저자: Investing Point · 외국인
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that we may not snap back 120 i would have calculated 20 years ago but we are going to have a very big reversal in favor of value stocks sooner or later i think we can be pretty safe about that and one of the things that comes down to the nature of of the fans the fangs are a very interesting subset and well worth anyone studying because they're unique in many ways there's never been there's been the occasional company in the past that looked a little fangy but there's never been a whole clutch of eight or nine in the u.s and two or three in china that become the biggest companies in the world they snatch value out of thin air they generate earnings on almost no asset value they're all about intellectual capital they are unbelievably disruptive and they move very fast so these are very special companies and they're worth a lot of money but they have also been bid up and bid up and eventually even the best companies can become overpriced i don't recommend necessarily going short of the fans but i do recommend owning as few us equities as you can face it's important to separate monetary from fiscal spending and fdr type broad-based planning of that kind i'm a great believer in that i'm much more suspicious of credit and interest rates let me just point out that we entered an era with greenspan of a fairly decent kink in the cumulative debt curve it had been drifting up very slowly and then it started to rise very rapidly since his era what you notice is that despite the fact that the debt ratio per unit of gdp has doubled and tripled and will soon quadruple since the first day greenspan the growth rate of the us and the developed world has slowed so if there was some easy relationship between debt and growth it should have showed up and in fact the reverse has occurred and that's one of the reasons i'm suspicious as to the point when the market gets jumpy very hard to read if you go back to the earlier bubbles and you look at 1929 there was no great event people have studied that now for 90 years and we still haven't found the reason the best we can come up with is quote selling came in from the country unquote which means it wasn't new york and boston and the financial centers it was the industrial centers of the midwest and they were the people who were seeing that the economy was weakening and they looked at the high prices and the optimism that was everywhere and decided they would take some profits and that was what turned the tide and then more people decided they would take profits and it spiraled out of control it was not done by a massive change in the federal reserve policy or any government spending program so that's what you have to be worried about that in the end high peas are an intrinsically nervous and risky situation where everything is confidence if you break confidence for any reason it could be uniquely different this time it has been quite different in each of the bubbles but if you break confidence and you're way overpriced since you're dealing with craziness or where it's going to peak i much prefer to look for signs of truly crazy behavior because every bubble that really crashed and broke in a spectacular way which most of them did was preceded by craziness by legendary stories this was notably lacking as i wrote and talked about over the years of the 10-year bull market it has not been lacking really i think you could agree in the in this rally off the covet low we have seen not only a terrific rate of acceleration in the price rise double the normal bull market which is characteristic that acceleration is characteristic of late stage bubble but we've also seen wonderful craziness the specs which are a promise to use your money give me your money and trust me i'll do something useful with it is a real echo of the south sea bubble where we have such a spectacular opportunity we can't reveal what the purpose of your money is yet and they got lots of money and ran off with it i'm not saying the spikes will run up with your money but i am saying it's a real testimonial to the speculative nature buying hurts a bankrupt company and having it go up four five six times in a real hurry and so on and so on you you read about your own having a tesla quadruple this year a few years ago i debated jim grant who called me an apostate amongst value managers for hedging about this time is different i maintain that the foremost dangerous words this time is different should be replaced by the five most dangerous words which is this time is never different that is a very dangerous idea to think that you can never have important permanent changes and i think almost everything has changed since 2000 so the certainties that we used to have no longer exist but that was five years ago that was before the most massive move against value on any way you care to measure it now we are off the scale so i don't think the value is as dependable and useful a weapon as it was for 70 years prior to 2000 but i think it's a very handy weapon when you push the parameters so far that it hits historical lows it gains the growth size the forest in new england and i'm a great fan of forestry and you back up 10 years 12 years you could get 6 return and then you push out the asset prices across the board and you come back 12 years later today and the same forest will give you a three percent return the same with the midwestern farm it's gone from six percent to three percent now that's been a wonderful ride in capital gains but the price you pay is you don't make six percent a year compounded which is very handy you make three and yes if it goes up even higher you'll make another capital gain but the cost of that will be that the yield on the virus will go to two you get my point so the price of staying high multiples is you get a low dividend uh whether it's a farm or whether it's stocks and that's what you see so in the interim you have this trade-off between lower yields on one side and capital gains on the other until it peaks out and then you're left with lower yields and declining prices in the way we've experienced cycle after cycle since time immemorial when you buy overpriced assets you get a guarantee of a low return what you don't get is the guarantee of being wiped out next week but since you bring that topic up my belief is that if you're trying to time the breaking of a bubble the value is not that important all of them are overpriced and whether they're overpriced at 25 times earnings or 35 times earnings or in japan but 65 times earnings it's very difficult to work out in any sort of academic why i own a tesla it's a wonderful car i i think they're a spectacularly interesting company but are they four times the company they were before covered i don't think so these stories are everywhere and they're what you need before a bubble breaks and we saw them in early 2000s and late 99 and we saw them in late 1929 before the crash we saw them in japan and here we are again so i think this is an indicator not a certainty but a strong possibility that we are quite close to the bubble breaking in terms of psychology perhaps a matter of weeks or months not yet
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