저자: CharlieMunger · 외국인
요약 보기
버핏과 멍거가 헨리 싱글턴(Teledyne)의 자본배분 방식을 평가하며 버크셔는 그와 다른 방식(주식 과발행 없이 인수)을 택했다고 회고. 미국 경쟁력의 최대 과제로 의료비 부담(GDP 대비 약 17.5% vs 경쟁국 9.5~11.5%)을 지목하고, 과도하게 커진 증권·파생상품 시장이 인재를 금융으로 쏠리게 한다고 비판. 적대적 인수는 하지 않았다고 설명.
다듬은 글
Well, Henry Singleton was a genius who could uh play chess blindfolded at just below the GR Grandmaster level and never got less than an 800 on any complicated math or physics exam. And uh I knew him. He lived in my community. But he started as a conglomerate where he was very interested in reporting higher earnings all the time so he could keep the daisy chain going.
And when he managed it on the way down, he bought in the stock relentlessly and very logically like a great chess player should. And but he managed those companies on a way more centralized uh basis than Bergkshire has ever operated. And in the end, the great bulk of the enterprises he wanted to sell to us.
and and by that time he was ill and he really wanted to sell to us and of course he wanted Bergkshire stock and we basically said to him Henry we we love you and we'd love to buy your businesses but we don't want to issue Bergkshire stock. So, I don't think you should get the idea that just because he was a genius, he did it better than we did.
You know, he did in some ways because he understood these very high-tech businesses, but uh he played the public markets way better. I mean, we're not interested in doing that actually. No, we're not. and and he and he he was incredible in that and and he made a a fortune for shareholders who stayed with him.
But he was to some extent he looked at the shareholder group as somebody to be taken advantage of and and he issued stock like crazy. I'll bet he did at least 50 acquisitions where yes, he he wanted to use a very fancy price stock. he was playing the game of the 60s and we actually have never wanted to get in that game.
I mean, he promoted the stock and you know, he had the Linton Industries uh background on it and uh it it was a game that worked wonderfully if you didn't care about how it ended up and and uh uh so we have not played that game. He was in terms of wanting to get Bergkshire stock. You know, he essentially was going into the third stage of first issuing shares at overpriced things, buying it back, very underpriced, and then he was going to
sell it to us for what it was worth. Yeah. Exactly. In terms of our own stock. But he was an enormously talented man, and that cool rationality was to be admired. I like our system better. We're more avunkular than Telodine was. It's not the toughest test. Okay. Station nine. I'm wondering if you can elaborate on what the top two or three things you think both business leaders and policy makers should be focused on to preserve US competitiveness.
Well, I would say healthcare cost would be a big item. We're spending we're a country that spending we'll say you get different figures but call it 17 and a half percent or so of GDP and most of our rivals in in the world are paying anywhere from probably 9 and a half to maybe 11 and a half or thereabouts.
So, you know, there are only 100 cents in the dollar. And if if you give up six or seven or eight points of that dollar, I mean, it's just like having a raw material that cost you more or something of the sort. Uh so that will be a major problem in American competitiveness. It is right now and it will it will uh all signs point to the fact that it will become more so.
And it doesn't relate to the Medicare problem, which is a huge problem obviously, but the real problem is health care costs, whether it's in the private system or or or whatever payer system you have. Uh we have a big big disadvantage in cost uh versus the rest of the world. People used to talk about how General Motors had $1,500 a car in healthcare costs that Toyota didn't have.
Well, if they had $1,500 a car uh disadvantage in steel costs, I mean, you know, the the management would be focused on that. If they had $150, if they had $15 difference in steel costs, but but health care costs, which are sort of beyond the beyond the control of any one company, uh promise to be a huge competitive disadvantage.
Overall though, incidentally, I mean, the United States since since the crisis of 2008, we've done very well compared to most countries and our system works. But if you ask me the number one problem for American business, I would say it's that healthcare cost disadvantage. Charlie. Well, I would add that I don't think it does our competitiveness any good to have this grossly swollen securities and derivative market uh markets and the young men from Caltech and MIT going into high finance and derivative trading and so on.
I think this is a perfectly crazy outcome uh in terms of its effect on the country. Anything further? Well, I agree with you about the healthcare, but I find the other more revoling. Charlie's very Old Testament. Yep. And he's right. You persuaded people to sell you their shares when they really didn't want to.
What were your three keys to influencing people in those specific situations? Yeah. I don't think you brought up Sandborn and you brought up uh Seas and uh I don't think the Seas the Seas family there had been a death in the Seas family. Uh it was Larry C, wasn't it? The diamond and and uh he'd been the instrumental um I guess grandson of of Mary C and the operator and there was a the rest of the family really didn't want to run the business.
So, it was put up for sale and I didn't even hear about it until they had had one other uh party uh I don't even know who it was, but that they negotiated a deal with and that it didn't go through. Charlie probably remembers this better than I do, but we certainly the C family and Charlie persuaded me to buy it that uh we didn't persuade them to sell it.
Uh Charlie Yeah, we didn't buy anything from any unwilling sellers. No. And in Bergkshire, we started buying that in 1962 in the open market. It it had quite a few shareholders. It was it was a it was it it traded fairly actively and uh we bought a lot of stock and we did buy a couple of key pieces.
We bought one from Otis Stanton who was Seberry Stanton's brother. But but Otis wanted to sell. It wasn't the most attractive business in the world. I mean, here was a textile company that lost money in most of the previous years and over a 10-year period that had significant losses and uh it was a northern textile company.
So, uh we bought stock in the market, a lot of stock in the market. We had two big blocks from Otis Stanton and from some relatives of Malcolm Chase, but they were they were uh they were happy to sell. I never met at the time I bought the stock from Otis Stanton. Uh I had never met him. So I I'd delivered no personal sales talk to him.
And the same thing is true of the Chase family that uh not Malcolm himself but but some relatives. They sold us a block of 100,000 shares. But we were not out convincing anybody to to sell their stock. Uh uh so there's been been very little that I can remember where uh we we talked to Betty Peters about avoiding a transaction we thought was dumb when was considered merging with Financial Corp of Santa Barbara.
I flew out to see her in in in San Francisco, but she stayed with us. uh she did not sell her stock and remains a shareholder to this day uh 30 plus years almost 40 years later. Charlie.
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