저자: JeremyGrantham · 외국인
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결론: 현재 시장은 역사상 가장 광범위한 자산 버블 상태이며, 비관론이 확산되면 부의 체감 가치가 과거보다 훨씬 크게 무너질 수 있다. 버블 규모 비교: 2000년 닷컴 버블은 펫닷컴 등 수천만~수억 달러 규모였으나 현재는 수십억~수백억 달러 규모의 투기 광풍과 밈 투자가 나타나고 있다. 하락 과정 설명: 2000년 3월 고점 이후 펫닷컴과 인터넷주는 약 80% 하락했고, TMT 버블 붕괴로 산업 전체가 약 50% 떨어졌다. 그동안 S&P는 횡보했으며, 이후 시장 전체가 2년간 약 50% 하락했고 나스닥은 82% 하락했다. 1929년에도 시장은 펀더멘털이 나쁘다고 여겨질 때가 아니라 열광이 최고조일 때 고점을 찍었다. 연준 비판: 그린스펀·버냉키·옐런은 자산 효과로 경제를 도왔다고 공을 주장했으나 버블 붕괴의 역효과에 대해서는 책임을 지지 않았다. 연준은 자산 버블을 제대로 다루지 못했다. 현재 자산별 평가: 채권 시장은 역사상 가장 비싸고(Jim Grant 등은 4천 년 중 최고 고평가로 봄), 미국 주식시장은 역사상 가장 고평가된 수준이다. 주택시장은 3주 전 기준 중위 가구소득 대비 배수가 2006년 버블 정점과 같아졌고, 원자재(골드만삭스 비에너지 지수: 식품·금속)는 2011년 슈퍼사이클 정점과 같은 수준에 도달했다. 즉 자산 3.5개가 동시에 버블 상태인 것은 처음이다. 쉴러 교수 반론에 대한 반박: 금리 대비 주식이 싸 보인다는 주장은 행동경제학적 설명일 뿐 정당화가 아니다. 채권이 역사상 가장 비싸므로 상대적으로 덜 비싸 보이는 것은 아주 위안이 되지 않는 근거다. 과거 교훈: 1989년 일본 증시는 PER 65배까지 올랐고 '100배도 정당하다'는 논리가 나왔지만 이후 붕괴는 우주적 규모였으며 아직도 회복하지 못했다. 버블이 클수록 정당화 논리는 정교해지고 하락은 더 길고 고통스럽다. 시장 전망: 긴 횡보장에서 실적이 괜찮고 종목 교체가 이뤄지면 무난하게 끝날 수도 있으나, 시장은 긴 횡보를 혐오하며 대개 예상보다 훨씬 크게 오르거나 떨어진다. 그는 길게 버티며 횡보할 것이라는 희망은 대개 실현되지 않는다고 본다.
다듬은 글
foreign of pessimism the potential unraveling in terms of perceived wealth is much greater this time than it will have ever been before I think since I said that we could take out the rivaling 1929 and 2000 I think we've gone way past that there are examples of large-scale craziness and meme investing etc for which there is simply no parallel in 1929 even or 2000 2000 had pet.coms and they were kind of glorious but they were scores of millions or a few hundred million we have crazy things now that are billions and in some cases tens of bills and we were the most impressive speculation I think there is nothing like that at scale even adjusted for current dollars in 1929 and we are down 80 percent which is a fairly fearful decline but along with us the next tier of speculative stocks also came down the SPAC index is down over 20 percent the market is a self-correcting mechanism that it's a little wonky in the time tanks sometimes it corrects pretty quickly and sometimes it corrects incredibly slowly and that's the problem but if you go back to 2000 which is the previous leader in speculation let's say what happened there is the market peaked in March of 2000 and uh between March and September the pet.com's basically went out of business the internet stocks basically went down 80 but the whole.com the whole TMT Bubble Burst and the industry which had been 30 of the market declined by 50 the s p was unchanged and you could have said during that five month six month window oh isn't that healthy they're selling the flakiest pet.coms and uh they're buying a Coca-Cola what's not to like about that that's exactly what happened and I like to think of them as the kind of pessimism termites they add through the craziest first and then the junior growth stocks and then the intermediate growth stocks and then finally Cisco which was for eight minutes or so the biggest company in the world by market cap and they were all down collectively 50 the balance of the market was up 17 so that looked incredibly healthy but then the termites reached the broad market and the entire 70 rolled over and fell 50 in two years and the NASDAQ was down 82 the thing about the underpinnings is they always look terrific in 1929 the market didn't Peak when they thought the underpinnings were terrible they peaked when the Market's enthusiasm for the underpinnings was approximately the highest it had ever been in history in 2000 in March the world uniformly including the boss of the Federal Reserve Allen Greenspan they all thought the system had never been better at the top of the housing bubble in 07 banagi and the boys thought the U.S housing market had never declined unquote it merely back to the strong U.S economy the underpinnings were great they have never gotten it right the Federal Reserve in particular has never had a clue about asset bubbles it doesn't even address it they act as if they don't exist except on the upside they occasionally take credit for the wealth effect helping the economy along and it does there is an income effect and it does help the economy alone and Greenspan Bernanke and Yellen all took credit explicitly for helping the economy along what they never did is they never took discredit for the reverse side the market has been reverting mechanism and eventually it goes back to a fair price and when it went back in 2001 2002 it had a dreadful negative income effect when the housing market collapsed and it took the equity Market with it it had a double pronged negative effect on the economy so it had a much bigger impact on the economy than had occurred in 2000 and this time we're really playing with fire because this time unlike 2000 we have an overpriced bond market Jim Grant would argue the most overpriced in four thousand years we have in my opinion and that of many other bubbles students the most overpriced U.S Equity Market in history we have a housing market that three weeks ago reached the same multiple of median family income as it did in 2006 at the peak of the housing bubble and we have Commodities that have recently run amok so that the Goldman Sachs index of non-energy which is food and metals which are pretty important have just equaled the peak of 2011 which was said to be one of the super cycle commodity events so this is the first time we've ever risked three and a half asset classes bubbling at the same time if and when we reach a period of pessimism the potential unraveling in terms of perceived wealth is much greater this time than it will have ever been before you quoted Robert Schiller Nobel prize-winning Economist about the fact that he said that even though his indices are showing the market at extreme valuations that really compared to the bond market which as you said is very expensive stocks don't seem so overpriced what is your response to those kinds of arguments I think the interest rate argument is an explanation of how we get there in behavioral terms it is not by any stretch of the imagination of justification you don't justify anything by taking the most overpriced asset in the history of man the bond market I'm saying compared to that we are merely very overpriced and therefore relatively cheaper that is very cold comfort the Solomon Brothers an important firm at the time in 1989 sent around a head Squad justifying the Japanese stock market which was approaching 65 times earnings we were told at the time the data was represented as 65 times earnings that's had never previously sold over 25 and so that was to say the least The Real McCoy and this team went around pointing out that the raids in Japan were so low that 100 PE would be fair of course the collapse that followed in land and bonds and and stars was Cosmic in 1989 and it still hasn't recovered it still hasn't reached the 1989 level in either their real estate market or their stock market which reminds us of the cardinal rule and that is the bigger the bubble the most ingenious the arguments and the bigger the bubble the most extended and painful the decline this is the most broad as I said asset bubble of all time with three and a half of the four major asset classes clearly in severe bubble territory thinking that you have no alternative but pick between one of the four bubbles is a pretty Grim way to view life I get the argument so pick a bubble they'll all go together probably and you will suffer a lot of pain and the intellectual content of that argument that they were all bubbles so we had to pick the least bad one we'll um resonate in your heads as the market unravels if you had a dozen to 15 years of flat Market with earnings doing okay and rotation within the market everything would work out fine and every portfolio manager I almost ever met has felt in market bubbles that that could happen it just right it does the market abhors long sideways movements as we all know it either goes up more than you think or down more than you think you can always hold out hope for an extended sideways movement but it never seems to arrive let
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