저자: BillAckman · 외국인
요약 보기
미 재무부가 패니메이·프레디맥 지분 약 80%(약 3,000억달러 추정)를 보유. 두 기관은 2008년 이후 16년간 conservatorship에 묶여 있으며, 매년 약 200억달러 이익이 재무부로 귀속. 자본 여력(자본비율 2.5% 이상, 재무부 신용한도 4,000억달러)과 보증수수료 기반 수익성을 근거로 민영화 시 큰 가치 상승 가능성 주장. 다만 정치적 리스크(입법·법원)와 일정 지연 가능성, 주가 변동성을 함께 언급. 지분 보유 및 장기 보유 기조.
다듬은 글
Everyone remembers 2008's villains, two mortgage giants that nearly torched the economy. Now, billionaire Bill Aman, who built his fortune spotting financial time bombs and opportunities, says those same companies could become America's $300 billion escape hatch. While politicians argue about cutting Social Security or raising taxes to solve the looming debt crisis, Aman points to something hiding in plain sight on the government's balance sheet.
a oneline test that flips the entire debt debate on its head. Let's dive in. We're going through, you know, uh, a time with very large government deficits, and it's not clear how we're going to work our way out of 36 trillion of debt. And I think Scott Besson, to his credit, has said, you know, look, we got to focus not just on the our expense side, the liability side, we got to focus on the asset side.
And the US government today is the 80% shareholder and a preferred stockholder of Fanny May and Freddy Mack. And these are two remarkable businesses. The the numbers they throw around are huge. 300 billion. Yeah. This the government's interest in Fanny and Freddy is worth approaching $300 billion. The path to the government realizing the 300 billion is today these entities are in conservatorship.
And conservatorship is you know what is meant to be a temporary place where the government puts a financial institution that goes into gets into trouble until it can recapitalize and emerge. By the way, this temporary conservatorship is what, a generation old now? Yeah. 16 years in or something like this.
Um, and Trump has been talking about first starting with Secretary Minutuchin in his first term. And now I think they're going to finish the job is the companies will come out of conservatorship and they need to come out in a way that of course protects uh the 30-year mortgage and make sure that the cost of mortgages doesn't go up.
But it can emerge. How do you prevent that? Because one of the wraps against privatizing or changing the status quo is that uh mortgage rates are going to go up. The guarantee fees have to go up. Aman just pulled back the curtain on why the government might finally set Fanny May and Freddy Mack free.
Washington is desperate. Deficits are huge and they can't fill a $36 trillion hole by just cutting spending or issuing infinite new bonds. Instead, he says, look at what Uncle Sam owns. The US Treasury effectively owns 80% of Fanny May and Freddy Mack, two quietly profitable mortgage giants. Right now, they're stuck in conservatorship, a fancy word for government custody.
Ever since they almost collapsed in 2008. They were supposed to be temporary wards of the state, but 16 years later, they're still in lockup. Here's what happened. Fanny and Freddy used to be private companies that buy up home loans and guarantee them. In 2008, when housing imploded, taxpayers saved them from bankruptcy.
In return, the Treasury got preferred shares and warrants equal to 79.9% of their common stock. Since then, virtually all their profits have been flowing to the Treasury, about $20 billion a year. dead money for regular investors because if you own Fanny or Freddy common stock today, you don't see a dime of those earnings.
So why would Uncle Sam ever give up that 20 billion annual stream? Because the onetime payday is far bigger and Uncle Sam needs cash now. At recent estimates, that 80% stake could fetch around $300 billion. That's about 16 of the entire US annual deficit. It won't fix the $36 trillion problem overnight, but it would be the Treasury's biggest single payday ever, and it avoids piling on even more debt.
Now, one big fear is what happens to the housing market if these mortgage giants go private. Will 30-year fixed home loans get more expensive? Think about Sarah, who just locked in a 6.5% rate on her first home in Denver. If privatization spikes mortgage costs, millions of future Sarah get priced out of the American dream.
That's political suicide. Aman hints that any release has to protect the 30-year mortgage. Policymakers know they can't send America's favorite mortgage into the stratosphere. President Trump explicitly said he'd maintain a government back stop even after spinning them off. That assurance can keep investor confidence high and mortgage rates low.
Aman has also floated merging Fanny and Freddy into one entity. A combined company could cut duplicate costs and possibly lower the fees they charge lenders. The bottom line is Washington won't sign off on a plan that spikes mortgage rates for Main Street. They need a win-win. But before we buy that rosy scenario, we have to address the elephant in the room.
2008. Many people still hear Fanny May or Freddy Mack and think of the subprime mortgage nightmare that nearly took down the economy. Why should anyone trust these institutions now? Aman's answer, because they're not the same beasts anymore. He describes them like they've been rebuilt into Fort Knox.
Notice the numbers he rattles off. They are the key to his confidence. Now, let's hear Aman explain why the math makes these companies safer than the government itself. Fanny May and Freddy Mack today are vastly better capitalized than they were for the first 60 years of their existence. They were only required to hold four5% equity against their guarantees.
And by the way, 0445% would have been enough during the financial crisis had they not got into subprime. But it was still a thin level of capital. When they emerge from conservatorship, assuming they do, they'll emerge with at least 2 and a.5% of equity relative to their guarantees. And if you think about their business, not a bank, people are confused by this penny business is they buy conforming mortgages, mortgages that meet a very safe standard, mortgages, first mortgages on middle- class homes from creditworthy borrowers that are not that likely to default.
And if they default, there's unlikely small losses. They buy those mortgages. They package them up in these trusts. They sell securities backed by them and they guarantee the securities. But the probability of default is very low on this kind of highly diversified, very safe collection of mortgages and they collect a fee, a guarantee fee for doing this.
So the protections they have against, you know, their inability to meet the guarantee is one they start with a huge amount of capital. They're going to merge with a couple hundred billion dollars of equity. If if they went private, would they still keep their line of credit with the treasury? Yeah. So is it's what how many hundred billion
as a so they've got about 7 trillion of guarantees uh and they have enormous cash flow that comes in from the 65 basis points peranom they charge on those guarantees um so if that we went through another financial crisis first they have to blow through all their equity then they have the benefit of almost 400 billion of the ability to call upon preferred senior preferred stock from the government and they also have this enormous earning power that continues even when they go through a challenging period.
So there there's a belt, there's suspenders, there's another belt, there's suspenders, there's a huge amount of equity. And then beyond that, because of the systemically important nature of Fenny and Freddy, they do have an implied government backs stop. Let's unpack what Aman just said because the math here is everything.
Back in the day, these companies were under capitalized. He mentions they only had45% equity against their mortgage guarantees. Picture this. For every $100 of loans they guaranteed, they held just 45 cents in reserve. No wonder they crumpled when the real estate market collapsed. But going forward, regulators are demanding at least 2.5% equity.
That's more than five times the buffer they had before. Here's a quick stress test. Say you have $100 of mortgages. Pre208, Fanny and Freddy held about 45 cents in reserve. If losses hit $1, they'd be 55 cents in the hole, insolvent. Now, imagine having $2.50 in reserve for the same $100. A $1 loss would leave $1.50 of equity still standing.
Losses would have to be more than five times worse than 2008 for these firms to run out of capital under the new rules. and government help is explicitly standing by. Aman reminds us of the $400 billion credit line from the Treasury. Think of it as a second layer of protection. After burning through their new equity, they could pull in up to $400 billion of emergency funds.
On a 7 trillion book of mortgages, that's another 5.7% of support. Add it up about 2.5% hard capital plus 5.7% backup equals roughly an 8% total loss buffer. An 8% loss across a diversified prime mortgage portfolio is almost unthinkable outside of a Great Depression scenario. What about the business itself?
Fanny and Freddy aren't banks. They don't take deposits or do complex trading. They bundle and guarantee mortgages. Only plain conforming loans, the relatively safe kind. Think 30-year fixed loans to borrowers with solid credit on homes below a certain price. They're like an insurance company for mortgages.
Collecting a small fee in exchange for covering any defaults. That guarantee fee about 65% a year on 7 of mortgages gives them an enormous revenue stream. Do the math.65% of $7 trillion is over $45 billion per year. Their overhead isn't huge and their loan defaults are historically low. So much of that flows through as profit.
In 2023, Fanny May earned $17.4 billion and Freddy Mack made 10.5 billion. Together, that's roughly $28 billion in annual profit, even while they're caged. Now, here's the kicker. In the public markets, the combined value of all Fanny and Freddy common stock is only about $17 billion at recent prices.
You heard that right, $28 billion in yearly earnings versus a $17 billion market cap. That's a trailing PE ratio well below one. It's like paying 80 to buy a company that earns a dollar every year. How is that possible? Because as long as they're in conservatorship, those earnings don't go to shareholders.
They go toward building capital for Uncle Sam's benefit. The market is basically betting that if the government never lets these companies out, the common stock could be worthless. But if Aman is right and a release is coming, that valuation gap is absurd. Even a conservative valuation of 10 times earnings would imply nearly a $300 billion value.
Some analysts think a fully privatized Fanny Freddy could be worth 400 to$500 billion combined. And remember, Treasury holds 80% of the common. That's the windfall Aman is talking about. For remaining investors, it suggests the current share price could potentially multiply many times over in a privatization scenario.
No wonder Bill Aman has accumulated a big position and hung on for a decade. This is a classic case of the market pricing in a worst case scenario. While Acman is betting on a return to normaly, now we should be clear. This trade is not without risks. The biggest risk is political. Fanny and Freddy reform is the third rail of housing policy.
It has died in Congress multiple times since 2010. There's no guarantee the Treasury can just flip a switch and do this alone. Some parts of the process could require legislation or could be challenged in court. Aman himself recently noted that a straight out IPO isn't feasible right now. The process might have to be more gradual, like relisting the existing stock on the NYSE instead of an immediate massive share offering.
And timeline matters. If it drags too long, political winds could shift again. There's also the question of the economy. If a recession hits the housing market hard before they're released, politicians might get cold feet again. But a housing downturn could also spur the government to act faster. Because if Fanny and Freddy remain stuck, taxpayers are on the hook for any losses.
Privatizing them would transfer some risk to private investors. For everyday investors watching this, the opportunity is tantalizing but speculative. You could buy Fanny May or Freddy Max stock today on the off chance that Acman's right and they skyrocket after privatization. Some big funds have done just that, treating it like a longdated option.
But be aware, these stocks are volatile and have been political footballs for years. One tweet from a policy maker could send them jumping or diving double digits in a day. If you're a homeowner or a home buyer, you also have a stake in this drama. A smoothly executed transition could actually improve the mortgage system, perhaps even lower fees over time through competition or efficiency.
A bungled one could tighten credit or nudge mortgage rates up. That's why it's so important that, as Aman said, they come out in a way that protects the 30-year mortgage. What Aman is really highlighting is how crisis can create opportunities. The US debt problem is daunting. over $ 36 trillion and climbing with interest costs now above $1 trillion a year.
Politicians have few palatable options. One of them is selling the family silver. Fanny May and Freddy Mack represent perhaps the shiniest silverware in the cabinet. Systematically important, yes, but also valuable and after a decade of rehabilitation, ready to be cut loose. It's ironic. In 2008, taxpayers bailed out these companies.
In 2024 and beyond, it might be these companies bailing out the taxpayer. The villains become the heroes. We started with a question. How do you solve a 36 trillion problem? Aman's answer, you cash in your hidden assets and let the market shoulder the load. And right now, that asset is two giant mortgage machines primed to be set free.
The lesson is bigger than just Fanny and Freddy. It's about seeing the whole chessboard, assets and liabilities. As investors, if you can spot what a desperate government has to do before it happens, you can position yourself on the winning side of that trade. Keep asking what's hiding in plain sight.
If you want to dive deeper into the risks to your wealth of America's looming debt crisis, check out this video where Warren Buffett lays out the cold, hard truth. I will see you over there.
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