저자: CathieWood/RaoulPal—소속제목·설명미기재,캐시우드·라울팔발언은자막내실명언급기준 · 외국인
요약 보기
연준 관련 CPI·PPI 등 물가지표가 월간 기준 마이너스이며 근원 CPI는 연 2.6% 수준으로 기대보다 낮게 나오고 있다. 재정적자는 GDP 대비 5.6%로 레이건 시절과 유사하며 국방 예산 확대가 주된 원인이다. 일본 정부의 엔화 방어 개입(미 국채 매도)으로 미국채 금리에 하방 압력이 생겼고, M2 증가율은 연 5.6%로 중간 수준이다. 캐시 우드는 AI 인프라 가동률이 높아 버블이 아니며 강세장이 이어질 것이라고 주장하고, 라울 팔은 AI·디지털자산 중심의 유동성 슈퍼사이클을 강조한다. 달러인덱스 전망치는 102.6으로 추가 상승을 예상한다는 내용이 언급된다.
다듬은 글
Overall CPI. It was in June. We will receive July data next week. Minus 0.4. Baseline—zero. These are month-to- month figures. The producer price index for the month is minus 0.3. The personal consumption deflator for June was minus 0.1, and the core deflator was only 0.1. Now, on an annual basis, consumer indices mostly remain within three percent.
Core and overall CPI, overall and core consumption deflator, core CPI—2.6% per year. So, we are still fighting for a two to three percent range for the core figure amid rising oil prices. Hello everyone, welcome to Everyday Finance. Raoul Pal and Katie Wood argue that crypto investors risk being wrong by expecting the next bear market to follow historical four-year cycles, instead noting that the convergence of artificial intelligence, global liquidity, and massive spending on computing infrastructure is ushering in an intelligence supercycle that will drive long-term capital inflows into technology and digital assets through 2026 and beyond.
While skeptics warn that AI has inflated a speculative bubble reminiscent of the dot-com era, Wood emphasizes that modern AI hardware is operating at full capacity alongside increasing global competition, indicating a fundamental structural shift, with bull markets historically thriving by overcoming a “wall of anxiety” rather than suffering from overcapacity.
The federal deficit to GDP is below 5% for the 26th year. Very few people believe this will happen. We are not giving up completely, even though the end of the fiscal year is September. So it's unlikely. However, if the economy starts to grow rapidly, as we expect, despite the unemployment report, technology and productivity will be one of the reasons for this.
We could see the deficit to GDP approach 5%. It is now 5.6%, as you can see here. So, at 5.6%, what's interesting is that this deficit-to- GDP ratio today is the same as it was in the early 80s , when Ronald Reagan was president. We have experienced two recessions in a row and very tight monetary policy, trying to reduce double-digit inflation.
And we ended up with a deficit of 5.6%. I just moved to New York and I remember people blaming " Reaganomics" and Art Laffer because he said, "If you lower taxes, the deficit will go down." Well, he did n't mean to cut taxes for 3 years. He meant to simply lower them. If you lower your rate, and the lowest rate will be in effect in three years.
You will probably postpone receiving income, which is exactly what happened. And that's one of the reasons why we're in a recession. So, we are at the same point now. I mention this because I think we are experiencing a moment of déjà vu. I am writing a letter about this, about the fact that we are returning to the future in the context of "Reaganomics." We have slightly different tax benefits.
They are more for corporations than for individuals, although the latter are also included. And, of course, massive depreciation. Interestingly, the deficit has remained stable , despite huge corporate tax refunds this year. And tax refunds for individuals were significantly higher than expected. Another process that can be seen in this graph: the growth of federal spending is starting to accelerate, largely due to a massive increase in the defense budget.
So the question when looking at this graph is the four-year annual rate of change. That is, it is quite significant. This means that it is starting to have an impact. But again, look at history. We are still at the low end of this historical growth rate, except, it seems , for the period before 2008-09 .
We are still at a low point, and we are seeing continued job cuts in the federal government, as well as at the state and local levels. That was a big part of this month's decline. So when you cut staff and actually increase government productivity , that's good. I think the defense boom is forcing the rest of the government to implement productivity tools like AI.
You see that the green line there has just started to increase at a four-year annual rate of change. And again , you can see in historical context where we were in the 70s. Many thought we were going back to the 70s because of post-COVID events. But that's not true. We... monetary policy did not support this.
In fact, it went completely off the rails. Many business categories: manufacturing, housing, automotive, and so on. So, for now, capital investments have supported the situation. You see, there is no resemblance to the 70s now. We do not consider inflation to be the biggest risk. We believe that deflation is a greater risk for companies that fail to keep up with change and whose products become obsolete or uncompetitive .
How high will the dollar be this year ? Again, the Kensho marketplace that we partner with to develop. You see today that the forecast for the DXY index is 102.6. This indicates that the dollar will continue to rise . And we find that interesting because there's a narrative of, "Oh, all the governments are selling off their Treasuries.
They are actually trying to get out of the dollar. So, we have some graphs on this. From this side, the dollar was pressured by very strong headwinds. Which I'll show you in a minute. But first, I'd like to talk about the yen. Something very important happened to the yen this week. It is now clear that the Japanese government has stated: “We will support the yen by selling treasury bonds.
"And since the beginning of the year, they've sold 5%—almost 5% of their Treasury securities." This week, Finance Minister Bessent, and it was known. It was even on his to-do list. One of them is to intervene on behalf of the yen. But what we didn't know until yesterday, or perhaps even today, was that the intervention consisted of selling the euros we had and buying the yen.
And not in selling dollars. So this tells us a few things. There seems to be some agreement between Japan and the Ministry of Finance not to sell any more Treasury bonds. This put pressure on the yields of our Treasury bonds. And it also shows that Japan is starting to worry about its inflation rate.
Remember, not so long ago they were worried they would never get out of deflation. Well, now they're worried about inflation and don't want the yen to fall any further. Katie Wood and Raoul Pal argue that investors are misjudging current markets through an outdated cyclical lens, failing to see that the massive, unprecedented investment in artificial intelligence and computing infrastructure by leading economies has fundamentally shifted the paradigm.
Rather than being a wake-up call, public and private debt increasingly functions as necessary financing for data centers, advanced chips, and energy capacity, creating a self-reinforcing mechanism where increased computing power drives productivity to service the underlying debt. Comparing this rapid transition to historical infrastructure leaps like rail and electrification, however, it is unfolding at an exponentially faster pace.
Pal argues that while individual companies may fail, the overall intelligence economy will continue its structural expansion, potentially provoking one of the largest liquidity expansions in modern market history in favor of digital assets such as cryptocurrency. So, here you can see a chart of the major sellers of Treasury bonds.
But Japan is almost at the top of the list, selling 5%. There's China, Canada, and Saudi Arabia. I found this interesting because Saudi Arabia actually needs $85 per barrel of oil to finance its budget without resorting to cuts in other areas. So now we see it in the form of Treasury bond sales. So, there was a lot of pressure on long-term profits, but we were never able to get them to the 5% level.
So let's now look at monetary policy in a little more detail. Here, in contrast to the four-year annual rate of change in M2 , we see annual M2 growth of about 5.6. And again, just as a guideline: you can see in historical context that this is not an extreme figure. Um, and that's probably mid- range.
Will it go higher? Maybe it will go. But will this cause CPI-based inflation to continue to rise? We do n't think so. And this brings us back to the topic of inflation: in the last month alone, there have been several surprises when inflation figures have turned out to be lower than expected. We will receive the overall CPI for June, and data for July next week.
Minus 0.4. The base index was zero. It's month to month. Producer price index, month-on- month, minus 0.3. The personal consumption deflator for June was minus 0.1, and the core deflator was only 0.1. Now, on an annualized basis, consumer indices are still mostly holding at three percent. The core and general indices are the CPI, the general CPI, and the core CPI is 2.6% annually.
So, we're still struggling in that two to three percent range for the core figure against the backdrop of the recent rise in oil prices. But why don't we think that the CPI will continue to grow in line with the money supply on an annual basis? First, I just gave you statistics that show that we are starting to see surprises below expectations.
Second, it has to do with the labor force participation rate that I just told you about . As you can see , it drops quite quickly , and I've given you the reasons, the two opposite poles of this spectrum. And that brings us back to the fact that I've always been amazed by the correlation—of course, not causation —between labor force participation rates and the velocity of M2.
When people worry about their future, they tend to cut back a bit on spending and maybe save a little. Although they didn't manage to save much, and I'll get to that a little later. But I still think that this decline in labor force participation —baby boomers are now dependent solely on their retirement income, so they're probably a little more conservative in their spending.
And on the other hand, young people, between the ages of 16 and 24, they're probably a little worried too. And maybe everyone is worried, but we said that the participation rate of the middle- aged working population has increased, so that's good news to some extent. They are the largest contributors of revenue.
So even if the velocity of money slows down just a little, it will not resume its downward trend, despite the fact that the labor force participation rate suggests otherwise. This will mitigate the impact of the money supply growth. So, the speed of 5.6% slows down by 1 %. And thus, in essence, it reaches a plateau.
This will take one percentage point off the strength of that 5.6%. Katie argues that the strongest bull markets are quietly rising, overcoming a wall of fear, and argues that the current widespread skepticism about artificial intelligence points to a healthy, sustained expansion, not a speculative bubble.
Unlike the technology boom of the late 1990s, when vast fiber-optic infrastructure lay unused for years, today's AI GPUs are operating at near full capacity, while global geopolitical competition, particularly between the US and China, is driving relentless investment in computing power. Combined with Raoul Pal's supercycle model, this environment suggests that artificial intelligence, digital assets, and blockchain infrastructure are becoming the main engines of future global economic growth.
Rather than experiencing traditional deep “ cryptowinters,” the market is poised for a multi-year structural expansion, underpinned by rising liquidity, improving productivity, and unwavering national priorities.
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