저자: HowardMarks · 외국인
요약 보기
결론: 현재 시장은 거대한 버블이라기보다 초저금리가 만든 높은 밸류에이션 상태이며, 금리가 오르지 않는 한 지금 수준 유지는 저금리 지속에 달려 있다. [시장 심리와 정책 배경] 2020년 3월 연준·재무부의 대규모 부양책이 급락을 되돌렸고 S&P500은 2020년 약 18% 상승, 기술주는 더 크게 올랐다. 금리 0% 인하로 손실 공포 대신 놓칠까 두려운 FOMO가 살아났고, 이것이 안전자산에 대한 강한 수요로 이어졌다. [위험 신호] S&P500 PER는 역사적으로 높은 수준이다. 스팩(SPAC) 확산, 적자 기업 IPO 용이, 상장 첫날 높은 수익률, 게임스탑 같은 현상, 개인의 신용거래·옵션 매수 증가가 버블 징후로 열거된다. [밸류에이션 판단] 마크스는 대부분 자산 가치가 금리 대비로는 합리적이라고 본다. 금리가 낮을수록 PER가 정당화되며, 자산 전반이 요구수익률 하락으로 비싸졌다. 다만 자산들이 서로 균형을 이루고 있고, 향후 수익률은 전반적으로 낮을 것으로 봤다. 버블의 전형인 '이번엔 다르다'라는 낙관 심리와 모든 대상이 성공한다는 믿음은 현재 시장에 명확히 존재하지 않는다고 평가했다. [리스크와 조건] 현재 가격 수준의 지속은 저금리 지속에 조건부다. 금리가 오를 수는 있어도 연준이 제로 아래로 내리기 어려워 40년간의 금리 하락 순풍은 끝났다고 본다. 성장과 수익성에 낙관 가정을 두고 현재의 낮은 할인율을 적용하는 것이 가장 큰 실수다. [출연자 전망] 마크스는 '정상 금리' 수준은 불확실하다고 인정하면서도, 금리가 큰 폭으로 오를 수 있다는 가능성을 열어 두었다. 금리가 인위적으로 억제된 상태에서는 자본 배분이 최적이라고 믿기 어렵다고 지적했다.
다듬은 글
we are definitely in a time of optimism and i think that that optimism is largely what i call man-made relating or stemming primarily from the actions of the fed and the treasury to counter the economic weakness of 2020 uh the economies of the world and the markets of the world were cascading down in march of 2020 when the fed and treasury came out with uh programs in mid-month and the fed strengthens its program in on march 23rd uh at that point the market was down about a third uh its fastest decline in uh modern era however the programs worked and produced a rebound the s p ended up the year 18 and the tech stocks were up much more than that and uh the interest rate cut to zero had a profound effect and it produced uh a resurrection of risk bearing fomo fear of missing out took over from fear of losing money and and it really led to a very strong demand for uh security so that that's worrisome the p e ratio on the s p is high relative to history and we see risky behavior ranging from the rapid acceptance of financial innovations such as spax which have uh taken over the uh consciousness of many investors to um the ease of doing ipos especially for companies that are unprofitable and uh and the the very great performance of those stocks on their first day and then we have uh phenomenal like gamestop and so forth which uh and we have the heavy involvement of retail buying margin buying and option buying so a lot of these taken together could be signs of uh of a bubble uh i i but i think that the that most asset valuations are reasonable relative to the level of interest rates the lower interest rates are the higher the pe is that's warranted uh valuations of all assets are higher when interest rates are lower which means that the demanded rates of return on all assets are lower so i think that the p e ratios are justified um and most assets are at equilibrium relative to each other they just all are priced to produce below history returns and uh so uh i think uh bubble connotes unreasonably optimistic psychology um and uh a uh a belief that there's no heart to price too high for the bubble asset and i don't think that those are going on today i just think that as i said all uh prices are up because all demanded returns are down prospective returns are low across the board and that means that the continuation of markets at these levels is contingent on the continuation of low interest rates that's the primary uh conclusion i've drawn one of the features of a bubble is that people conclude that every member of the subject asset class will be a success you know in 1999 everybody said the internet will change the world so you have to get involved in e-commerce and the internet did change the world and all those e-commerce companies well a few of them are household names today but many many are gone uh and uh and the other thing i is that uh in my uh most recent memo i did mention the fact that never before has it has it been more has it been more acceptable to uh to be unprofitable uh you know uh when we started uh the cut the fact that a company lost money would would pretty much put it off limits and today it's not a problem for anybody and and people are lined up uh to invest in companies that are unprofitable uh well you know that that that leads me to the old saying that this time is different and uh john sir john templeton uh uh stated uh several decades ago that that people tend to get into trouble when they start saying this time is different uh they what what they mean is that the constraints of history don't matter the uh the normal business cycle and the normal performance of business in the past doesn't matter and the valuations standards in the past don't matter and and uh as i say when people say those things they get into trouble on the other hand he allowed back in 1985 i think it was that at 20 of the time it really is different and that was then and the world was a pretty static place then and i would say right now it's probably really different 40 of the time or sixty percent assignment and the example you gave was one so uh one of the things that's that's different this time is interest rates uh you know back in 40 years ago in in 81 i had a loan out standing from a bank and i have the i still have the ticket on my wall it says the rate on your loan is now 22 and three-quarter percent today i can borrow two and a quarter percent uh so uh let's talk about the changes that that has produced i mentioned the change on the effect on valuation uh and you know the world has been flirting with negative interest rates do you think we'll have negative interest rates and what would be the impact of that and lastly uh when the demanded return on something is negative its value is infinite so uh what what how do you how do you view how do you factor uh the difference in interest rates and the outlook uh uh and uh you know i've been thinking for a long time since uh 08 actually uh that interest rates have not been naturally occurring uh presumably all of us as investors are capitalists and we believe that the capitalist system the free market system is the best allocator of resources uh but when uh interest rates are administered as opposed to naturally occurring then you can't have great faith that that capital allocation will be will be optimal um another question that you that you uh rightly give credence to you talk about normalizing interest rates but what's normal i mean if you is it 20 is 22 normal is too normal is six normal you know when i started uh managing money when i switched from equity research to high-yield bonds in 1978 the the short-term rate was uh the t bills were nine percent so i would say that your six is not high enough but of course thinking about six or nine today when they pay a fraction of a percent it seems crazy so we know we want to normalize we just don't know what normal is uh the other thing i would say is that um uh well i think the one thing that you and i would agree on is that the big mistake today would be to make optimistic assumptions for growth and profitability and then apply today's low uh discount rate that would be a disaster uh we don't want it we don't want to do the opposite either we don't want to make draconian assumptions and apply nine percent or six percent because that would be nutty but i think that i think that we can all agree that interest rates can go up but not down when the fed funds rate is zero and the fed says repeatedly that they're not going to go negative i think we can go we can agree that the 40-year tailwind of declining interest rates that has lifted the price of all assets is at an end you
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