저자: WarrenBuffett·CharlieMunger · 외국인
요약 보기
버핏과 멍거는 공식적인 할인율(discount rate)을 쓰지 않는다고 말하며, 대신 정부채 금리를 기준선으로 삼고 그보다 훨씬 높은 현금 수익률을 요구한다고 설명한다. 할인율 개념에 대해서는 정부채 금리가 2%라면 3~3.5% 기대수익의 사업은 사지 않으며, 금리가 4.75%라면 그보다 상당히 높은 수익을 기대한다고 밝힌다. 다만 정확한 허들레이트는 정해두지 않고 주가 급락이나 금리 추가 상승(100~200bp)에도 만족할 수 있는 수준의 매수 가격을 중시한다. 멍거는 허들레이트 개념 자체는 합리적이지만, 측정 가능하다고 해서 핵심 변수가 되는 것은 아니며 많은 오류가 그 개념에서 나온다고 지적한다. 여러 투자 대안을 비교하고 각 기회의 예상 수익을 따져보는 것이 중요하며, 기회비용(opportunity cost)이 실제 의사결정의 기준이 되어야 한다고 강조한다. 기업 프레젠테이션의 내부수익률(IRR) 계산에 대해서는 버크셔가 참여한 19개 이사회에서 본 많은 발표가 허황된 숫자로 가득했다고 비판한다. 사업 발표자들이 경영진과 청중이 듣고 싶은 숫자를 맞춰 넣는다는 것이다. 사모펀드 운용자가 투자자에게 20% 수익을 약속한 사례를 들며, 그런 약속은 즉시 배제 대상이라고 말한다. 연기금 등 대형 기관투자자들이 성배 같은 약속에 쉽게 현혹된다는 점도 지적한다. 이 영상에는 개별 종목·자산의 1~3개월 가격 방향에 대한 예측 발언이 없으며, 장기적 투자 원칙에 관한 논의만 담겨 있다.
다듬은 글
mr buffett mr munger i'm very curious how you come up with your discount rate and how you might adjust that discount rate based upon various businesses my you might want to discuss your discount rates used for coca-cola j j or some of your past investments yeah we don't we don't formally have discount rates i mean every time i start talking about all this stuff charlie reminds me that i've never prepared a spreadsheet but i do you know in effect in my mind i do but uh we are going to want to get a significantly higher return obviously in terms of cash produced relative to the amount we're outlaying now for a business than we are from a government bond i mean we you know we're gonna that that has to be the yardstick at a base then how much more do we want well if government bond rates were two percent we're not going to buy a business to earn three or three and a half percent expectancy over the years we just don't want to commit our money that way we'd rather sit around and wait a little while uh if they're four and three quarters percent you know what do we hope to get over time well we want to get a fair amount more than that but i can't i can't tell you that we sit down every morning and and i call charlie in los angeles and say what's our hurdle rate today i mean we have never used the term uh you know it's a little bit of the the we want enough so that we feel very comfortable if they close on the stock market for a couple of years if interest rates go up another 100 basis points or 200 basis points we're still happy with what we bought and above that i really you know i know it sounds kind of fuzzy but it is fuzzy charlie yeah the concept of a hurdle rate makes nothing but sense and yet a lot of terrible errors are made by people who are talking about hurdle rates just because you can measure something and guess it doesn't mean that it's the controlling variable and what you're dealing with in a messy world and uh i don't there's any substitute for thinking of hope about a whole lot of investment options and thinking about why one is better than another and what the likely returns are from each etc etc and the trouble with the hurdle rate concept not that we don't have one in a sense uh is it doesn't work as well as as a system of comparing things in other words if if i have something available that i think will give me eight percent for sure and i can buy all i want of it and you've got a perfectly good investment that i think will earn seven i don't have to waste five minutes with you you're like the mail order service offering the bride through the mail and she's got aids you know i can go on to some different subject and it's and so this the concept of opportunity cost is it's so little taught in investment they teach it in the freshman course in economics and all the major universities but when you get to the corporate finance departments and so forth it doesn't lend itself to the kind of mathematics they want to use so they ignore it but in the real world your opportunity costs are what you want to make your decisions based on yeah and even if you were if you had something you were really familiar with and were very sure on the eight percent eight and a half wouldn't tempt you if somebody came along that's a practical matter for you it i've been on as i mentioned i've been on 19 corporate boards i would say that of the presentations i've seen and i've seen a lot of them and every one of them had a calculation of internal rate of return you know if they'd burned them all the boards would have been better off i mean it it there's so much nonsense presented because the presenters essentially know what the listeners or desires of hearing and what is needed in order to get through something that the ceo wants to do anyway that you just it's just you just get nonsense figures and you know we may get nonsense figures too but they're ours yeah and let me give you an example of that i have a young friend who sells private partnership interests to investors and he's in a really tough field where it's hard to get decent returns and i said what return do you tell him you're aiming for and he said 20 and he said how did you pick that number he said if i chose any lower number they wouldn't give me the money and there's no one in the world we think can earn 20 with big money i mean it just so anybody making a promise like that basically we we're gonna write off immediately uh uh it's amazing to me what you know in a sense how gullible big investors are pension funds and so on and that they they have people come around and promise them the holy grail and they want it so badly you know that they're willing to believe things that just have to be nonsense let's go to number nine you
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