people장 홈📈 Stock Masters주식 유튜브를 Articles로 읽고 Author의 예측을 실제 가격으로 확인합니다 people장 Board 홈요청하기

한국어 · English

하워드막스

Accuracy score-0.8
순 place154
Scored calls87 calls
Hit rate / Market-adjusted / Return-weighted36.7% / 45.8% / 50.0%
1-month return / Market / beta excess return / Peer excess-1.1% / +0.0% / -0.8
Bullish / Bearish / Neutral12.8% / 21.9% / 65.3%
Best horizon1d
Performance badgeTwo-way badge
Main channelBloomberg Television
국적외
Note
Updated2026-10-28 07:00:00

Main stocks: #미국기술주 (101)#S&P500 (95)#미국채금리 (69)#미국금융주 (19)#나스닥 (8)

How scores are calculated

Howard Marks: How value investing evolved in the past 50 years

The value investing channel · 2022-04-16 · 유튜브 시청 389 · Board Views 8 · International

International

유튜브 썸네일

← 목록

저자: HowardMarks · 외국인

요약 보기

결론: 가치투자는 과거의 공식(저PER·저PBR 싼 기업 매수)에 갇혀서는 안 되며, 정량 정보가 누구에게나 공개된 지금은 질적 통찰과 미래에 대한 우월한 판단으로만 초과수익을 얻을 수 있다. 가치투자의 변화: 과거 가치투자는 성장이 느린 평범한 기업을 낮은 PER·PBR에 사는 방식으로 정리되었다. 하워드 막스의 아들 앤드류는 이런 공식화된 가치투자는 더 이상 통하지 않는다고 주장했다. 과거 환경과 현재 환경: 버핏은 60년 전 1달러를 50센트에 사는 저평가 종목을 쉽게 찾았다. 당시에는 모건 매뉴얼 같은 두꺼운 자료를 수작업으로 넘겨야 했고, 정보에 접근하는 사람이 적었다. 지금은 인터넷과 데이터베이스로 누구나 재무정보를 즉시 얻는다. 정량 정보의 한계: 누구나 아는 정량 정보로는 초과수익을 낼 수 없다. 초과수익을 내려면 다른 사람이 모르는 것을 알거나, 같은 정보를 더 잘 해석하는 능력이 있어야 한다. 정량 정보 기반 알고리즘으로는 이것이 어렵다. 질적 정보와 미래 통찰: 성공의 근거는 정량 정보보다 질적 정보에 대한 더 나은 이해나 미래에 대한 우월한 통찰에 있어야 한다. 막스의 메모도 이 점을 중심으로 다뤘다. 기술 파괴 사례: 과거 워싱턴포스트 등 신문사는 지역 광고·구인·영화 시간 정보를 독점해 해자가 있다고 여겨졌지만, 인터넷이 등장하며 이 해자가 무너졌다. 기술 영향을 받지 않는 기업은 거의 없다는 뜻이다. 열린 마음의 필요: 성장주는 사지 않는다거나 기술주는 사지 않는다는 식의 라벨에 얽매이면 안 된다. 매력적인 가격이라면 높은 PER·PBR 기업도 포트폴리오에 포함할 수 있어야 한다. 버핏의 말처럼 우리는 성장투자자나 가치투자자가 아니라 투자자일 뿐이다. 편향 극복: 투자자는 자신의 역사와 편향을 극복해야 하며, 이것이 메모의 또 다른 주제였다. 구체 종목·지수 가격 전망: 발언에 특정 자산의 1~3개월 방향 예측은 없다.

다듬은 글

※ 자동 자막 원문(다듬기 전)

01. my son we lived together for months during the pandemic his family moved in with us and we had great head-to-head uh discussions especially about growth investing and you know he believes that you know something called value investing has grown up and become uh to use one word theologized you know very form formulaized and and uh what does it say it says that well the value investor invests rather in mundane companies usually slow growing usually the because they're slow growing a lot of the merit is here in the present not too much of the argument depends on what exists in the future um thus they're predictable quantifiable um and but because they're not such wonderful companies vis-a-vis their glowing futures uh they don't sell at high p e ratios or high price to book their bargains so that's that's what value investing in quotes has grown into and andrew says you can't invest that way anymore because you know buffett used to be 50 60 years ago buffett used to be able to he he says he made a lot of money buying dollars for 50 cents and you could buy dollars and 50 cents because everybody else was ignorant uh that there were that there were 50 cent dollars out there so he would go around the country and pick up these 50 cent and you know just imagine you it's hard i'm sure it's hard for you people uh to imagine but imagine no computers imagine no online no internet no data sources no fees no databases no no screening programs and everything was done manually so if you wanted to find i talked about this in the i wrote a memo called something of value in march talking about this experience i'm sorry january and you know if you wanted to study a company you want to study general motors believe it or not you had to write to the company and request the annual report and then a few weeks later it would come in the mail and if you want to then say well i'd like to compare this with ford then you would have to write to ford and a few weeks later you get there and it was very slow and laborious and a few people had access to these things through the public library but not too many and so buffett would sit in his back room in omaha with moody's manual which was this book this thick literally this thick i would say eight inches thick with thousands of pages of the thinnest possible paper and they had the financials of every public company in america so if you had nothing to do and a lot of patience you would sit there and go like this page through and then eventually you say oh here's a company that you can buy for less than the cash on the books let's go a little further say oh here's a company selling at one times earnings etc so but not many people did it because not people not many people knew how to make money in the stock market or knew about the existence of these bargains so buffett would find them and take advantage but now if you think about it now the world is an intelligent place uh and every well not intelligent let's say people know more intelligence is different from knowing stuff but but you know everybody knows everything and there's no facts that are not in evidence and uh you know if i'm if i'm at dinner and somebody says oh who hit the most home runs in 1987 i can tell you like that used to take an hour or a day or something and so what andrew argued was that the the readily available current quantitative information is in everybody's hands and if it's available to everybody then clearly by definition it can't be the route to superior performance in order to have spirit forms you you have to know something others don't know you have to either have facts they don't have the sec has the goal of making sure everybody has all the same facts or you have to have a superior ability to interpret that but chances are you're not the only smart person who's trying so it's not even clear you can get an edge that way so andrew says you can't base investment success on currently available quantitative information it has to be your superiority has to come through uh either a better understanding of the qualitative information which by definite in my opinion by definition can't be the result of an algorithm or superior insight with regard to the future and that's what the memo was mostly about and you know there's a great quote from buffett he says we are not growth investors or value investors we're investors and so the trouble is when things get labeled then they get narrowly defined you have to i think to be an investor in the coming decades you have to be broad-minded and you have to say i'll buy anything at an attractive price and you know so for the last 30 years investors value investors have been saying we don't buy fast growing companies we don't buy tech these are we we don't buy anything with a high p e but what can you buy today that's not if reliant on tech you know i mean 20 years ago or so uh you know buffett made a ton of money in the washington post and other newspapers and that they were they they were moated they could not be disrupted by technology because every town had a newspaper you needed a newspaper it's the only place that the that the used car lot would advertise the only place you could look to get the movie times it's the only place that that employers could advertise jobs they had available and the the newspaper from the next town wouldn't do because they had they didn't have the locally relevant information so each newspaper had a mode and was defensible and then guess what the internet came along and on the internet you can find all the jobs in your town and the next town and the next city and the next country you don't need a newspaper anymore for that and the newspapers have been horribly disrupted and um uh you know many of them struggling they only got it they got a life life preserver when trump became president because he was so controversial that people were reading more the newspapers more but other than that it just it just shows you that there's very little which is immune from technological influence so uh so the argument is you have to be broad-minded you can't say we do this but we don't do that and and you have to be it rather than buying mundane companies at low prices you have to be open to buying good companies at high prices and you know uh buffett there's another quote where buffett says something like you know it's not clear that low p e low price to sales low price to book is it carries the carries the the secret of of high performance and it's not clear that that the high price to book high p e ratio high price of sales should be excluded uh from portfolios and i think that that's what the memo was mostly all about it was also about trying to overcome our inherent biases uh and our histories uh history is very important because it makes us who we become and uh and so i'm trying to do that now

원문 보기 · 글 내려 주세요 신청

← List으로
공유페이스북밴드

이 Articles에 대해 요청(숨김) 수정 요청

Comments 0