저자: OaktreeCapital공동창업자HowardMarks · 외국인
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Howard Marks는 시장이 과열되어 위험을 줄여야 할 시점이라고 경고하지만, 당장 시장 붕괴를 예측하지는 않는다고 설명한다. 핵심 주장: 투자자들이 돈을 많이 벌고 있을 때가 경고할 때이며, 낮은 금리가 모든 자산의 밸류에이션을 부풀렸다. 리스크가 높은 행동과 높은 가격이 관찰되며, 특정 자산보다는 시장 전반의 투자 심리(행동)를 문제로 본다. 근거 지표: 신용 스프레드가 매우 좁고, 변동성은 낮으며, 하이일드 시장이 비싸졌다. 2000년 기술주 경고와 2005년 경고가 있었고, 현재는 경제 성장이 완만하여 경제 붕괴가 임박했다고 보지는 않는다. 종목 언급: FAANG 주식은 나쁜 투자라기보다 강세장의 징후로 언급됐고, 밸류에이션 하락 추세지만 여전히 높다고 봤다. 넷플릭스 채권(3.58%)은 위험 대비 수익이 낮다고 지적했다. 소프트뱅크 비전펀드의 자본 구조(부채 62%, 자기자본 38%)는 리스크가 불리하다고 평가했다. 조건/리스크: 현금이나 헤지 등 안전자산을 선호하되 완전 매도는 아니며, 투자는 흑백이 아니라 위험도 조절의 문제라고 설명했다. 아울러 Oaktree는 완전 투자 상태를 유지하면서 평소보다 높은 신중함을 적용하고 있다. 출연자 전망: 장기 투자자 중심의 고객 구조 덕분에 단기 성과 부진을 감내할 수 있다고 봤다. 최종적으로 투자자가 위험을 기꺼이 받아들이고 안전을 무시하는 시기가 가장 큰 우려 대상이라고 강조했다.
다듬은 글
you have a flare for writing memos and in your latest memo you do what few people have the courage to do particularly at a time when everyone's making so much money in financial markets you've sounded a warning why well first of all Eric the time to sound the warning is when everybody's making a lot of money because that means the Market's going up up up enthusiasm is Incorporated in prices and behavior and you know you can't sound a warning after the thing has turned over died uh so I think that we see a market in which uh there are lots of uncertainties prospective returns are low asset prices are high and people are engaging in Risky behavior and that is the kind of climate in which we should uh take a hard look at what we're doing and I think uh reduce risk there are lots of people who want to keep making money what kind of push back have you gotten well here's a shocker for you Eric I want to keep making money too but I don't I try not to deceive myself about the ability to do that uh this memo has gotten some of the most response of any in history uh and uh I would say 90 odd percent favorable but some some strong unfavorables and what do those people have to say well um one of them who I've seen on TV this morning says Howard Mark says it's time to get out I absolutely do not say it's time to get out I don't say anything about getting out uh I say it's a time for caution um one of them said now is no better time for caution than any other time and and in fact uh there is no better time for cash or for Hedges uh etc etc and no worse time that we can perceive in other words it's it's impossible to uh correctly put risk on or take risk off it's we should always uh uh act as if we don't know that sounds like a recipe for disaster well uh not for disaster but I would say for uh merely mortal performance uh if I mean if I think if if you want to perform uh at an above aage level one of the things you have to do is to use your parlament put risk on at some point in time and take it off at some point in time rather than be consistent in that regard there are better and worse times for aggressiveness and for conservatism so let's touch on that point for a moment you have rung the alarm Bell before yes in 2000 yes a very timely ringing of the bell in 2005 which as you yourself have acknowledged was a bit early right does the need to reduce risk feel any more urgent to you now than it did then um well I I I I thought that you know in 2000 my comment was not about the stock market it was about the tech stocks and I thought that was much more urgent than today I mean they really looked offbeat in those days uh in 05 uh it wasn't quite so urgent but then of course the market had another two years to run at which time it became emergent so uh you know I wouldn't describe it as urgent today uh the economy is still clipping along at a modest pace and likely to do so there has not been an economic boom so I don't think there has to be an economic bust and certainly not anytime soon I'm I'm merely commenting so I'm not really commenting so much on the fundamentals I'm commenting on investor behavior and uh asset prices okay so many of the conditions that you describe in your memo are reflective uh or indicative yes of an overheated Market or at least a market that is on its way to being overheated among them right Rich valuations low volatility super stocks like the fangs the popularity of ETFs the reach for yield those conditions Howard have been in place for months if not quarters if not years so what changed why now Eric it's there's no magic it's just the accumulation of of uh of things you know uh uh I once read uh where a journalist said I gather string you know I I gather string I I I uh I I gather anecdotes about high valuations and about behavior my son Andrew brings these things to my attention and we talk about him and I think just just enough Accu accumulated so it's a it's a got feeling yes there's no magic there's no and there's no uh quantitativeness doeses anything in particular Howard strike you as most vulnerable or most dangerous right now absolutely not Eric I think it's evenly spread about uh the the the main cause for all of this is uniform and applies to everything and that is the low level of uh interest rates uh low interest rates cause for inflated valuations of everything and by being so unappealing to investors on safe instruments they push everybody out the yield curve to do risky things the real question is how do you make a good return in a low return World okay so how do you do that well what what what out there offers the appropriate mix of risk and reward right now there is no magic there is no magic well how should be something well no I mean let me let me float a few ideas yes right um credit spreads are awfully tight yes you might say that things are getting expensive in the high yield Market yes is an investor better off today safer buying an investment grade Bond than a high yield Bond or is he better off buying treasuries or agencies well I mean that's the dilemma and that's why there's no easy answer today you you're safer buying a treasury that yields one or two but high yield yields five or six and you may have to wait a few years before the treasury turns out to have been the right thing to do in which case you passed by 8 12 points of yield I know it's not easy but the reason people are watching us having this conversation is because they too are struggling trying to figure out what to do so let's give them a few ideas okay the only thing I'm confident about Eric is that within every strategy and Market Niche whether it's high yield or or Emerging Market debt or equities there are riskier and less risky things to do and at this point I would be moving toward the less risky um somebody said on TV recently about me it's time to get out I don't say it's time to get out but and many investors can they have to be invested exactly and somebody said there are no better and worse times for caution but I don't agree with you you don't agree there are better times for caution and this is one so you should be moving in the investing is not black or white in or out risky or safe when behavior is risky and prices are high and the market has been doing well for a long time it's time to be shifting your portfolio in the direction of caution is that what Oak Tre is doing yes yes we have we have we are fully invested uh in every currently investing vehicle but we are applying an unusually high level of caution and we consider ourselves cautious investors and we are doing more than usual will oak tree investors have the patience Howard for underperformance if your warning and the caution that results from it proves to be too early well Eric that's a great question uh I believe so you know why because when they sign on we tell them if the market cooks and every and the and and you get into a climate where the people who take the most risk are making the most money it won't be us and our clients are in intelligent clients and they self- select the ones who come to us are the ones who say I don't necessarily want to make the whole return on the market when it does well I want to be protected in The Bad Times Howard at one point in this memo you call the fee structure around soft bank's Vision fund hundred billion doll Vision fund questionable yes is that fair well it's not really the fee structure it's the capital structure it's if you want to put $100 into that fund 62 of it has to go into debt and 38 into Equity so you only if if they make good Tech Investments and and produce a high return you only get that high return on 38% of your money okay but I think you're taking substantial risk on all your money I don't know their portfolio I don't know what they're going to do I don't know the but one of the things they might do is buy Charter for $65 billion uh and is that a is that a wise use of capital I don't know the situation well enough and I would never say on your show whether it is or not but the point is you have you have upside on 38 I believe you have downside on more than 38 so the the calculus is weighted against you if you were to look at every capital and fee structure on every oak tree fund that has ever existed could you say with confidence that that none of them in retrospect was ever questionable well you know we get on our closed end funds we get 20% of the profits um we but we have a hurdle rate we have to make 8% before we come in for our 20% the clients have to make 8% net of fees so I think it's fair to them you know you can all look incentive fees carried interest has been the story of the investment business in the last 30 years you can always complain about it you can say well is it fair to get carried interest and should it be 20 as opposed to 15 or or 30 but I don't think it's unfair as long as number one you get paid on multi-year performance not one year and number two there's a hurdle rate what about the Fang stocks they too Merit special mention in your memo yes and it appears that you have some concerns about the momentum behind the Fang stocks the amount of money that people are pouring into them if if we were to measure them on the basis of valuation yeah and we use the price to forward earnings right the valuation has been coming down for most of those stocks well they're doing some the ones that have earnings are doing well earnings wise so the valuations are coming down I think they're still high I think they still embody a lot of optimism Eric my point about the fangs was not that they are bad Investments individual or that they're overvalued it was that the the anointment of one group of superstocks is indicative of a bull market you can't have a group treated like the fangs have been treated in a ctitious pessimistic sober Market uh so uh that should not be read as a complaint about that group but rather indicative of all the things you highlight in the memo we've covered a number of them the Fang stocks the vision fund ETFs Emerging Market debt skinny spreads and credit single out one for me what's the one that concerns to the most I'm going to single out too although that's probably an oxymoron when you use the word single Netflix bonds at 3 and 58 per.
you know you go to a a video store you rent a video some of the videos give you a choice of an ending which is the good ending for that Bond the best ending is you make three and 58% how good is that at a time when high your bond pay 5 and a half this is a company that chewes up capital and all when you buy a straight Bond the coupon is the best you can do all the other endings are worse so I think the fact that people will buy a 3 and 58% bond from as growthy a company as as Netflix is one and the other of course is the fact that Argentina emerging from bankruptcy can issue 100-year bonds they've had five devaluations in the last 100 years what's the chance they get through the next 500 years without a devaluation debt repudiation coup uh or Scandal uh so it it's all about Investors willingness to take risk as opposed to insisting on safety and when people are highly willing to take risk and not concerned about safety that's when I get worried
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