저자: HowardMarks · 외국인
요약 보기
효율적 시장 가설(EMH)을 설명하며 투자자들의 합리적 경쟁으로 가격이 공정가치에 수렴한다고 주장. 대부분 액티브 펀드는 수수료 차감 후 S&P500에 못 미치며, 인덱스 펀드(뱅가드 1974)가 유리하다고 언급. 다만 EMH는 '틀렸지만 중요하다'며, 시장을 이길 수 있다고 믿을 때만 위험하고 겸손이 필요하다고 조언.
다듬은 글
efficient market hypothesis. And, um, basically, she's saying that there are thousands or millions of investors, and most of them, or at least some of them, are smart, literate, numerate , objective, rational, computerized, and highly motivated to make money. And because their combined efforts force stocks—I'll say "stocks," but that applies to all investments—to have a fair market value.
You see, if there's a stock and it's undervalued, people read about it, they understand it. They place bets on the market. They buy it because it's a good deal. And their purchases lead to a price increase. If there is a stock whose price is too high, they study it. They realize it is overvalued, sell it or open a short position, and their actions cause the price to fall.
So the prices of profitable assets are rising. Overvalued securities become cheaper, and eventually prices converge to what is called fair value. So, there's this thing called " fair value ." This, this, this, actually, are dollars. I won't tell you exactly what it is now, but this is how securities are valued.
Some are below fair value, and some are above. But when all these people I mentioned study the market, they buy cheap stocks, forcing their prices to approach fair value, and sell expensive ones, also forcing their prices to approach fair value. So at the end of this process, everything looks exactly like this, and all prices, all stocks are on this line—the so-called efficient frontier.
Now, on this curve, this axis is risk. There is an assumption that I will discuss in the second chapter. It is assumed that people are risk averse, and since they are risk averse, they need to be tempted by additional returns to invest in risky investments . You know, if I offered you a Treasury bill that guaranteed 7% per annum, or a portfolio of venture capital startups in Silicon Valley and AI, where, with a lucky combination of circumstances, I could bring you the same 7%.
Well, you will choose the bill because it is a certain seven percent, not an uncertain one. Everyone prefers certainty over uncertainty. Which was what had to be proven: you need to be encouraged to take risks. So, the efficient market hypothesis states that, thanks to the coordinated actions of investors, prices converge to fair value and everything is priced correctly .
and you can't beat the market. This, in fact, is the main conclusion of the so-called strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. This is what Sherry mentioned: I went to the University of Chicago and was fortunate enough to get a degree in business there; I joined there in '67, and the Chicago School of Investment Theory had just emerged in '62.
So I was very lucky to be among the first students to be taught these things. And you know, if you've read Malcolm Gladwell's book "Geniuses and Underdogs, " about demographic luck, which is being in the right place at the right time. This is just such an example. It's great to be first in line, and I'm lucky in that regard .
So the efficient market hypothesis states that you can't beat the market, and actually...I would say you can beat the market, but it's hard and few people can. And when I was studying at Chicago, the professor said -- by the way, if you look at mutual funds, " equity" -- that's another word for stocks.
You know, Mark Twain defined the profession as a conspiracy against the laymen, they use all these complicated words, so in the professional environment we say "equity" and you say "stocks." So if you look at equity funds, most of them don't even match the performance of the S&P 500 before fees are deducted, and then they charge a high fee for their efforts, and after fees their performance gets significantly worse.
So when I was there, they said, why not just buy one share of each company in the S&P 500 index? At that time, this did not exist yet, but now it is possible. It wasn't until '74 that Vanguard created the first index fund that simply replicated the S&P 500 index. It guaranteed you the S&P results, and since there was no brainer or effort involved, there were almost no management fees.
It is very cheap and guaranteed to provide average profitability. Of course, the average return isn't that much, but it's great if, on average, most people perform worse, which is exactly what they did. Why did they have worse results? Because they spent time buying this, selling that, buying this, buying twice as much of that , less of that, buying that, and buying that .
And they were paying commissions on all these transactions that added no value because on average they were wrong. So, this is the efficient market hypothesis. When we talked earlier, Sheri asked me, well, do you believe that? And my answer is: it's wrong, but it's important. If you take this on faith, you will never invest because you will think that all your efforts are in vain, and you will only invest in index funds.
But on the other hand, if you ignore it, you will get into trouble, because it is relevant, and there is a lot of truth in it . There are many other investors in the market. They are all trying very hard. My understanding of the importance of the efficient market hypothesis is very simple. Other people are not idiots.
That's what this hypothesis says, and it's true. It's like golf: you think you're going to beat everyone just because you're out there, but they're playing pretty well too and probably no worse than you. So one of the biggest mistakes in life, and especially in investing, is to think of yourself as smart and everyone else as fools.
For example, you wake up in the morning, turn on the TV, and see: General Motors shares are at 64. You say, "Oh, I think they're worth 74." This is a great deal. I'm going to buy General Motors. I can easily make $10. Why are there 64 of them? They are worth 64 because thousands of investors voted with their money that day that GM was worth 64 .
That's why the price is 64—because some people want to buy for that much , some people want to sell , but on average they're willing to make a deal for 64. If you say, "No, it's worth 74," you're saying they're all idiots, because every GM deal for 64 means someone sold it for 64. Are they all idiots, or are you?
Charlie Munger, Warren Buffett's partner, once told me in 2011, "Just remember, none of this is easy, and anyone who thinks it's easy is a fool." Charlie was very blunt and direct, but it's true. After all, everyone is trying to make money. The combined efforts of all market participants have led to the fact that General Motors shares are worth 64, and you come and say: " No, 74," and you turn out to be right, and they are all wrong.
What is the probability of this? You know, that's what people do. They come and say, " Oh, that's too cheap." I will buy it. This is too expensive. I will sell it. This is too cheap. This is too cheap. I'll buy this. I will remove this from my portfolio. I will double this share compared to its weight in the S&P index.
And I'll cut this one in half. And what is the probability that you make these decisions better than others? So, I firmly believe—of course, you shouldn't invest if you think you're never right, but you'll get into trouble if you think you're always right. Therefore, a strong sense of modesty should guide everything you do in investing.
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