저자: CharlieMunger · 외국인
요약 보기
뮤추얼펀드·현대 포트폴리오 이론은 쓸모없다는 주장. 훌륭한 기업 3개면 충분하며 50개 분산보다 안전하고 수익도 높다. 코카콜라·질레트처럼 변화가 적고 강력한 브랜드·유통망을 가진 기업에 집중하고, 변화 예측이 어려운 산업은 피해야 한다. 해외 매출 비중이 큰 기업을 간접적으로 보유하는 것도 장점으로 언급.
다듬은 글
What is taught in modern corporate finance courses is twaddle. Do you want to elaborate on that, Charlie? Three wonderful businesses is is more than uh it's more than you need in this life to do very well. And uh the average the average person isn't going to run into that. I mean, if you look at how the fortunes were built in this country, uh they weren't built out of a portfolio of 50 companies.
They were they were built by someone who who uh identified with this with a wonderful business. Coca-Cola is a great example. A lot of fortunes have been built on that. And there aren't 50 Coca-Cas, you know, there aren't 20. If there were, it'd be fine. We could all go out and diversify like crazy among that group and and get results that would be equal to owning the really wonderful one.
you're not going to find it. And uh and the truth is you don't need it. I mean, if if you have a really wonderful business is very well protected against against the vicissitudes of the economy over time and and and competition. I mean, you know, we're talking about businesses that are resistant to effective competition.
And three of those will be better than a hundred average businesses. Uh uh and and they'll be safer, incidentally. I mean they there is less risk in owning three easy to identify wonderful businesses there than there is in owning 50 uh well-known big businesses and uh uh it's amazing what has been taught over the years in finance classes about that but uh uh I can assure you that that uh I would rather pick if if I had to bet the next 30 years on the fortunes of uh of my family that would be dependent upon the income from a given group of businesses.
I would rather pick three businesses from those we own than own a diversified group of 50. Charlie. Yeah. What he's saying is that what is taught in modern corporate finance courses is twaddle. You cannot believe this stuff. I mean it it's a modern portfolio theory and yeah it's it's it has no utility but I mean it it you know it will tell you how to do average but you know I I I I think u anybody can figure out how to do average in fifth grade.
I mean, it it's just not that difficult. And it's it's elaborate and, you know, there's lots of little Greek letters and all kinds of things that make you feel that you're in the big leagues, but it uh there is no value added. I have great difficulty with it because I am something of a student of dementia and I have we hang around a lot together.
I can ordinarily classify dementia, you know, on some uh theory structure of models, but the modern portfolio theory uh it involves a type of dementia I just can't even classify. Something very strange is going on. If you find if you find three wonderful businesses in your life, you'll get very rich.
And and if you understand them, bad things aren't going to happen to that those three. I mean that that's the characteristic of it. Uh by the way, maybe that's the reason there's so much dementia. If you believe what Warren said, you could teach the whole course in about a week. Yeah. And the high priest wouldn't have any edge over the lay people.
And that that never sells well, right? But I'm thinking about not only Microsoft but say Fizer and J&J uh all three companies which have already proven that not only do they have a a great product uh proven management over 10 to 15 years great market share positions which are not easy to get into and I frankly don't see a big difference on in the PE ratios for example if you say Coca-Cola uh or you know against Johnson Johnson or Fizer which are very powerful companies.
I wonder if either or both of you would address that question again. Charlie, why don't you if you have something you think you understand that looks very attractive to you, uh we think it's smart to do what you understand. If we'd been unable to find companies, if we'd been unable to find companies, slender talents, we well might have been in to it.
We don't sneer at it. Other people with more talent have found that a wonderful course of action. We we we generally look at businesses we feel change works is is likely to work against us. We we do not have great ability. We we do not think we have great ability to predict the uh where change is going to lead.
We think we have some ability to find businesses where we don't think change is going to be very important. Now, at a Gillette, the product is going to be better 10 years from now than now or 20 years from now, than 10 years from now. You saw those earlier ads going back to the going back to the blue blade and all that.
The blueb blade seemed great at the time, but they they keep the shaving technology gets better and better, but you know that Gillette, although they had that little experience with Wilkinson in the early 60s, but you know that Gillette is basically going to be spending many multiples the money on on developing better shaving systems than exist now compared to anyone else.
You know, they got the distribution system. They you they got the believability. If they bring out a product and they say this, they got the distribution system, they you they got the believability. If they bring out a product and they say this, this is something that when they said to women uh to look at it uh in the shaving field, they wouldn't they don't have they wouldn't have that same credibility someplace else, but in the shaving field, they have it.
Those are assets that that can't be built and they're very hard to destroy that. Uh uh so change we think we know in a general way what the soft drink industry or the shaving industry or the candy business is going to look like 10 or 20 years from now. We think Microsoft is a sensational company run by the best of managers but we don't have any idea what that world is going to look like in 10 or 20 years.
Now if you're going to bet on somebody that is going to see out and do what we can't do ourselves I'd rather bet on Bill Gates than anybody else. But that I don't want to bet on anybody else. I mean, in the end, we want to understand ourselves where we think a business is going. And if if somebody tells us the business is going to change a lot in Wall Street, they love to tell you that, you know, that's great opportunity.
They don't think it's a great opportunity when Wall Street itself is going to change a lot, incidentally. But, but they, you know, it's a great opportunity. We don't think it's an opportunity at all. I mean, we we it scares the hell out of us because we don't know how it's going to how things are going to change.
We are looking, you know, when people are chewing chewing gum, we we have a pretty good idea what how they chewed it 20 years ago and how they'll chew it 20 years from now. And we don't really see a lot of technology going into the art of the chew, you know, but so that as and as long as we don't have to make those other decisions, why in the world should we?
I mean, you know, if I at uh all kinds of things we don't know and so why go around trying to bet on things we don't know when we can bet on the simple things we are indirectly in all of these emerging markets through Coca-Cola and Gillette. So it isn't true that we're totally absent. No. Well, at Coca-Cola, the international markets are 80% of of profits.
Actually, a little more. Gillette uh uh I think they're about 70% or so. So the uh we love the international aspects of the Coca-Cola or Gillette businesses and and that's a that's a very major attraction but the management of those companies is focused on that. But they are doing they have distribution systems and they have they have recognition and they've got a lot of going for them over there and they're but the the beauty of it is that they're maximizing what they do have going for them which was not the case uh 20 years ago.
They just sort of let it go more by default and they started fooling around with a lot of diversification and you know basically that has not worked that well. So we we we like focus. We love focus. Yeah. and doing it indirectly as we've done uh one can argue that uh we thereby do it a lot better. We won't explore the implications of that.
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