저자: CharlieMunger/워런버핏—영상자막상버핏·멍거주주총회발언편집본,출연소속은제목·설명란에명시없음 · 외국인
요약 보기
장기 복리 학습과 자본배분 역량이 버크셔의 장기 성과를 만들었다고 설명. 버크셔 내재가치는 보유 상장주식과 영업자산, 유보이익의 자본배분 효율에 달려 있으며 현재 가치 판단은 두 사람 모두 대략 비슷하다고 언급. 의료 문제는 어렵다며 자신들이 해결할 수 없다고 선을 그음.
다듬은 글
What on earth has caused this extreme record to go on for such a very long time? I would argue that the young man who was reading everything he could read when he was 10 years of old uh became a learning machine and he got a lot of power early and then he got a very long run when he kept learning. If Warren had uh not been learning all the while, I'm telling you, having watched the process closely, the record would be a pale shadow of what it is.
And Warren has improved since he passed the retirement age of man. In other words, in this field at least, you can improve when you're old. Now, most people don't even try and create that kind of a record. They pass power from one 65y old to 159y old and then do it over and over again. But you get an enormous advantage from practice in this field.
And so what happened accidentally in the case of Warren has helped you shareholders greatly because you had this long run with power extremely concentrated and uh and with the man holding the power being a ferocious learner. uh our our system ought to be more copied than it is. This idea of of passing the power from one old codger to another in a settled way is not necessarily the right system at all.
We we have a very strong culture now of of rationality of being owner oriented that will go on long after I'm not around. Uh and and we have the talent on the operating side in place to do a lot of wonderful things over time. We we will need in capital allocation to keep doing intelligent things. We won't get to do brilliant things because you don't get to do brilliant things with the kind of sums we're talking about.
Maybe once in a blue moon something, you know, you get a chance. But we will need somebody uh that never does a basically doesn't do any dumb things and occasionally does something that's that's reasonably good. That can be done. and and we have we're on that road all the already. Uh it is not fitting into this organization as a investment officer or a capital allocator.
You're getting in the right vehicle. It has the right standards. It will reject ideas that that really are irrational. I I've been on a lot of boards. Charlie's been on a lot of boards. You would be amazed at the number of things that are responding to animal spirits rather than the rationality that take place.
And we have our animal spirits, but we devote them to other areas. Uh the intrinsic value of of a Bergkshire uh like any other business is based on the future amount of cash that can be expected to be delivered by the business between now and judgment day discounted back at the proper rate. Now that's pretty nebulous.
Another way of looking at it is to try and figure out the value of the businesses we own presently and we try to give you the information that will enable you to make a reasonably close estimate as that. We own lots of marketable securities. It's probably safe to say that that that they are worth more or less what they are carried for.
And then we own a number of operating businesses and we try to give you the figures on those businesses that are the figures that we use in in making our own judgments about the value of those businesses. Now that tells you what what we have today and more or less what it's worth. But since Bergkshire retains all of its earnings, it becomes very important to evaluate what will be done with those earnings over time.
I mean it it it is not only a question of what the present businesses are worth. It's a it's a judgment on the on the efficiency or the effectiveness with which retained earnings will be used. If you had looked at the intrinsic value of Bergkshire in 1965, we had a textile business that was probably worth about $12 a share.
Uh but that was not the only part of the equation because we intended to use any cash generated to try and buy into better businesses than we had and we were fortunate enough to be able to buy in the insurance business in 1967 and build on that. So it was not only a combination of with the business we had but the skill with which retained earnings would be used that determined uh what the present value actually should have been at Bergkshire going back that far.
It's the same situation today. We will put to work billions and billions of dollars this year, next year, the year after. If we put that to work effectively, each dollar has a greater present value than a dollar has in simply in cash or distributed. If we if we do it ineffectively, it it has value of something less.
The businesses today, you know, we have whatever the figure is in the annual report, uh, roughly $80,000 in marketable securities. If our insurance business breaks even, that $80,000 is free to us in terms of using it. And we have a group of operating businesses and we show their earnings in the in the report and we're going to try and add to those and they'll try to add to their earnings.
Um, but if Charlie and I were each right now to write down on a piece of paper what we think the intrinsic value of Bergkshire is, our figures would not be the same. They'd be reasonably close. Uh, number 12. Morning. Uh, good morning. Morning. My name is Mike Klene and I'm a general surgeon from Selenus, California.
Given your resources and experience in underwriting insurance, do you have any thoughts of venturing into or helping to solve our healthc care mess? Time is ripe for a new approach with Birkshire's clarity brought to the formula. Let's acknowledge the stakes are huge with implication for our economy and our f future as a country.
Let me try that one. It's too tough. I would we can't Warren and I can't solve that one. Yeah, we can't solve that one. uh we we try to look for easy problems because those are the ones we find we have the answers for and and you can do that in investments. We we don't really try tough things. Uh now sometimes life hands you a problem not in the financial area in our case usually but in it'll hand you a problem that is that is very tough and that you have to wrestle with.
But we don't go around looking for tough problems. I would say this, we we do very very little in in health insurance. Uh you know, if if we were to have if we were looking for a solution through the private sector, we would be looking for something with very very low distribution costs. I mean it that you do not want a lot of the revenue soaked up in frictional costs between uh the benefits paid and the and the and and the premiums received.
I don't know how to do that. And and I haven't seen anybody else that's very good at doing it. And you can say if you're paying close to 15% of GDP for health costs, you know, somebody ought to be able to figure out something. But I haven't I haven't heard it. Maybe we'll hear it in the upcoming political campaign. Charlie's view reflects mine at the present.
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