저자: ChristopherWaller · 외국인
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연준 이사 Waller는 인플레이션이 2% 목표를 크게 상회하지만(PCE 3.7%, 근원 3.3%) 3개월 근원 인플레이션이 4.76%에서 3.05%로 둔화되는 등 디스인플레이션 초기 신호가 있다고 진단. 경제는 2026년 상반기 실질 GDP 1.8%, 연간 2% 이상 성장 전망, 고용은 안정(실업률 4.1%). 8월 CPI/PPI 등 데이터에 따라 9월 FOMC에서 금리 동결 유지 또는 인상 가능성을 열어둠. 현재 정책은 수요를 약간만 억제하는 수준이라고 평가.
다듬은 글
Chris, I'll give you the floor. OK. Well, of the how early signs of disinflation. If this data momentum continues over the next two weeks, I am the impact of on prices and economic activity. If August data shows that this movement was only temporary, it may be worth raising . After describing my views on economics position put pressure on economic growth , real gross domestic product ( GDP) continues to grow at a solid pace.
. After a sluggish start to the year, consumer spending growth was fairly stable in the second quarte indicator that best reflects the strength of consumer demand— grew by is due to the fact that the Amazon Prime Day promotion took place in June, which dragged down seasonally adjusted sales figur increasumption growth going forward.
s related to AI development believe could be hurt by AI's ability to write code, has risen to almost its long-term average. Some , which perversraged. I disagree with this . Investment in AI is a significant componen in the same way continued of non-manufacturing companies in July to a level that I would also call solid.
The number of new orders for these firm report for August. So we'll see if this trend continues. Combining various aspec, which is also in satisfactory condition. , or even slightly above, estimates of increased in rate, just below the median long-run equilibrium rate estimated by FOMC participants.
e situation to repeat itself adjustment of monetary policy. But they provide an important backdrop , which is inflation and my judgment of the extent to which at in a moment. So, inflation is significantly above the FOMC's 2% target and has been above tha Consumer Price Index (PCE) s the trend of lower monthly readings we saw earlier in the year, what caught my eye in last month's PCE report was the prices of non-market services, which accounted for about half of the price increase in the core PCE index.
As you probably know, I don't like to exclude certain rather than actual price changes. So, ignoring this single factor, I believe that core inflation is performing even better than last month's number growth figur what inflation is like currently see increased prices for understand chang. Currently, three-month core inflation as of July is 3.05%, e trend.
Three-month inflation has been steadily fall expect will reduce reported inflation somewhat is an upcoming change in the way non-market price estimate, which I expect in the near future, could lower 12- month PCE view this as a desirable measurement correction. Now I see a certain risk of rising inflation.
Energy prices have risen again and remain significantly higher than they were in early 2026, and the economy faces both pressure on the prices of technology goods due , when adjusted f perceptions of future inflation may deteriorat meeting its commitments, and we do not see should act on reducing inflation stalls.
So, this brings me to my forecast for monetary policy, which I mentioned at the beginning of this speech. howing slow but steady progress toward employment data to deviate significantly from what we've seen before. believe that policy is currently not take a large acceleration in inflation to persuade me to support tighter policy.
slownvey my current . At the time, I was pleased to support the FOMC's decision in late July to keep rates unchanged, as the data at the time led me to view the real economy as strong, and we finally saw hints that disinflation might be beginning. So I was willing to wait and see if disinflation am trying to describe my reaction function.
Thinking about future data, I'm saying that if—I emphasize that word—if the data comes in a certain way, then I'm going to advocate for setting policy in a certain way. The main point here is that this is not a commitment to specific political action. This is a conditional statement of a different political action.
In my remarks today, I outlined what would be needed for me to support an extension of the pause, as well as what would cause me to support a tougher policy. By report on policies given different outcomes and factor this into their future planning. So, is this response function perfect? No. But my years as a professional economist and politician have given me a solid understanding of how policy should respond to shocks.
In that sense, I consider myself a home plate umpire in baseball. The pitcher is trying to get the batter out of the game. The batter attempts to hit the ball or gain a base with a walk. Both want to play, but can't do so until they learn about the umpire's strike zone. The strike zone is a function of the umpire's reaction.
If the ball flies here, it's a strike. If the ball flies here, it's a pain. Players don't expect a perfect strike zone from an umpire. They just need to have a rough idea of its parameters and some guarantee that it won't change with every roll. Perfection is not necessary for them to play well. So when it comes to my response function, I don't let perfection become the enemy of the good.
The third and final type of communication is forward guidance, which sets a path for the discount rate in the future that is essentially independent of input data. This type of communication is most justified when the discount rate is at the effective lower bound and additional communication is needed to guide market expectations.
For example, in September 2021, it was clear to me that we needed to raise the discount rate to combat accelerating inflation. But since this could only happen after the asset purchases were terminated, I supported the forward guidance and clearly signaled the end of these purchases, paving the way for a rate hike in 2022.
With signals to the markets that a rate hike was imminent and would happen soon, market interest rates began to rise. By March 2022, two-year Treasury yields had risen by 200 basis points, and we had not even moved away from the effective lower bound on the discount rate. So, in this example, the forward guidance helped strengthen economic conditions long before we actually raised the rate.
But it is important to remember that these actions were taken when the discount rate was close to zero . I agree with Chairman Powell that forward guidance is inappropriate now or in many other situations, but when it is truly needed, I believe it should be used. I think I've said enough on this. So, Howard, let's move on to your questions, which I'm sure will be more insightful than most of my answers.
Thank you, Chris. We'll move over here, to the chairs. Please. Thank you again for the detailed and, as always, provocative speech . Let me start by saying that this has put a lot of responsibility on the consumer price index, and I'm sure the rates on it will now fluctuate constantly. Let's dig into this a little bit , if we can.
The 2% inflation target is set s (PCE) index. It is different from the Consumer Price Index (CPI). So you need to convert the CPI into PCE. Tell us more about what you will pay attention to on September 11 when the new CPI report is published to understand whether the data is bad or whether the situation continues to improve.
Yes. Once you get the CPI and the producer price index a day later, you have a pretty accurate idea of what the PCE will be like. That's why we can focus on these two numbers, as they indicate quite accurately what will happen next . Therefore. I have been arguing for over a year that the customs effect on the price level will run out and by the summer we will see a rapid drop in inflation.
The energy shock at the beginning of the year added some uncertainty to this. But if we go back to January 2025, core PCE inflation was around 2.3%. We weren't that far from the goal. So if the downward effect that I talked about comes true—and it's almost a whole percentage point— we should see much lower numbers.
I think that's what we're going to start seeing . As I said, energy prices have not yet spread to other goods and services. I guess my expectation is that we will get acceptable CPI and PPI numbers next month. Yes. Now people will accuse me based on individual data. I think you've already started doing that.
But what I'm trying to point out is that if you only look at the trend, you'll always miss the tipping point. Turning points are not reflected in the trend. That's the whole point. So when you reach what you consider to be a tipping point, you have to pay more attention to short-term data if you want to catch it.
Oh, in the speech I gave in July, I tried to argue that I thought we might be at a tipping point on inflation. It could go up, but I thought it would potentially start going down. Two indicators have arrived , they look exactly like this. I'm willing to sit, wait, and be patient to see if there will be a third.
But if the situation changes, then, you know, it's time to act and raise the stakes. So, regarding the CPI, will the underlying figure matter compared to the overall one? Well, definitely the underlying one, because the overall index is usually a bit noisy for estimating future inflation. This doesn't mean we should ignore energy or food.
I never said that. But for inflation forecasting, we try to rule this out, given the volatility of energy prices this year. This is a perfect example of why you should look past the overall index and focus on the underlying one. OK. So, to avoid being too dependent on the data, give us a benchmark for the three-month CPI, what level do you think would tip you in one direction or another ?
Yes. I mean, I'll just say: if the indicator turns out to be high, and the definition of what " high" is, I'll leave it to you. Good. Then you will understand that two indicators are not enough. This has happened to us in the past. We had soft summer numbers , and then inflation went up again. I got burned on this in 2024, for example.
So I don't want to give a numerical estimate, but if the numbers start to drop this three-month figure , right now it's 3.03 . If you lower it to somewhere around 2.8, it will be fine. Then you must take action. Just continue to hold at the current level. So let's talk about the change in PCE methodology, and also the index that Chairman Powell gave us at Jackson Hole last week, where he focused on what portion of the PCE basket is growing more than 3%.
Yes? So, a) is this index a good fit, and b) what is the risk of acting in September guided by this CPI when the PCE target could get a revision in two weeks that would lower it. Yes, that's exactly what I mean . We all expect that revision will bring this figure down. So if you add that to what's happening in the data, you can see a significant drop in core PCE.
So if it's 3.3 now, it'll drop to about 3.1, right? And then, if we get good data, it will drop below three on an annualized basis, and even lower on a three-month basis , right? So I'm willing to take the risk to see, you know, to paraphrase John Lennon: give disinflation a chance, okay? We can wait for one meeting.
I just don't see why we have to do this now. The mistake is that if we are indeed at a tipping point and disinflation is starting, as we have long expected, or at least I have expected, then you raise rates during disinflation, you are too late, or you are too hasty, you are too reliant on the past.
That's why I ask: what is the price of waiting for one meeting? A 25 basis point rate hike now will not bring CPI down to 2%. Of course. So come on, I think it's risk management. You want to check whether disinflation continues, but I don't see much risk in that . Of course. In July, when you talked about this, it seemed like your approach was leaning towards an increase in the near future.
It seems your position is shifting towards Yes. Because that's exactly what I mean . In July, we saw about six months of growth in core PCE . Instead of falling, it grew. So the trend was saying: things are bad, get ready to act. But we got a soft report, and then the question was: can we wait one session to see if this continues?
And I felt that it was . And this was confirmed. We received another rather mild report. Even, as I said , if you exclude non-market services, it was around 0.12, right? Okay, maybe we'll see if there's another one, right? And to make it clear to the audience, these non-market services, for example, commissions to brokers, which depend on stock market prices.
This is not supply and demand in economics. And this is also a quantity. It's like saying: if you buy more shares, you'll pay more, right? Their commissions, their overall commissions are increasing. So you're mixing up price and quantity when you look at this. That's why I, you know, welcome the efforts to somehow fix this thing.
In the past, it wasn't a big problem, but for some reason over the last year it's become... I mean, these professional finance fees—it's almost all that increase in prices for non-market services. So you wonder if you let something alone move half of the PCE, and that's not even the actual measured price.
Maybe you just want to say, let's put this aside. And I hate to do this, but this is one of those times where I think it's worth at least keeping an eye on it. Let me move on to a few other aspects of what you just said, regarding the discussion of inflation. So, 2%+ growth is good for the economy. This is above the long-term trend, right?
So I guess the question is whether this is a non-inflationary type of growth, or whether it is stretching the output gap to the point where you feel like the underlying pressures in the economy are pointing towards higher inflation because we are stretching our productive capacity . Yes. I mean, if you increase your production capacity, the potential output increases.
So this isn't inflation, right? I mean, we always...it's not something new that the Fed discovered. The Fed and research staff have been doing this forever. So when you take production growth, you look at the potential and then you say where you are relative to the potential. So, if potential is growing and it is closer to actual, then the output gap or, as we say, excess demand is not so bad.
Not bad. So you can see disinflation even with fairly good growth. So, do you feel like the potential is growing now? I think so. We have been watching this for the last few years. We've seen growth go up, productivity has increased for many reasons other than AI. This started before AI. Mhm. AI will probably do this someday.
I think it's amazing technology. I watch my wife program all day long . It's just amazing what she can do with it. What is her best program to date? What exactly? What is her best program? I can't tell you. I don't want to advertise what my wife does. So, I'll probably get arrested. So, um, but I just watch what she does with it , and I'm really excited about what she can do with coding and stuff.
So I think that's it . I mean, I heard a joke recently that's a paraphrase of Robert Solow. We see AI everywhere except in corporate profits. Okay. Yes. You know, we think it will manifest itself someday, but it hasn't happened yet. Another aspect: you mentioned that you don't consider the current monetary policy settings to be too restrictive .
You and the chairman seem to be in agreement on this issue. This is what he said at Jackson Hole . The current policy does not seem to restrict anything. So this is a strong argument in favor of the idea that perhaps rates need to be raised. Yes. I mean, I've said this before. There is a difference between financial conditions on Wall Street and Main Street.
Mortgage rates aren't low, are they? Car loans and their rates are not low. How do ordinary Americans look at , you know, credit spreads and all these other rates on corporate bonds. They ask: what's in it for me ? I don't understand. I've made this argument in the past: what looks like loose financial conditions is actually a reflection of stock market prices.
I'm looking at macro data. This is what worries me. And if I see that the housing sector is in decline, and new cars have become almost a luxury item, not something affordable for the average family. These are not soft financial conditions, and most of the shares are not owned by the bottom half or even three-quarters of the population.
They are concentrated mainly in the top 25 % of the income distribution. So, given such a differentiated outcome for different households, do you think that the current level of policy could get us back to 2%? Yes, okay. I think so. At least let's try and see. As I said, I'm not advocating waiting until next year, but let's just wait and see if there's any progress here.
Um, let me go over, if I may, I think it's pretty clear. Okay, okay. I hope so. Anyway, bond markets, rising yields , and let me start by saying, I know you're not into fiscal policy , but just as a less informed to a more informed, taxpayer to taxpayer, what do you think about the U.S. national debt right now?
Because I want to provide some context. Everyone in your shoes always says, you know, $40 trillion, 6% of debt to GDP, three trillion dollars a year is spent on interest now. This is an unstable situation. " Unstable" is a very strong word, but it's also somewhat empty, because it raises the question: within what time frame, right?
So, are we on the brink of collapse or not? And if not, where is she? So, when it comes to fiscal policy, I mean you have about a 6% nominal deficit, half of which is interest. I don't know the exact numbers, so no...yes. But that means you have about a 3% structural deficit. We can't do this all the time.
You simply can't . Therefore, it is not so much a matter of percentage. Drop the percentage. This is the structural part after the interest. It's as if you're simply spending more than you earn, fundamentally subtracting interest payments. Most calculations, no matter what you do, show that you can't do this long term.
So, does this mean you will fall into the abyss? Maybe not. You might see what we're already seeing— yields start to rise because people say, "Look, you have to pay me more to hold this debt." I will not stop funding. "Just pay me more." And that is exactly what I have argued is likely to start happening.
So profitability will likely increase due to fiscal matters and competition from AI for funds. Remember, when AI was first developing, they used their own internal resources. They didn't take anything from anyone. They now compete with the U.S. Treasury in the corporate bond markets. So I believe this is a factor that is pushing up yields.
And the last thing that no one focuses on is interesting research. US Treasury bonds, as the reserve currency and safe liquid asset in the world, had a premium in the form of a higher price and lower yield. There was interesting work by Hannah Lustig at Stanford Business School and her colleagues about this prize disappearing, right?
Now it is negative. That's why, yes. So that's another reason for this shield, and a few years ago in Iceland I gave a speech about the neutral stake. And my biggest concern about the rise in neutral rates was precisely that there was no longer a premium for safe, liquid U.S. Treasury bonds. And that forced me to raise my estimate of the neutral rate.
What does higher interest rates mean at any level of inflation? Maybe you're not as restrictive as you thought, and that's okay . Yes. Yes. Yes. So, you mentioned math, so let's talk about math for a minute. Mathematically, how difficult is it for the US to climb out of the debt hole? Well, it's not that hard if you can reduce the structural deficit closer to zero.
I mean, that was the best idea since tax time, right? As I said, all I'm saying is that 3% structural deficit is unsustainable. How to fix this—I don't have any advice. Of course? This is not my job. And it's Congress's job to figure out how to fix it. I'm just curious how the lines intersect when looking at growth alone.
Yes, first of all, this is nominal growth . Remember, the debt-to- GDP ratio is debt to nominal GDP. And you know, the bad news about this argument is that you're doing it because of inflation, right? What did the US government do after World War II? They inflationarily devalued a huge portion of the debt.
This is not a very good result. It doesn't make people richer. You want real GDP growth. But, you know, that's exactly what I mean . If your deficit is growing by 6%, and you have growth of even 3% and inflation at 2%, then this ratio is growing. It still adds to it. It still increases it. It's just arithmetic.
It's just arithmetic. There is nothing political here. It's just math. I mean, it's just like that. So let's talk about profitability in the world, because there seems to be a certain point, and you hinted at it a little bit, but let's go into a little more detail. You know, there's some good news, right ?
which seems to be the one that the Treasury Secretary and the Fed Chairman are leaning towards, that all of this is the result of a sudden abundance of investment ideas. There is real competition for capital directed towards productive purposes, which means there will be competition for available funds, and as a result, profitability will increase.
The bad scenario is that demographic challenges, a certain fragmentation of the world order and the higher inflation it causes, as well as fiscal deficits, which are observed not only in the US but almost everywhere in the developed world, all accumulate, and a difficult adjustment awaits us ahead .
At the moment, it does not appear that the Fed will lose control of inflation. Inflation remains stable, but how do you feel about the dilemma: is this good because people are investing money in the cause, or is it just that life has become too expensive and we are driving ourselves into a dead end?
Yes. So, frankly , in any standard model of economic growth—without going into too much detail—real interest rates are determined by two or three key factors. The first is population or labor force growth. Well , it is zero. This will reduce profitability, right? And it won't increase , right? If you have good growth, you will see higher profitability because firms can afford to pay higher real rates.
Their products or investments become more profitable, they can pay higher rates, and this is an indicator of healthy growth in real rates. The third factor is what I just said. There is a return on the convenience of this debt, and it is disappearing. Well , that will raise the stakes. This is not a very good story.
It's more of a bad story if you're losing profitability from convenience. So, that's part of the story, but I'm not convinced it's the whole story. There are many other factors. There is also a term risk premium. If you look at growth, it's all a real term risk premium, right? This means that investors are saying: I'm not entirely sure where the world is heading.
I'm not entirely sure about the dollar's status as a reserve currency. Maybe I need to be paid a bonus. And again, that's not very good. But growth is certainly part of it. Right. So, this is partly good news, partly bad news. And what is relatively controllable is probably the bad news side, right?
To fix some structural problems. Yes. If you fix some of them, you can achieve a lot. True. So, let me ask you about some recent action in the Treasury bond market. I think the Treasury Secretary and the Fed Chairman got a good deal in Asheville at the G20 regarding what's going on, as well as the recent Treasury interventions and buybacks.
Did any of this surprise you ? You know, the affairs of the Ministry of Finance are the affairs of the Ministry of Finance. You know, um ...As an economist, not a politician, I've never believed that such short-term interventions produce much. But, you know, if they want to do it, it 's their right to decide whether to do it or not.
Of course. Are there any implications for the Fed? Well, if you think these interventions had a very short-term impact on long-term profitability, then no, none. True. If they want to adjust something and it's somehow justified, maybe they're correcting certain distortions, that's fine too. I have no problem with that.
So let's get to what the Fed chairman mentioned in Jackson Hole: he prefers to get unfiltered market views. And if the Ministry of Finance becomes more active in this, it probably creates distortions in the market, right? This is related to an issue he also raised. This brings us to the issue of communication.
This is a " hall of mirrors" problem, right? Are you seeing a pure market signal and an undistorted price, or are you in a situation where the Fed is talking to the markets, the markets are talking to the Fed, and you're not really getting an objective picture of the world. So, is this a problem now?
Are you in this circular "hall of mirrors"? Well, I'll give you an example to explain the situation: as many of you know, I lift weights. Yes. And my wife is my coach. Yes. This is that application. Yes. And the first thing she told me when I started training was: don't look in the mirror. I asked: why not?
She replied: because if you start looking in the mirror, you worry more about how you look than what you do. So don't look in the mirror. Focus on technique, do the exercise, and don't worry about how it looks . I'll tell you what it looks like. So, with the problem of the " mirror maze" in communications, the situation is approximately the same.
Just don't look in the mirror. And if you noticed, in my speech I said almost nothing about financial conditions. I look at macroeconomic data . Macroeconomic data is not part of the " mirror maze." So if you focus on your work and the metrics that really matter, you can view the financial market as a kind of indicator of what's going on .
But ultimately, our mandate is price stability and full employment, not financial conditions. Here's how I've always managed to avoid it: I just look at the macro data. So just don't look in the mirror. Former Deputy Chairman Rich Clarida seems to have had the same explanation a few years ago. He wrote about this and noted that this is not a problem, because you can compare market data with survey data, econometric data, and many other sources to see if they are consistent with each other.
So, in your speech today, you very clearly outlined what you call your " response function." The chairman at Jackson Hole said, "I won't do it." Because it can't be perfect. You use a baseball metaphor to explain that it doesn't actually have to be perfect. It just has to be, you know, generally parametric to outline broad boundaries, right?
So what is the optimal way to do this? Yes. As I said, if you take any standard macro market model for forecasting, you need a rule of thumb for how the Fed will react, otherwise the model won't work. You won't be able to make a prediction. I think every Wall Street research firm has some kind of reaction function built into it.
There are many different reaction functions that can be used, but the key is that they are consistent in how they respond to events. If inflation rises, you raise rates. If GDP is growing, look at inflation to decide whether it needs to be compensated. If unemployment rises sharply, rates may have to be lowered.
This is basic economics. You don't give any weird advice. That's what I mean by reaction. I'm simply using economic theory to determine what I should do as a central banker if unemployment exceeds its long-run maximum, if inflation starts to rise, or if it starts to fall. So, the exact number is sometimes where the imperfection arises.
I can't necessarily tell you what the right number is, but at least I can give you a qualitative indication of the direction things are going to go, right? Because I mean , it occurred to me that you're not just addressing the financial markets, you're addressing the public, shaping societal expectations.
So if we all act blindly, it's probably worse than if we had some kind of awareness. Yes, you want to have at least something, like I said, that's the point of the strike zone. She is not perfect. It doesn't...and it varies from judge to judge. Right. Right. Right. But the players just say, "Just tell me how it is." I don't care, as long as I just know what it is , and then I can move on.
Right. So is the head, as you called it, is the head now allowing the perfect to get in the way of the good? What do you think? Well, I think that's exactly what his statement said. You know, it's like, "I'm not going to say anything because it's so complicated that we can't really do it ." OK. I mean, that's good, but I just have a completely different perspective on it.
Right. So, let's talk about communications, uh, more broadly. Because there was, uh, and I think you could look at it from two perspectives, you know, more than Kevin Warsh, more than the head, some people say, "There's too much chatter, it's getting too confusing; one person says one thing, the other person says another ." However, if you go back to the 80s and 90s, there were really, uh, significant political battles in the US over the transparency and secrecy of the Fed.
There have been bills introduced, there have been efforts to open up access, use freedom of information laws, and since then the trend has been to say more, not less, right? Quite consistently. So are we at a point where you think this drive for transparency and more information, not less, has reached a point of diminishing returns, or is that a problem?
You know, I was looking through the academic literature from the 80s and 90s , that's when it all started. Yes. It's like, why do you want to surprise people? What is the benefit of this? I used this example for years when I taught my intermediate macroeconomics course . If you were the state department of transportation and you were going to close three lanes of a highway for construction, right?
You can do two things in your communication. You can say nothing and let people just fall into this construction zone and get into trouble. Or you can start giving them signs in advance, saying, " Look, there's construction ahead. Look, there are alternative routes." Which of these two worlds do you want to live in ?
I think we would all prefer to have information in advance to make better decisions. So that's my view on communicating and providing, I don't want to call it predictive guidance, but providing some insight into what's ahead, right? so that you can make any important decisions that you make. So, I mean, if we expect this from a state department of transportation, I would think it's not bad to expect this from a central bank, right?
I mean, do you think that in this era, where suspicion is the default mood, it's a good idea to hide behind a wall and say, "Listen, we're better off this way. Trust us if you just let us, you know, stay out of the loop." Well, that was the old model in the past, we just, you know, never explain, never apologize, right?
Ah, good luck returning to that world. It just doesn't work. and it is not a good model for thinking about economic well-being . So I try to communicate as best I can so that people can make the best decisions they are capable of. Surprising people has never been my goal when I think about things. Now, that doesn't mean you won't be surprised.
Sometimes it's just inevitable, but that's not my goal to try to say, " Look, whatever I do, it's going to be a surprise." Um, let me sum it up . We're running out of time, but on the working groups : Fed Chairman Warsh announced five working groups: communications, balance sheet, AI and productivity, inflation base, and I forget the fifth one.
Yes. Yes. So, which of these issues were talked about a lot ? Data was the fifth question. Many of them are quite new. You know, AI and productivity—it's kind of coming into focus for the first time . in an acceptable manner. Um, what do you think has the best chance of a quick result from this in terms of actionable recommendations from various committees that the FOMC could implement so that in six months or a year people will say, "Yes, this is a better way to work." Yes.
I mean communications, because we've been talking about it for my entire 17 years at the Fed, and as you just pointed out, it goes back to the 90s. So there are some small improvements that can be made, but we just did a complete review of the structure where we discussed communications, and you know , people have very strong views on how to communicate and what is right, just take the scenario analysis that Chairman Bernanke promoted last year, right?
People's reaction was, I kind of appreciated it , but the resistance was quite strong. So I'm not sure anything new will come out of this . As for balance, this, in my opinion , is exactly the issue where there will be the most differences in views on how to proceed. If you want to reduce the demand for reserves, but stay within sufficient reserves, I don't mind.
But if you want to say that we should move to deficit reserves, I would be categorically against that. Regarding private data — great , we use private data all the time. What worries me is that if you start making decisions based on private data that is not available to the public, the public, and of course the market, will pay too much attention to what you say, thinking that you know something that I don't.
You also risk losing confidence in yourself. If I can't verify what you're saying with data, then I'm going to have a trust issue, and that's not good. As for AI, who knows? This is still a matter of the future, and we are not necessarily developing monetary policy for two years ahead right now. Yes.
Epic. Yes. And the issue of inflation may , frankly , be the most interesting. I don't know. I know the people on that committee . They have very different views. So I wonder what they'll come up with. But if they have some new inflation model that will help me predict better, give it to me. I am willing to try to make it better with open arms.
Yes. Good. Well, that concludes this. Thank you so much, Chris, for being here, and thank you to everyone who watched and listened to us.
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