저자: NourielRoubini · 외국인
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트럼프 정책은 감세·규제완화·에너지 증산 등 성장·저물가 요인과 관세·재정적자·Fed 독립성 훼손 등 스태그플레이션 요인이 혼재. 고율 관세는 미국 물가 상승 요인이며 중국과의 전면적 경제전쟁(디커플링) 위험이 가장 큼. 유럽은 잠재성장률 1% 미만으로 구조개혁 전망이 어둡고, 달러는 펀더멘털상 강세지만 향후 Mar-a-Lago식 달러 약세 합의 가능성 존재. 기술혁신으로 미국 잠재성장률은 3% 근접 가능.
다듬은 글
Now we are a party of really macro associates looking ahead to the new year and right in this. Some of Trump's policies will increase growth and reduce inflation, while others could be stagflation rate. So the impact on growth, inflation and on markets depends on how much of the former versus the latter.
Noria joins us now for more note. Wonderful to see you, sir. Great seeing you. How difficult does it make it to look ahead to next year with any real clarity to come up with some kind of outlook when things are so difficult? There's a lot of policy uncertainty. As I pointed out, some of the economic policies of Trump may increase over time growth, reducing inflation, being overall pro-business, keeping tax rates on, confident in labor law, deregulating the economy, and things like increasing the production of fossil fuels and pushing down the prices of energy.
Probably also this large initiative over time, a greater economic efficiency and so on. So those are the positives. And then over time, that could increase growth, that could reduce inflation. But we know there are some sets of other policy. We don't know how much they're going to be implemented. They will increase inflation and potentially be stagflation.
In my view, tariffs are inflationary protections. The risk of a economic war with China first, draconian restrictions on migration, if not the mass deportation, if we have unfunded fiscal deficits and the promises imply $8 trillion of deficits of an additional over the next ten years, that's going to crowd out growth by increasing interest rates and real and the bond market vigilantes are going to wake up if you try to disorderly weaken the dollar, that could be inflationary and if you interfere with independence of the Fed.
Now, I think on the positive side, I think there are a number of factors are going to constrain the bad policies. One is market discipline. If you follow positive inflationary, then wild market vigilance, they're going to wake up, bonuses are going to go higher. The stock market is going to correct any cares about the bond market, the cares about the stock market.
Secondly, fed independence. If it follows policies that lead to inflation, the Fed may not continue to cut rates next year, may even raise rates if inflation were to be going higher. And also policy choices, as you pointed out, on one side, you have people like Scott Bass and the want to escalate escalate on tariffs and others were thoughtful trade hawks on trade there on China, like Peter Navarro.
So it depends on the balance between who's going to be in power. Let's unpack some of that and pick out tariffs. Big debate already so far this morning. You've had some of it. Please weigh in. If it's targeted, could it be a good thing for the American economy? Well, if it's targeted that I would say that the impacts on inflation are going to be modest.
And maybe some of the reshoring that already is occurring is going to continue. And there'll be actually pressure on our trade partners to say, if you don't want tariffs, you have to bring more investment. Semiconductors, autos, EVs, you name it, to the United States. So that's the escalate in order to de-escalate.
But I would say the higher the tariff become, the more there's an impact on import prices, the more there's an impact on inflation and the more there is global fragmentation. There's also the risk, of course, of trade wars, of our trade partners retaliating against the United States if that occurs. The impact on growth is going to be more negative.
The impact of inflation is going to be on you. Depends on the size of these tariffs. If it's. Navarro types of policies on trade is stagflation or if it's escalated to escalate, maybe the impact of inflation is modest and the negative impact on growth is also modest. So some people are arguing that we're in this wave of globalization that basically reverses some of the disinflationary forces of the three decades following really the mid eighties.
I'm wondering whether that's actually true, whether that's what we're seeing, because there still is quite a bit of trade. It's just going different routes. And frankly, you could see that overproduction from places like China are going to lower prices in certain places, even if they don't in the U.S.
if they're walls up. In other words, are we overestimating the inflationary impact and a dramatic level of a lot of these tariffs? Well, the impact of high tariffs on the United States would be inflationary. But if you think about the impact on growth and inflation, the rest of the world will be this inflationary because if there is a shock to the demand for the exports of Europe, Asia to China, then there'll be excess supply.
Growth is weakened in those parts of the world and that leads to disinflation, the rest of the world. So the impact on the U.S. of high tariff is inflationary. The impact on the rest of the world is these inflationary because the excess supply used to be called Dr. Doom. Are you retiring that mantle?
I would say that I'm not Dr. Doom, I'm Dr. Realist. There are plenty of upsides in economic growth. And by the way, some of them, I think, are more secular. I think the impact of technological innovation imply the potential for growth in the U.S. by the end of the decade could be close to 3%. And the fact we already have seen for the last couple of years growth of 2.5, 2.8% with inflation falling, is a sign that maybe productivity growth is increasing and potential is increasing and we can grow faster with having lower inflation.
So I'm not Dr. Doom. What? When it comes to tariffs. Just to go back to this idea of the personnel, we know what Jamieson Greer as well thinks about China. In a hearing to Congress, he had talked about strategic decoupling. Do you expect that over the next four years between Beijing and Washington? Yes, I do.
I think that one of the biggest risk is not just tariffs in general, but a broader economic war against China. If least they listen to a long list of complaints of the Trump administration. They say China has been riding on free riding on the international trading system, tired of non-tariff barriers, government procurement policies.
If the policies, intellectual property rights and of course fentanyl and lots of other things and also geopolitical, there may be an attempt to try to contain the rise of China. So the biggest risk is not just tariffs on China, but how much their overall policy toward China is going to be confrontational.
And if they feel that we are trying to contain the rise, they could become quite aggressive themselves. Well, from page of the F.T. today is talking about these four government backed authorities that are telling local chip companies that you can no longer buy silicon from the United States. They're no longer safe or reliable or we already in this moment you're describing.
Well, certainly anything to do with they have a high tech with stock already and they buy by the enemy seems to be in a process of decoupling restriction to exports, both of semiconductor and equipment restriction to anything that's saturated. We have a high and high technology and thereby than was a narrower than high fences and stuff that was supposed to be critical.
So derisking, I think that in the case of Trump administration, we may move from de-risking with China to decoupling with China being something much more severe. It does. Europe need to pick a side. They'll be in a very, very tough position because geopolitically Europeans are close to the United States, Natal and so on, but they do a lot of trade and investment with China under the Biden administration was easier because there was a compromise within the G seven about the de-risking as opposed to decoupling.
It is you have to goes towards decoupling and says Europeans have to follow us otherwise that consequences not just on trade but those on NATO's security and you name it then I think Europe is already weak will be in a very tough response. How much worse could things get for the Europeans? We've been saying through this morning that France is ungovernable at the moment, which means it can't deliver reforms.
And, you know, in Europe, things have to get worse before ultimately they find solutions. How much worse is going to get? Well, things are really pretty bad already in Europe. I think that potential growth is below 1% in Europe. Growth. Europe is going to be in the eurozone less than 1% next year. So in structural reform, I'm not going to court anytime soon.
There's a fragmentation between these 27 countries. Some of them want more integration, some of them want less. At the core of Europe, Germany, Germany and France are going to be politically unstable. So I don't see either the latter report or the Draghi report for more integration, for a common market, for more productive competitiveness being implemented.
So it looks pretty dark for Europe right now, which is the reason why I'm surprised that so many people come in and they say it's priced in. We don't really see a path out of here. We don't necessarily see an economic engine or the political will or capability to really counter it. At what point are we facing off with a potential dollar shock?
And I ask this because, yes, the euro is likely to stay around here a week and further, but what if it actually weakens dramatically as the ECB is forced to cut rates and that divergence widens? Well, there are many good reasons why the dollar may continue to strengthen. One is, of course, tariff, if to reduce the trade deficit is going to strengthen to Trump and say, I want to have actually the dollar at the center of the global reserve system.
And therefore that implies you want a strong dollar, then a weaker dollar relative to differential relative monetary policies. The fact that the US is innovating and capital is flowing into the US capital markets and the stock market all implied that the dollar over time should become stronger, the euro and other currencies should become weaker.
The problem, however, is that Trump says a strong dollar has related to the industrialisation, the American carnage. People are free riding on us to having large trade deficit, and we want at some point a weaker dollar. The fundamentals imply a stronger dollar, but policy that may be an attempt eventually, maybe in the second half of his administration, to find an agreement on currency, maybe to say either you accept 10% tariffs or you accept a 10% depreciation of the dollar.
I would not rule out there'll be some big Mar-A-Lago agreement is this affects agreement. They're always in a resort, you know, Bretton Woods, Marriott Accord Plaza, you know, Louvre and so on. So in Mar a Lago Accord is something that they're going to think about, not in the first two years, but down the line.
They're going to say to the trading partners, you don't want tariffs, you have to do other things for us.
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