저자: KenFisher · 외국인
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결론: 실리콘밸리은행(SVB) 파산은 특수한 예금 집중 문제이며 은행 시스템 전체의 전염 위험은 과장됐고, 이런 공포는 오히려 강세 요인이라는 주장. SVB 사태의 원인: 은행 포트폴리오의 장기채 평가손실이 문제였다기보다, 예금자 구성이 벤처캐피털과 그 포트폴리오 기업·임직원으로 극도로 집중되어 있어 VC들이 일제히 자금 인출을 요구하며 뱅크런이 발생했다는 설명. 비교 대상: 같은 지역·규모의 퍼스트리퍼블릭은 예금자 기반이 다양해 동시 인출이 없었다는 점을 들어 SVB의 특수성을 강조. 규모에 대한 오해: 언론이 SVB를 역대 2위 은행 파산이라 부른 것은 명목 예금액 기준이며, 경제 규모 대비로는 1931년 뉴욕 Bank of the United States보다 훨씬 작다(약 4%). 1984년 Continental Illinois 파산은 상대 규모로 더 컸지만 경기침체나 약세장을 유발하지 않았다고 설명. 시스템 건전성 지표: 은행의 지급능력은 총대출/예금 비율로 보며, 이 비율로 보면 대형은행은 도드-프랭크 이후 자본을 강화했고 은행 시스템 전체는 과거 수십 년 대비 양호하다는 주장. 소형은행 일부가 파산해도 전염되지 않을 것이라 전망. 출연자 전망: 은행 전염 공포는 틀린 공포이며 이는 강세 요인(bullish)이라는 입장. 특정 종목·지수의 구체적 가격 목표나 1~3개월 방향 예측은 언급되지 않음.
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just recently Silicon Valley Banks failure along with that of signature failure uh as a bank a lead so many people to fear that this was some contagion like bank failure weakness in the banking system that would lead to widespread failure and downside problems that would be significant uh Moody's for example rating agency one of the three big rating agencies uh downgraded the entire banking segment which in my opinion was an extraordinarily Moody thing to do most of these rating agencies and Moody's in particular just tend to go with the crowd sentiment shifts and it was a statement about sentiment in my opinion but first Silicon Valley Bank problems were very unique and mostly misunderstood most of the public commentary about Silicon Valley Bank has been that which is somewhat true that they in their portfolio that a bank normally uses to be able to liquidate quickly to cover withdrawals that are unusually large on a given day the so-called available for sale portfolio we're using elongated bonds that when long-term interest rates went up tied to earlier 2023 inflation fears felon price and made them have to take unrealized losses bigger than what you'd like to see and they couldn't cover all the incoming requests for withdrawals and well that's true it's really kind of a misnomer because the real problem was they got all these requests for withdrawal and why because what's really unique about Silicon Valley Bank unlike almost any Bank in America not any bank but almost any Bank is that it had an extraordinary concentration in same type depositors those who then ended up withdrawing the money were like peas and pods they were overwhelmingly and unusually so compared to any part of American banking Venture Capital firms The Venture Capital firms portfolio companies the employees of both families and friends of both and when on Wednesday and Thursday VC firms started phoning their portfolio companies and demanding that they yank the money out of Silicon Valley Bank quote before others do that created an extraordinary run on the bank different than let's say some other banks that are similar sized but that have diverse portfolios of donors let me give you an example overlapping in the same geography with a almost exactly the same size and very similar balance sheet was First Republic Bank but it has a very in that same geography overlapping geography it's not perfectly so but hugely so Silicon Valley Southern California a little bit in New York tied whoever VCS are but not the VC depositor base they withstood requests as other family friends and what have you demanded to take money out easily because of the very diverse customer base so they didn't all do it at once now the other thing about Silicon Valley Bank that created fear which is a false fear was the media Fanning the false notion that's also kind of correct but basically false that this was the second biggest bank failure ever and that the New York Bank signature that failed with a concentration in crypto stuff was the third biggest both failing within days of each other Friday and Sunday that's right in one unimportant way if you take Silicon Valley Bank about twice as big as the other it had a little over 200 billion of deposits and that's how you'd measure that and that's what was cited if you take that 200 billion dollars and compare it to the size of the total US economy versus the size of banks that have failed before tied to the size of the U.S economy then then Silicon Valley Bank was even close to the big bank failure ever let me give you an example of that in 1931 as the great depressions building the new york-based Bank of the United States not a federal entity just a commercial bank with that name failed it was the largest bank failure of 1931.
Silicon Valley Bank with 211 billion dollar bill the size of yours economy in 2023 is only to a rounding error four percent as big as Bank of U.S was in 1931 relative size the U.S economy then even though and this is a little hard for people to get their heads around but it's true Bank of the U.S then was only a little over 200 million dollars in deposit the difference is almost 100 Years of both inflation and U.S economy growing about 2500 percent that phenomena which people don't take into account says that Banks then were I mean that bank in particular hugely more important to the economy it's bank failure was hugely more significant detrimental to America if you take the 1984 Continental Illinois bank failure it would have been bigger than signature and Silicon Valley Bank together adjusted that way relative size the economy and didn't even cause a recession didn't cause a bear Market didn't cause any contagion didn't cause other Banks to fail what I'm wanting you to see is those two things then the third one which I think is really the killer item is that the way you basically measure the solvency of a bank is its loans in total compared to the size of its deposits make sense because it's the depositors that'll pull the money out and if you've got plenty of government bonds mortgages and other assets relative to deposits that might get pulled out you can cover the deposits readily and that's always been what banking's been all about fundamentally when we look at all banks in America today small Banks balance sheets are a little bit worse in that way than big Banks big Banks after two thousand seven eight nine were forced by the FED particularly in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank legislation to beef up their balance sheets and the FED has focused on forcing the big Banks to so-called too big to fail Banks to make sure their balance sheets were super strong and stronger than ever but the banking system as a whole I'm going to tell you based on loans to deposits is not as strong as it's ever been but almost as strong as it's ever been in my over 50-year professional career almost stronger that's ever been in my septuagenarian life the fact is if you just look at a chart of that function it keeps improving and isn't quite as high as it was just a little while ago but is higher than it was five years ago 10 years ago 15 years ago 20 years ago 30 years ago and 70 years ago which tells you that the banking system is actually in pretty darn good shape which is one of the reasons why the fears of contagion and downgrading and worrying about the banks and thinking Silicon Valley Bank might fail so maybe this one would or that one would or the other one would isn't really right on now another point to this that I'd like you to see is of course there might be some other banks that fail they would be smaller ones the same principle would apply that it wouldn't spread it's not a systemic problem of importance and therefore fear of a false factor which this fear of Bank contagion is a false factor is always a bullish feature thank you very much for listening to me I hope you found it interesting
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