Warren Buffett & Charlie Munger on the state of Japan's economy (1999)

요약 보기

1999년 일본 경제 불안이 글로벌 경제와 미국 증시에 미칠 영향을 묻는 질문에 대한 답변 영상이다. 결론: 두 사람은 거시경제 예측에는 자신이 없다고 밝히며, 일본 문제가 이미 수년간 지속돼 와 추가 영향은 제한적이라고 본다. 거시 예측에 대한 입장: 버핏은 거시 요인을 예측하지 않으며, 내일 무엇을 사고팔지 결정할 때 일본 경제를 고려 요인으로 두지 않는다고 말한다. 개별 기업의 사업성에 집중한다는 입장이다. 투자 원칙: 10~20년 관점에서 사업이 옳다면 거시 변수는 문제가 되지 않고, 사업 판단이 틀리면 거시 요인이 구제해주지 못한다고 강조한다. 1972년 Sees Candies 인수 사례를 들어 1973년 오일쇼크 등 거시 충격과 무관하게 이익이 크게 성장했다(세전 이익 400만 달러 → 작년 6,200만 달러)는 점을 예로 든다. 일본 경제 분석: 멍거는 일본이 케인즈식 정책(제로금리, 대규모 재정적자)에도 장기 침체를 벗어나지 못한 점이 경제학자들에게 흥미로운 사례라고 본다. 원인으로는 토지·주식 가격의 극단적 버블, 회계 관행의 부패, 금융(은행 포함) 규제의 문제를 꼽고, 회계·규제 체계의 허점과 시장의 어리석음이 중요한 교훈이라고 말한다. 통화정책 논의: 단기금리가 0%에 가까워도 일본 경제가 살아나지 않는 점은 고전적 케인즈 이론과 맞지 않는 측면이 있다고 평가한다. 1930년대 미국도 금리를 크게 낮췄으나 같은 문제를 겪었고, 당시 미국의 번영은 주가 상승에 따른 이른바 '자산효과(wealth effect)'와 관련이 있을 수 있다고 본다. 출연자 전망: 특정 자산에 대한 1~3개월 가격 방향 예측은 없으며, 장기적 기업 가치 중심의 견해만 제시한다.

다듬은 글

※ 자동 자막 원문(다듬기 전)

01. good morning my name is Bob Brewer and I'm from down the road in Lincoln Nebraska I just wanted to ask you how you think the continuing economic turmoil in Japan is likely to affect the global economy and the US stock market over the next five to ten years well Charlie and I are no good on those macro questions but I would say this I mean that the Japan problem has been around now in financial markets and banking system song have been around for some time now so I see no reason why it should have more impact on the rest of the world now than a than it has had in the last few years and I would say it's had certainly very little effect on the u.s.

02. in the last few years and it's not it's no factor in our in our thinking at all in terms of what we would buy or sell tomorrow morning I mean if if we got offered a good business tomorrow unless it was directly involved I'm his primary business was in Japan but if it was a business in this country that's not something that we would be thinking about we would be thinking about the specifics of that business we don't really get too concerned about the things that that come and go I mean in the end if we're right about a business over a 10 or 20 year per mistake cease candy we bought it in 1972 look what happened in 1973 and for you know and all the oil shocks and what this country was going through and inflation all that sort of thing thrust it let's say and let's say in since 1972 somebody laid out a roadmap from 1972 to 1982 with the prime rate going to 21 and a half percent long-term rates going to 15 percent and all of the things happening the Dow going to 570 or what are 561 and that wasn't the important important thing was that this peanut brittle tastes like it does which is terrific and that over time we can get a little more money for it so you know seas made four million dollars pre-tax in 1972 when we bought it it made 62 million last year it doesn't we don't want to be thinking about the wrong things when we're buying businesses and that applies to marketable securities just as much as it does is when we're buying a hundred percent of the business if we're right about the business the macro factors aren't going to make any difference you know and if we're if we're wrong about the business macro factors are not going to bail us out charlie yeah I think what's interesting in Japan is interesting to Juan as a as a citizen here's a major industrial country and they understand all about Keynesian economics and everything else and when it starts sliding down and do a big recession it just keeps going and going and floundering and staying down and you're follows here and you take the interest rates down to practically zero when you run a big budget deficit the economy still stays down I think this has been very interesting to the economists of the world I don't think any of them would have predicted that it's modern a country as Japan could could contract for as long as it as it did and I think the cause is related to the extremeness of its booms in both land prices and security prices and the corruption in its accounting practices and in its regulation of financial system including banks I think it's an interesting lesson for the world of how important it is not a lot of slop get into the end of the accounting and regulatory systems and a lot of folly in markets doesn't help either sort of fascinating too you know people keep saying well why doesn't Japan stimulate wit they got short-term rates down to zero and long-term rates at 2% well that would stimulate me but it that it's sort of as Charlie says it sort of defied a little bit some of the the classical Keynesian theory on that but in the 30s we had the same problem in this country we drove interest rates way down and toward the latter half of the 30s and and I would argue that probably the extreme prosperity in America is related to this so-called wealth effect with stock markets going up and up and and I think people thought that was a smaller factor than maybe it is you