which company they're along
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