저자: HowardMarks · 외국인
요약 보기
시장 사이클은 성장과 주가가 과도하게 치우쳤다가 교정되는 '과잉과 조정'의 반복으로 이해해야 한다. 사이클은 완전히 같지 않지만 낙관, 위험 회피 약화, 자본 과잉이라는 공통 테마가 반복된다. 강세장은 낙관 과열, 위험 회피 소멸, 과잉 유동성이 겹칠 때 형성되며 이때 자산 가격은 본질가치를 웃돈다. 투자자는 본질가치 대비 가격과 시장 심리를 점검해야 한다. 사이클 고점에서는 위험이 크고 저점에서는 기대수익이 높지만, 심리 때문에 대부분 반대로 행동한다. 특정 자산에 대한 방향 예측 발언은 없다.
다듬은 글
I believe there are cycles, and that they are extremely important to understand. I believe there always will be cycles. I have followed cycles for 50 years, and I think I've been able to help our clients by dealing with them. Halfway through writing the book, a thought occurred to me: why are there cycles at all? That is a really important question. The US GDP grows about 2% a year on average, so why doesn't it just grow 2% every year? Sometimes it grows 3%, sometimes 1%, sometimes 4%, and sometimes it's negative in a recession. The S&P 500 has returned about 10% a year on average for roughly 90 years, so why doesn't it give 10% every year? If you look at the history, the return is rarely between 8 and 12. It's usually much better than 12 or much worse than 8. So why isn't the average the norm? This is a very important question to understand, because it's the key to dealing with cycles. The answer is simple: positive trends in the economy or the market eventually go to excess, and those excesses correct on their own, or are corrected. Most of what I'll talk about for the rest of this section comes from that.
So rather than thinking of cycles in terms of ups and downs, which I always did and most people do, I think it's better to think in terms of excesses and corrections. Excesses are when things go too strong, and corrections are when they go too weak. Why do we get excesses? Because people are involved. This is not mechanics and not physics. This is an area where people have a very strong impact. The great physicist Richard Feynman said physics would be much harder if electrons had feelings. When we walk into this room and flip the light switch, the lights come on every time, because the electrons flow from the switch to the fixture every time. The electrons never say "not today, I'm tired," they never go in the wrong direction, they never go on strike, and they always do what they're supposed to do. But in my opinion, people rarely do what they're supposed to do, especially at the extremes. Because economies and markets are made up of people, and people have feelings, we get cycles.
For example, positive feelings can make company directors anticipate big demand, so they build a factory, hire workers, and produce for inventory. If they all do it at the same time, we get a period of above-average growth from the factory building and inventory production. That's what's called an upcycle. Positive investor psychology causes stock prices to grow faster than the value of companies. The value of companies may grow 6, 8, or 10% a year on average, but in the 1990s, for example, US stocks in the S&P 500 appreciated 20% a year. The value of companies was growing at one rate, and the price of stocks was growing at another. That's dangerous, because it creates an excess. Eventually the excesses get corrected. If every factory management builds a new factory, hires workers, and produces for inventory in anticipation of strong demand, we may reach a point where there are too many factories and too much inventory, earnings disappoint, and then they close the factories, lay off workers, and sell from inventory rather than produce. That gives a period of below-average economic growth, or maybe negative growth, which becomes a recession. Likewise, if prices outstrip the value of companies long enough and become too high, they can't stay up or keep rising. They have to flatten out or decline. That's a period of correction. So bullish periods are followed by bearish periods. It's the creation of excesses and corrections, and I think it's better to think of cycles that way than as ups and downs.
The next important question: are these cycles dependable? The best way to answer it is another quote from Mark Twain: "History does not repeat, but it does rhyme." This theme runs through my book. The details of cycles are always different from one to the next: the amplitude of the fluctuations, the length of the cycle, and the speed of the fluctuations are all different. The causes of the cycles and their effects, the ups and downs, are different too. People often ask me, "Which cycle from the past is this one like?" It has some characteristics of others, but it's never quite the same. History does not repeat, but there are certain underlying themes that do repeat, or rhyme, from one cycle to the next. If we can learn to recognize them, we can be ahead of the game.
In my time in this business I've lived through about half a dozen important bull markets, and in general they share certain themes. Here they are: too much optimism, too little risk aversion, and too much capital availability. Those three things together are a pretty good recipe for a bull market, and it's hard to imagine a bull market without them. These are the themes we should associate with a bull market, meaning a period of appreciation to excess.
Let's talk about the three, starting with optimism. Many people think asset price rises are produced by good events. But the connection isn't just between events and prices. It's between events and psychology, and between events and how they are perceived, that produces changes in asset prices. The role of perception and psychology in setting asset prices is extremely important. All things being equal, a high level of optimism will cause things to be priced high relative to their fair value, or what we call intrinsic value. In my opinion, it's the professional's job to figure out the intrinsic value of each stock, company, or building. I want to buy when the price is below intrinsic value and sell when it's above. I think that's a simple recipe for how an investor should behave. So we have to figure out intrinsic value, but clearly, in a period of great optimism about the future, prices will tend to be high relative to intrinsic value. We want to know that. The higher the optimism, most of the time the higher the price. As I say here, if I could know only one thing about every investment I was considering, it might be how much optimism is priced into the shares. That's an important element in considering every bull market.
Second, risk aversion. Most people don't think about it every day, but it's extremely important. Most people are afraid of losses, meaning they are risk averse. If most people make a thousand euros, they're okay, but if they lose a thousand euros, they feel terrible. So for most people, losses count more than gains. Most people are biased toward risk aversion, and risk aversion is a very important ingredient in markets. When people are risk averse, as they should be, then if they consider an investment, they study it thoroughly, make only conservative assumptions, and are rigorous in their analysis. They demand a margin of safety. I want to be sure that if things go poorly, I'll be okay. They demand risk compensation: if they're going to do something risky, they want an exceptional return as the potential reward. When we have risk aversion, conservatism, caution, diligence, and demands for risk premiums, we can say the market is safe and sane. But when people get excited about the future and about what's been going on, they forget to be risk averse. They become risk tolerant and accept risk. When that happens, they say, "It's not so important to do due diligence or make conservative assumptions, because if I'm too careful I'll miss something and my friend will get it." There's a book by a man named Kindleberger who says there is nothing worse for your mental condition than watching a friend get rich. Eventually in the market, fear of missing out takes over from fear of losing money, and then people do bad things. So we have to understand whether the market is based on risk aversion or risk tolerance. When it's risk tolerance, because people are excited, we have to understand that the market can be a dangerous place.
Number three is the impact of capital availability. The market is an auction place. A good way to think about it is the loan market. You want to borrow some money, so you go to several banks, and each one tells you what they'll do to provide you money. But if there's too much capital in the hands of people, and they're too eager to put it to work because they're afraid of missing something, the bidding goes too high and prices become excessive. At that point the prospective return is low and the risk is high, and we want to know that. "Too much money chasing too few deals" are the seven worst words in the world, and it happens from time to time. I wrote a memo in February 2007, before the global crisis, titled "The Race to the Bottom," because the bidding was too strong. That meant the winners of the auction were winning the opportunity to make bad loans and buy overpriced securities. We can figure out when that's the case if we have exceptional judgment, and we can act accordingly.
To sum up the subject of cycles, let me walk through a typical one. Let's say we start after a bad experience, at a low point, and then things begin to head up. On the way up, economic fundamentals are improving, earnings are increasing and beating expectations, and the media report only good news, because that's what they do. As a result, investor expectations for the future rise. Psychology gets stronger, and people perceive only favorable developments. Capital is readily available and asset prices rise. Holders of assets are happy and want to buy more, and people who haven't been in the market are unhappy, out of jealousy, and begin to buy. Everybody wants to buy and nobody wants to sell. Risk aversion evaporates, and people say, "Risk is my friend, the more risk I take the more money I make, and anyway I don't see much to worry about." When that becomes the case, prices go too high, and eventually we reach what investors and professionals call a top: the maximum price beyond which the market will not go. At the top, asset prices are high, prospective returns are low or negative, and risk is high. This is the time for caution, but most people are unable to be cautious at the top, since the high in prices corresponds with the high in emotion. No one is willing to bear the risk of selling and missing out on future gains. That's human nature.
Eventually the top is passed and we're on the way down. On the way down, economic fundamentals deteriorate, earnings decline and fall short of expectations, and the media report only bad news. As a result, investor expectations decline. Psychology gets weaker, and people see only undesirable developments. Asset prices fall, holders of assets are grim and sell, and people who never held assets pat themselves on the back for their wisdom but, of course, refuse to buy. Risk aversion grows, and investors flee from risk, saying bearing risk is just another way to lose money. "I don't care if I ever make a euro in the market again, I just don't want to lose anymore, get me out." The worse things go and the lower prices go, the more people want to sell. That's human nature. All you have to do is understand human nature. At the bottom, asset prices are low, prospective returns are ultra high, and risk is low. This is the time to be aggressive in the market, but most people are terrified at this point, because the low in prices corresponds with the low in psychology. They just can't move ahead because they're depressed and cautious.
That's a cycle, and you can see how events conspire to make people do the wrong thing. Nothing says sell at the top other than your own mentality, and nothing says buy at the bottom. We see this all the time, and it's human nature. It will never change.
Comments 0