저자: NourielRoubini · 외국인
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결론: 코로나 충격으로 기업 부채 버블이 터질 위험이 크며, 연준의 회사채 지원은 한계가 있다. 신용시장 충격: 2016년에는 하이일드 스프레드가 300에서 900까지 올랐다가 약 3개월 만에 정상화됐지만, 이번에는 한 달 안에 300에서 1100으로 급등했고 하이일드·레버리지론·CLO 시장이 사실상 멈췄다. 연준·재무부 대응 한계: 연준이 고등급 회사채와 CP를 지원하고 있으나 하이일드 발행 기업과 중소기업은 지원 범위 밖이다. BBB- 등급 회사채 약 1조 달러가 정크로 강등될 위험이 있어, 연준이 이를 매입하는 것은 실수라고 봤다. 포드는 이미 BBB에서 정크로 강등됐다. 부실 기업 구제 반대: 유가 20달러 수준에서 셰일 가스·오일 생산업체 다수가 수개월 내 파산할 것이며, 호텔·크루즈·외식·유통 등 레버리지가 높았던 업종도 실질적으로 파산 상태다. 유동성 위기의 지급능력 있는 기업은 살려야 하나, 지급불능 기업까지 구제하면 재무부와 납세자가 큰 손실을 떠안는다. 도덕적 해이: 지난 10년간 기업들은 자사주 매입으로 주당순이익을 부풀리고 CEO 보상을 챙겼으며, 이를 위해 부채를 늘려 자본구조를 취약하게 만들었다. 이제 와서 정부 구제를 요구하는 것은 이익은 사유화하고 손실은 사회화하는 것이라고 비판했다. 출연자 전망: 기업 부채 위기는 이미 진행 중이며, 구제는 주주·기존 채권자를 보호하는 방향으로 흘러 불공정하다는 입장이다.
다듬은 글
ASH BENNINGTON: When you look at the potential for credit shock, when you think about bond yields, what's your outlook on that front? NOURIEL ROUBINI: Well, as I pointed out, even before, for the last two years, we've had the debt bubble in the United States. That debt bubble was mostly in the corporate sector.
The last debt crisis was households, mortgages and leveraged banks. This time around, we've been saying it's the corporate sector and shadow banks that finance them. CLOs, leveraged loans, fallen angels in high grade, there are trillions of dollars of high yield junk bond issued in the way that we kept covenants, covenant light, we have a loosening of our lending and credit standards, it was just toxic, it was a crisis waiting to happen.
Guess what? When a similar shock occurred in 2016, spread went from 300 to 900 for high yield, but it took about three months, and then they went down back to normal once we realized we're not going to have a global recession. This time around, they've spiked in less than a month from 300 to 1100, and the entire market for high yield, leveraged loans, CLOs as completely shut down.
Even firms that had high grade issuing commercial paper, and corporate bonds could not issue them. That's why the Fed and the Treasury have come to the rescue of the high grade. There are two problems. Even if you have a plan to essentially backstop commercial paper and high grade their debt, you're not going to take care of all the firms that are issuing junk bonds, because of course, the Fed cannot take that credit risk.
You can backstop high grade, but not high yield. You cannot backstop the mediums or those medium and small firms that don't issue bonds, like small and medium sized enterprises have no access to the capital markets, it's only larger firms, high yield and high grade. You're taking a huge credit risk even for the high grade, because within the high grade, you have a trillion dollar of bonds that are BBB minus, they are on the verge of being downgraded to junk.
Ford was just downgraded to junk. A big firm like Ford has been downgraded from BBB to junk. The Fed now is telling us we're going to take and we're going to buy high grade bonds, including BBB minus. To me, it's a mistake. Because most of these guys, even if you backstop them, the fundamental's going to lead to a downgrade, and once they're downgraded, you're taking a market risk, because then there is a spike in the spread and you do a mark to market loss on your portfolio as a Fed, you take a huge credit risk.
I would have said if you want to backstop corporate bonds, do it for high grade and exclude fallen angels. Instead, they decided to save the fallen angels. Even by doing that, you still have all their high yield that is essentially not backstopped, you have leveraged loans and you have CLOs and you have every firm that is not even issued debt, that is the majority of firms in the country who are not issuing bonds.
They have to use either banks or other forms of lending. We have already a debt crisis, let's speak about it. With oil at 20, most of shale gas and oil producer in a matter of months are going to be bankrupt, completely bankrupt. There's not only them, anybody, hotel, cruise lines, hospitality bars, restaurants and big chains, retail, they were highly leveraged before that segment of the market also is effectively bankrupt.
These are not illiquid but solvent firms, we should not bail them out. These are illiquid, at that current economic conditions, they are solvent and if we're going to bail them out, there'll be a massive loss for the Treasury and for the US taxpayer. The whole point is you want to save those are illiquid but solvent, but in the high yield, and in the junk area, there's tons of stuffs that is illiquid and it's insolvent, and you should not backstop them.
Otherwise, you're literally privatizing the gains again, socializing the losses again, for equity holders and for other bull holders and a creditors, that would be unfair. We're not going to do it hopefully. ASH BENNINGTON: One of the things that comes up in this context is the risk of moral hazard for backstopping debt and for companies that have effectively been engaging in massive share buyback programs that's generated an incredible amount of angst and blowback against corporate America.
NOURIEL ROUBINI: Absolutely. For the last decade, the amount of share buybacks has been huge, has been artificially increasing earnings per share and the growth of earnings per share, boosted valuation. Since compensation of many CEOs, and senior managers are based on valuation, they literally pocketed those gains for themselves, and that's something reckless, because if you do share buyback, you're changing your capital structure.
You're reducing the amount of equity in your firm, and you're increasing the amount of debt, because most of these share buybacks were financed for those who are not profitable by essentially issuing debt. You have essentially leveraged up your capital structure with more debt, less equity. You made yourself vulnerable, and now, the shock occurs, and they go bankrupt.
There's a huge moral hazard because even if the law says you cannot use this money for a share buyback, that's the minimum, of course that you need to do. The share buybacks were done in the past. You've made yourself financially fragile. You've made yourself near insolvent. Now, you're asking for a government bailout because you screwed up and you've privatized the gains, you socialized the losses for a decade.
Now, I'm supposed to backstop the equity holders and the existing creditors by giving you a bailout? It is still bailing out people and socializing the losses even if you say that you get an increased compensation of CEOs, and you got to do more of share buybacks. The damage in the moral hazard occurred for the last decades.
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