저자: TomLee · 외국인
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Tom Lee 결론: 2019년 S&P500 두 자릿수(15~17%) 상승 가능성이 2009년 이후 가장 높다고 주장한다. 핵심 근거: 60일 내 19% 하락 후 평균 1년 수익률 21%, 전년 하이 퍼포먼스(고수익·고성과 주식) 마이너스 해 다음 해 평균 21% 상승, 연쇄 음의 해는 이례적이라는 점을 든다. 1987·1962년 정책 주도 둔화 사례처럼 경기침체만 피하면 재테스트 후 매수 구간이라고 본다. 리스크 인식: 리스크 목록이 긍정 요인보다 많다고 인정하며, 핵심은 얼마나 선반영됐는지와 완화 가능 여부다. 가장 큰 완화 요인은 연준이며, 연준이 긴축을 되돌리면 시장이 극복할 수 있다고 본다. 연준 정책 논쟁: 토론자들은 연준이 주식시장에 반응했다는 데 대체로 동의하지만, Tom Lee는 12월 FOMC 후 7일 하락폭이 과거 최대(8%)였다는 점을 들어 정책 실수 가능성을 제기한다. 반면 12월 고용 30만 명 이상 등 펀더멘털을 근거로 정책 실수가 아니라는 반론도 나온다. 신용시장 관점: Tom Lee는 리스크를 신용시장(장단기 금리차, 하이일드·레버리지론)과 정책 실수로 본다. 연준은 평탄한 수익률곡선에서 거의 긴축한 적이 없고 대체로 경기침체로 이어졌다는 점을 지적한다. 토론자 의견: Jenny는 가능성은 있으나 험난한 길이 예상되며, 연준보다 밸류에이션 배수(포트폴리오 12배, S&P 14배)가 낙관 근거라고 말한다. 자동차(GM) 긍정 신호와 주택시장 부진을 대비시키며 불확실성이 크다는 의견도 있다.
다듬은 글
Tom Lee, head of research at Fundstrat Global Advisors, is back with us on set right now to give us a first look at his forecast. You say we're going to have a double-digit gain for the stock. Because? Well, we published our perspectives. We listed a sort of five cross-market sentiment factors. We believe the probability of a double-digit year is the highest since 2009.
And I think the market, you know, is potentially going to have, you know, 15, maybe 16, 17%. So why do you say that? What leads us to that point? Well, the first thing is that, you know, we had a cascading fall. Since World War II, the average gain after a 19% drop in 60 days is 21%. There is a cross-argument in the market.
High performance recorded a negative year last year. There have been five years in which high-yield investments had negative returns. In the year following a negative year for high performance, the average gain is 21%. High performance has never had two consecutive negative years and has already started well.
And then, you know, the market has devalued. There are several factors that we have discussed. So you think the bull market is intact and is simply going through what you call a midlife crisis, right? Here's your report, here's your grade. You posted it right before going on air. That's what it's all about.
So, do you think this has a long way to go? Yes, and I think the key is that we avoid a recession. If we avoid a recession, then it will be a slowdown similar to the policy-driven slowdowns of 1987 and 1962. And after a possible retest, the market is a buy. You know, the buying slump that people thought was dead last year is back.
Okay. So, you're not naive about the risks that exist. In fact, you say that the list of risks outweighs the list of positive aspects. So how do you acknowledge that but believe you can reach 16, 17% in the year? Yes, I mean, and there are a lot of risks , right? The risks that developed in 2018 and turned into a series of problems are still in effect.
So the key here is how much has been discounted, which we think about a lot, and whether it can be mitigated. And I think one of the biggest mitigators is really the Federal Reserve. You know, the Federal Reserve has scared people because of autopilot, and I think, you know, they created it, but arguably it's the biggest policy mistake in 50 years because of the magnitude of the drop we saw in December.
And if the Federal Reserve makes us back down, then the market can overcome those things. Is he back? Do you really think it was the biggest mistake in 50 years of Federal Reserve policy? Looking at the 7-day stock market decline, the stock market change in the 7 days following an FOMC meeting, the largest drop on record was 8%, which occurred in December 2018.
The second largest was in March 2018. So, the two biggest stock sell-offs following the FOMC took place last year. We achieved a figure of more than 300,000 jobs in December. So, what could you call a policy mistake? The job of the Federal Reserve is not to manage the stock market price . Well, that's exactly right.
They are not in charge of stock market finances, but the tightening of financial conditions due to a 20% drop in the stock market will have a negative wealth effect that will impact GDP. Therefore, there are already headwinds for GDP growth in 2019, which I agree with. I'm just saying that the stock market isn't the system for measuring policy errors, at least not that.
Internally, they would tell you they've adopted the no, but you could argue that they caused the credit... I would accept the argument that the policy error could be measured in credit spreads more than I would accept it measured in the S&P. Having a pullback in the stock market could reflect what people believe was a policy mistake, a communication error, some kind of mistake.
Correct, but that belief system was proven wrong on the first day of January when we received the December job posting. In other words, if the Federal Reserve is analyzing that and not whether the S&P is going up or down, it's clearly not a policy mistake. However, we looked at the minutes and the minutes say that it was a heterogeneous set in terms of what the voting members wanted to do.
So, perhaps it's a policy mistake, we'll review it. I don't think they should have done it , but what do I know? The Federal Reserve is not reacting to the stock market. It is reacting to the credit market. And they spoke specifically in early December about credit markets. They brought up credit markets again when they met last Friday when we had the powerful rally.
They started... They may have done what you said first, yes. But in some aspects they have begun to react to the stock market and the big fall. Why do you think Powell had to come back out and Williams had to come out and soften his tone a bit? The Federal Reserve's tone changed as the market downturn deepened.
That 's a fact. But, I insist, we are going to disagree because the fall means that I am presenting you with facts. Okay, but the facts are, if you want to talk about the facts, talk about what happened in the high- yield market, talk about what happened with leveraged loans and how it affected sales in the stock market.
The stock market sell-off was driven by the fear and volatility we saw in the credit markets. If you recall the first episode of volatility we had and the first drop in stock prices we had, it was not accompanied by the credit markets experiencing the kind of volatility that you were seeing in the stock markets.
And the stock markets were able to recover quickly. The stock market crash, Jim, I think you can make a credible case to force the Federal Reserve to come out and clarify its message or change policy in some respects. The investment of two and five was worse. Yes, so I agree with what they both just said.
I agree. I think they did react to the stock market, and Josh, you're right. I think they also reacted, as they should have , to a flattened performance curve. But I think the reason we're having a debate here is because the future is a bit unclear. And when we talk about cause and effect, Tom, as in your note and the patterns you look for to recognize what's going to happen, I think we have to recognize that we're in uncharted territory and we're seeing that in many signs.
I'll give you an example today, okay? If the Federal Reserve made a policy mistake, it's been reflected in the housing market, right? It's very sensitive to interest rates, and the housing market hasn't been doing well for quite some time. On the other hand, another sector sensitive to interest rates is the automotive industry, and today you have a publication—sorry, not a publication, but a previous announcement from GM—that would tell you that everything is going well.
What conclusion do you draw from this? The crystal ball is very cloudy right now because we are in uncharted territory. Tom, you mentioned the risks, they are there. We've never seen anything like it. We've never seen a president like this. We haven't had a trade war like this in decades. Brexit is underway.
I'm just saying that this is a time when patterns, whether they're indications of whether the Federal Reserve made a mistake or not, or previous patterns of what the stock market might do, have a low degree of confidence. Tom, are you saying that your goal can be achieved unless the Federal Reserve alters history, right?
You mentioned a policy... Yes. Yes. That's right. I mean , the two biggest risks we mentioned are credit markets, which are measured through the yield curve, and policy error. But, as you mention , the Federal Reserve has almost never tightened when the curve is this flat. In fact, we have shown that it almost always leads to recession.
So, the key is that if it's just about employment and ignoring credit signals, then we have a disaster. What do you think, Jenny? What do you think of the target? Do you think we're within double digits of here? Do you think this January, the so-called January effect, will somehow get people going? I think it's plausible, with a really bumpy road in the meantime.
And , in my case, when I think about why it's plausible, it has less to do with the Federal Reserve than with the multiples that have existed. Therefore, in my portfolio right now, my portfolio is at a multiple of 12 times. The S&P is at 14 times. Those figures alone are incredibly inspiring and make you think that Tom's double-digit goal could actually be achieved.
I also think, you know, I play with this idea of whether the Federal Reserve has a policy problem. And I agree with Josh that the Federal Reserve should not respond to the stock market. But one of the things we were talking about with the stock market decline was whether that would trigger a recession.
And if it triggered a recession, that would cause job losses, you know, and then they would have to do it and then it would become a matter of policy. Hey.
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