저자: ChristopherWaller · 외국인
요약 보기
월러 연준 이사는 경기(실질 GDP 연 2% 내외)와 고용(실업률 4.1%)은 양호하다고 평가. 물가는 PCE 전년비 3.7%, 근원 3.3%로 목표 2%를 크게 상회하나 3개월 근원 인플레이션이 4.76%(2월)에서 3.05%(7월)로 둔화되며 디스인플레이션 신호가 나타남. 8월 물가가 둔화를 이어가면 9월 FOMC 동결을 지지하고, 반전되면 금리 인상을 고려하겠다는 조건부 입장. 에너지 가격과 관세는 지속 인플레 압력으로 보지 않음.
다듬은 글
economic, uh, issues and discussions that, uh, drive these decisions. Prior to that, he was the director of research at the St. Louis Federal Reserve for about 11 years , as well as a professor of economics at the University of Notre Dame. Yes. He was previously, uh, among several people that President Trump was also considering as a candidate for Fed chairman.
We'll be chatting with him and hoping to cover a lot of topics, but before that, Chris has a prepared speech to kick off the discussion. Chris, I'll give the floor to you. OK. Thank you, Howard. Before we begin, let me outline my views on today's economic outlook and its implications for monetary policy.
In short: while inflation remains well above the Federal Open Market Committee's 2% target, recent data suggests that we are finally seeing signs of disinflation. If this trend in the data continues over the next two weeks, I would be inclined to support keeping the federal funds target rate at its current level.
However, there remains significant uncertainty about how military conflicts, trade policies, and artificial intelligence will affect prices and economic activity. If incoming data for August shows that this movement was fleeting, it may be appropriate to raise the policy rate at the FOMC meeting on September 15-16.
Now, after describing my outlook on the economy and monetary policy, I will share my thoughts on how I communicate these views to the public. So, let me start with the real sector of the economy. Despite the uncertainties I mentioned, most of which weigh on economic growth or activity, real gross domestic product, or GDP, growth continues at a solid pace.
Real GDP grew by 1.8% year-on-year in the first half of this year. Consumer spending growth was steady in the second quarter after a slow start to the year. While business investment was strong throughout the period, total real private domestic final purchases—the spending measure that best reflects the underlying strength of consumer demand— rose by a significant 3% in the first half of 2026.
We currently have only limited data for the third quarter of this year, including weak retail sales figures in July. But this decline reflects the fact that the Amazon Prime Day promotion was held in June, which led to a drop in seasonally adjusted sales in July. Excluding non-store sales, retail spending increased.
Given the rise in wealth due to rising stock prices this year, I believe this will support continued consumption growth. In the business sector, data center plans point to continued rapid growth in investment , driven by the deployment of AI and related technological upgrades. Investment in high- tech continues to grow rapidly, and investment in software, which some feared might decline due to AI’s ability to write code, is showing growth at the level of its long-term historical average .
Some may argue that these investments in a narrow sector that is more capital-intensive than labor-intensive are deceptively supportive of GDP and should be somewhat discounted. I disagree with this. Investment in AI is a legitimate part of GDP today, and I expect this technology to remain an important part of the economy after the peak of development is over, when AI becomes as integrated into our lives as the internet.
More broadly, one of the signals of steady growth in business spending was another increase in sentiment among purchasing managers in the non-manufacturing sector in July to a level that I would also call solid. New orders for these companies, which make up the majority of businesses in the economy, continued to rise in July, and the index of supply problems continued to improve.
Today we will receive the results of the August survey in the non-manufacturing sector. So we'll see if this trend continues. Combining the various elements of the economy, I expect real GDP to grow by just over 2% this year. This is a decent result, considering all the uncertainties I mentioned. Now let's move on to the labor market, the state of which is also satisfactory.
Although there were signs of weakening labor demand relative to supply in the second half of 2025, these signs have disappeared. Job creation , while somewhat erratic, has increased by an average of 60,000 per month this year as of July. This is close to estimates, and perhaps slightly higher than what is needed to match slow labor force growth, largely due to much lower net immigration.
Job growth has spread across most sectors of the economy in recent months, and the unemployment rate fell slightly to 4.1% in July —a historically low figure that is just below the median of the FOMC’s long-run equilibrium rate. Layoffs and initial claims for unemployment benefits are also at low levels.
I expect this trend to continue tomorrow when we get the August employment report. Since economic activity and the labor market are in good shape , they are not a determining factor in my decision to set the appropriate monetary policy parameters. But they provide an important foundation for the part of the forecast that I am currently focused on— inflation and my assessment of how well the current policy stance is conducive to returning inflation to 2%.
More on this later. So, inflation is well above the FOMC's 2% target and has been going beyond it for five and a half years. In July, prices based on the Personal Consumption Expenditure Index, or PCE inflation, rose 0.2%. And core prices, excluding food and energy, increased by 0.2%. While I was pleased to see this monthly core inflation figure as it continued the trend of lower readings we saw earlier this year, what caught my attention in the PCE report was that non-market services prices accounted for about half of the increase in core PCE prices.
You probably know that I don't like to remove individual categories from the PCE inflation estimate, but non-market services have always been a problem for me because they are estimated, not actual, price changes. So, ignoring this factor, I believe that core inflation is even better than past monthly figures suggest.
PCE prices are now up 3.7% year-over-year over the past 12 months, and core PCE inflation is 3.3%. While it is important to recognize these 12-month increases because of their real-world impact on businesses and consumers, they are not the best guide to understanding inflation levels today. I say this because, despite the uncertainty about the geopolitical factors that have pushed up prices, I do not see high energy prices and tariffs as a significant source of ongoing inflationary pressure at this time.
Evidence suggests that the price effects of tariffs have already largely been reflected in inflation, and my previous concern that higher energy prices would spill over into many goods and services has not yet materialized. After these price shocks, to determine the current inflation trend, it is useful to focus on more recent price increases, such as how inflation measured over the past three months has evolved over the year.
To deal with the ongoing volatility in energy prices, I will focus on core inflation excluding food and energy, which is usually a good guide to future inflation. So, three-month core inflation is 3.05% as of July, which is still not consistent with the FOMC's 2% target. Nevertheless, it is important to note this trend.
Three-month inflation has been steadily declining from 4.76% in February to 3.05% today . This is a significant change in the three-month inflation rate. This is a significant improvement. And the speed of this downward trajectory is encouraging. One factor that I believe will slightly reduce the level of reported inflation is the expected change in the method by which the Department of Commerce assesses commissions paid to stock traders and related professionals .
This change in the valuation of non-market prices, which I expect to occur in the near future, could reduce 12- month PC inflation by a few tenths of a percentage point. Given my comments on pricing non-market services, I see this as a welcome measurement adjustment. Now I see certain risks of rising inflation.
Energy prices have rebounded and remain significantly higher than in early 2026, and the economy faces both price pressures on technology goods related to the development of AI and the possibility of further tariff increases. But unlike the period of high inflation after the pandemic, wage growth, taking into account labor productivity gains , is broadly consistent with the expectation that inflation continues to decline to 2%.
I also note that public expectations about future inflation may rise after a prolonged period of inflation above the FOMC target. Fortunately, the Fed has a very good track record of delivering on its commitments, and we are not seeing a significant increase in long-term inflation expectations. But this needs to be recognized as a risk that the FOMC should be prepared to respond to if long-term expectations begin to rise and progress in the fight against inflation reverses.
So, this brings me to my monetary policy outlook, which I mentioned at the beginning of these remarks. As of today, the labor market is stable, employment is close to its maximum sustainable level, and inflation is slowly but surely approaching 2%. We will get another employment report tomorrow and another inflation figure before the next FOMC meeting.
I don't expect the employment data to be much different from what we've seen so far. Therefore, my decision on the appropriate policy stance will depend largely on what we learn about August inflation. If progress towards our 2% goal continues, I am prepared to support keeping the policy rate at its current level.
But if inflation turns out to be high, I will consider raising the rate. In my opinion, current policies are only slightly constraining aggregate demand, and it may take a small acceleration in inflation to push me to support tighter policies. If evidence emerges that progress towards 2% inflation has reversed in August, a small adjustment to our stance would help ensure its recovery.
Finally, I want to talk about central bank communication, which I consider an integral part of the monetary policy process. I will distinguish three types of communication that are relevant to monetary policy and explain how I personally try to communicate my views to the public. First, I try to explain why I chose this particular political position.
If I vote to keep rates, I explain how current economic conditions influenced my decision. So, I supported the FOMC's decision in late July to keep rates on hold, as the data at the time indicated stability in the real economy, and we finally saw signs of the beginning of disinflation. So I was prepared to wait and see if this disinflation process would continue.
The second way I communicate is by explaining how future economic data will affect my future policy decisions. In short, I'm trying to describe my response function. Thinking about future data, I'm saying that if— let me emphasize —if data comes in a certain way, then I'm going to advocate for setting some policy.
The key point here is that this is not a commitment to specific political action. This is a conditional statement about policy. A different economic outcome would prompt me to advocate for a different political action. In today's speech, I outlined what would be needed for me to support a further pause, as well as what would make me support strengthening the policy.
By highlighting my reaction function, consumers, businesses, and investors can better understand how I will vote on policy issues for different outcomes and factor this into their planning. Is this response function perfect? No.
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