저자: JeremyGrantham · 외국인
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결론: 제러미 그랜섬은 현재 미국 주식·채권·주택·원자재 등 여러 자산이 동시에 버블 상태이며, 과거보다 거품 붕괴 시 자산 손실이 훨씬 클 것이라고 경고한다. 지수투자 관련: 지수투자는 과대평가된 주식까지 모두 담게 되므로 드물게 찾아오는 버블 국면에서 손실을 피하기 어렵다는 점을 지적한다. 다만 장기적으로는 잘 작동하며, 1929·1974·2000년 폭락 후 원금 회복에 수년~수십 년이 걸렸던 사례를 든다. 버블의 특징: 거품은 (1) 가격이 눈에 띄게 급등하고, (2) 막판으로 갈수록 상승 속도가 빨라지며, (3) 언론 헤드라인과 방송에서 대중적 광기가 드러난다고 설명한다. 비트코인·게임스탑 등 투기 자산과 2000년 닷컴 열기를 예로 든다. 과거 사례: 1980년대 후반 일본 시장이 주가수익비율 60배일 때 한 미국 증권사가 매수를 권했으나 다음 해 시장이 붕괴했고, 31년이 지난 현재까지도 고점을 회복하지 못했다고 언급한다. 버블 판단의 어려움: 버블을 일찍 경고하는 것은 상업적으로 위험하며, 강세장에서 일찍 빠져나오는 것이 특히 불리했다고 말한다. 1929·2000·2007년 정점 때 당국자와 전문가들은 기반(펀더멘털)이 매우 좋다고 낙관했다고 지적한다. 연준 비판: 연준은 자산 버블을 제대로 인식하지 못했고, 상승기에는 '부의 효과'를 자신의 공으로 돌리면서 하락기의 역효과에는 책임을 지지 않는다고 비판한다. 2000년 붕괴보다 2007년 주택시장 붕괴의 경제 충격이 훨씬 컸다고 본다. 현재 평가: 현재는 미국 채권시장이 4000년 역사상 가장 과대평가되었다는 견해를 소개하며, 미국 주식시장은 역사상 가장 고평가되었고, 주택시장은 2006년 버블 정점과 같은 소득 대비 배수에 도달했다고 본다. 원자재(비에너지)도 2011년 슈퍼사이클 정점 수준에 도달했다. 이는 3.5개 자산군이 동시에 버블인 최초의 상황이므로, 비관이 찾아올 때 인식된 부의 붕괴 폭이 역대 최대가 될 수 있다고 경고한다.
다듬은 글
the beauty about indexing is you never miss an Amazon or an apple and the bad thing about indexing is you never miss having a lot of overpriced stocks into one of the relatively rare bubbles such as we have now so it's kind of good news bad news if you can ride out the odd 50 decline totally unnecessary of course I'm fundamentals as Chiller pointed out 30 years ago the market has mildly hysterical from time to time and it's totally unjustified by the steady stream of dividends and earnings but it happens and if you want to ride those 50 drops you know good luck it it works out very well in the long long run but it can take you 20 years to get back in the game if you get caught in 1929 it works out just fine but you don't get your money back until 1955.
if you get hammered in 74 you don't get your money back until 87 and then when you've gotten it back for a month or two you give it up again and the same in 2000 by 2010 you're still losing so you have to be willing to ride out and some people feel their lives aren't long enough to take the odd 10 15 20 Wipeout so for those who feel they're brave enough and willing to try I've always thought that sidestepping some of the pain might be a good idea I think they're perfectly straightforward intellectually easy and psychologically disastrously difficult they're easy because in most cases they're so extreme it's like how you notice the Himalayas who when you're standing in Northern India I mean they they come out of the plane and they soar up you can't miss these things 1928-29 was just such a massive rally so the sheer price rise you can't miss secondly just to make it easier the great bubbles have always tended to rise faster and faster towards the end and that's a kind of defining feature also and then thirdly they have all been accompanied by Massive public obvious crazy behavior where the headlines migrate from the the financial page to the front page where they migrate to the opening few sentences of the evening news on the radio of the television and they talk about Market New highs and they talk about what the Bitcoins of the era have done I know it's not a stock but it's a speculative instrument and The Game Stops of the world and back in 2000 most of you will be old enough to to remember the pet.com and the utter craziness of of that period and the same was true of 1929 the same was true of Japan we had a group from Solomon Brothers a leading American brokerage House of the era who came around in 88-89 when Japan was moving to 60 times earnings and explaining that their yields Etc and their interest rates Etc they really should have been selling at 100 times and they were cheap and you should buy them and it didn't start the Japanese Market breaking the following year it has not recovered the high of 31 years ago yet so it's one thing to call a bubble timing it is another thing and maybe even foresight is a curse so just talk to me a little bit about the business pressures of being early or calling a bubble especially in a time of exuberance what we found in 98.99 was that it was far more commercially dangerous to be early getting out of a bull market the thing about the underpinnings is they always look terrific in 1929 the market didn't Peak when they thought the underpinnings were terrible they peaked when the Market's enthusiasm for the underpinnings was approximately the highest it had ever been in history in 2000 in March the world uniformly including the boss of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan they all thought the system had never been better right at the top of the housing bubble in 07 Bernanke and the boys thought the U.S housing market had never declined unquote it merely reflected a strong U.S economy the underpinnings were great they have never gotten it right the Federal Reserve in particular has never had a clue about asset bubbles it doesn't even address it they act as if they don't exist except on the upside they occasionally take credit for the wealth effect helping the economy along and it does right there is an income effect and it does help the economy alone and Greenspan Bernanke and Yellen all took credit uh explicitly for helping the economy along what they never did is they never took discredit for the reverse side the market has been reverting mechanism and eventually it goes back to a fair price and when it went back in 2001 2002 it had a dreadful negative income effect when the housing market collapsed and it took the equity Market with it it had a double pronged negative effect on the economy so it had a much bigger uh impact on the economy then had occurred in 2000 and this time we're really playing with fire because this time unlike 2000 we have an overpriced bond market Jim Graham would argue the most overpriced in 4 000 years we have in my opinion and that of many other bubbles students the most overpriced U.S Equity Market in history we have a housing market that three weeks ago reached the same multiple of median family income as it did in 2006 at the peak of the housing bubble and we have Commodities that have recently run a mug so that the Goldman Sachs index of non-energy which is food and metals which are pretty important have just equaled the peak of 2011 which was said to be one of the super cycle commodity events so this is the first time we've ever risked three and a half asset classes bubbling at the same time if and when we we reach a period of pessimism the potential unraveling in terms of perceived wealth is much greater this time than it will have ever been before
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