저자: HowardMarks · 외국인
요약 보기
금리가 제로 시대의 저금리 체제는 끝났고, 현재 금리는 과거 15년과 비교하면 높은 수준이 아닌 '정상적인' 수준이라는 진단이다. 마크스는 매크로 예측에 기반해 투자하지 않는다는 원칙을 밝히며, 금리가 현 수준에 머문다는 중립적 가정을 전제로 생각한다고 말한다. 과거 제로금리와 양적완화 기간에는 자산 가격이 금리 하락으로 상승했고, 저금리로 차입한 사람은 거의 손실을 볼 수 없었다고 설명한다. 부동산 쪽에서는 4.5조 달러 규모의 모기지가 높은 금리로 재융자되면서, 현재 대출비율을 유지하려면 약 5000~6000억 달러의 추가 자기자본이 필요하다는 추정이 제기된다고 언급한다. 사모펀드는 3~4년 만기 레버리지 대출에 의존하고 있어 이 대출들이 역(逆)담보 상태가 되면 경제와 주식시장, 은행 시스템에 충격이 갈 수 있다는 우려를 전한다. 은행 시스템은 2008년과 달리 위협받고 있지 않다고 보며, 실리콘밸리은행 사태를 교훈으로 꼽는다. 다만 과도한 레버리지를 가진 기업과 부동산에서 손실이 발생할 것이며, 오크트리의 핵심 사업인 부실채권 투자 기회가 커진다는 점을 강조한다. 금융위기 당시보다 현재 금융 시스템 충격은 덜하다고 판단한다. [종목 언급] 개별 한국·미국 종목 언급 없음.
다듬은 글
despite the high level of stimulus from the zero rates and quantitative easing and the resulting decline of unemployment we still didn't have inflation in that period which permitted the FED to maintain the that regime of low in low interest rates and that that's in my opinion what's over now I'm not saying that rates haven't come down are going to go back up I merely say they're they they'll probably kind of skate along here and you know anybody who joined the industry in the last 15 years probably thinks we're in a high interest rate environment today but we're not we're in a normal interest rate environment I would say largely normal and I think whereas and the and so one of the tenets of oak trees investment philosophy is that we don't predicate our investments on macro forecasts we don't believe in macro forecasts especially our own and um and so we try but but interestingly you have to have some thought about the macro environment in order to make a prediction and you have to predict earnings cash flows uh whatever it might be in order to be able to buy an asset so but the answer is that we make neutral assumptions and today I think the neutral assumption is that rates stay where they are so what do you do with that you know do valuations revert to some historic mean you know what happens after 15 years of your two percent loan yeah well uh I mean for for every basic interest rate there's a there's a a range of appropriate uh discount rates or whatever your cap rates whatever you want to call it for every asset and uh you know the the cap rate that is uh a friend of mine bought retail on Fifth Avenue uh 10 years ago at a two and a half cap rate I dare say that's nice I dare say that's not appropriate today you know what is it for that property now seven or eight yeah okay but anyway um you know the other thing is one of the one of the most important lessons is never confuse brains with the bull market and I was talking to Bruce cars my partner uh two days ago we had a call with a client we're talking about this thesis and when I got off I called Bruce and I said you know what occurred to me is just think of somebody who had the idea to buy an asset whether it was a property or a building or a company within the last 15 years and went to the bank and got and bought it with borrowed money just before having interest rates declined steadily you'd have to be seriously deficient person to lose money you know because the the declining interest rates make every asset more valuable discounted present value of future cash flows when the discount rate declines the present value increases and then you borrowed money and every time you had to renew your your loan it was at a lower rate how could you not make money on that basis this was a grade period for uh people who owned assets great period for people who borrowed money and a double Bonanza for people who bought assets would borrowed money but if that's changing if rates are done declining then you have to know that so and I I think I want to save the real estate questions for a little bit later but so some of us have done the math on so rates stay the same the four and a half trillion dollars of mortgage Capital out there is going to refinance at the new rates and there's projections that to maintain current loan to values with these higher rates would require an additional 500 to 600 billion of additional Equity Capital that's just in real estate I want to focus on the broad economy and markets have you if you believe that that where we are today is not only not only the old normal it's the new normal and it's going to maybe be higher for longer maybe forever have you or oak tree thought through okay so like the real estate example if that flows through the economy and I'm particularly concerned about away from Real Estate I think more money is going into private Equity financed probably with leveraged loans three or four year maturities uh we don't have any way of tracking that real estate we can track we know what's going on there um and uh if if those loans are upside down what is the impact on the economy on the market a stock market on the banking system here well you know I put out a memo last Monday about about the banking system a lesson called lessons from uh Silicon Valley Bank and um I I don't think that the bank is threatened I don't the banking system is threatened I don't think it's comparable to 08 uh you know in 08 we we saw a Merrell bear Stearns Wachovia Bank Washington Mutual uh and ultimately Lehman either disappear or require rescues or be acquired uh I don't think this is I don't think this is as as uh as thoroughly uh taken up within the financial system as where the subprime mortgages and the relating rmbs um and of course remember that the the banks at the time were making so much money from packaging uh mortgages into rmbs that they would they would bought buy the bottom tranche in order to facilitate the process right so and I don't think that that the banks own the Bottom now they they I think they own the top I don't think I'm not concerned about the banking system either but the impact on the economy well uh people will you know people are going to lose money because when you when Bob talks about it requiring a half a trillion of equity Capital to to re-equitize the real estate industry uh and you know let's say a similar amount uh for the private Equity industry uh what what he omits to say is that the old Equity might be gone you know somebody's going to eat those losses right right and um you know oak trees uh greatest business is is investing in distressed debt and we started that in 88 and it's been a great business for us but uh it's it's mostly predicated on the fact that even good assets can get over levered and if they're over levered they're the probability of getting through a rough patch declines your ability to get through a rough patch is is all else equal is proportionate to the amount of equity on your balance sheet and of course when things are going well people disregard that and they go for the highest The Leverage they can get because uh you know as they say in Las Vegas the more you bet the more you win when you win um but so I so so what we do is we buy the debt of those over leveraged companies when they suffer difficulty and we'll do and we do it with properties too um and uh because not everybody's going to put in their have their their share of the half trillion right and not everybody has it to put in um and uh you know and people let things go um so uh there will be losses in uh you know throughout the the economy throughout certainly throughout the investment World um and that will you know have a deleterious effect on everything and it'll it'll seem uh you know you you think it's uncertain now when that happens everybody will be certain that it is going down the drain right uh but of course but of course it never does and and remember that I think the global financial crisis was much worse for the financial system than this is and we got through that well
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