저자: CathieWood · 외국인
요약 보기
이번 은행 위기는 소수 은행에 국한된 격리된 문제라기보다 금리 구조에서 비롯된 시스템적 결함이며, 근본 해법은 통화·재정정책과 물가 안정이다. 은행권은 팬데믹 시기 유입된 유동성을 국채·정부보증 MBS 등 안전자산에 장기로 투자했으나, 금리 급등으로 채권 평가손실이 커졌다. 두 가지 잘못된 가정은 금리가 곧 오르지 않을 것이라는 점과 예금이 줄지 않을 것이라는 점이었다. 장단기 금리 역전 폭은 1980년대 볼커 시기보다 체감 충격이 크다고 설명했으며, 4% 대비 100bp 역전을 리히터 규모에 비유했다. 실버밸리뱅크(SVB)는 제로금리 환경에서 수익률을 쫓아 만기를 늘렸고, 부채는 단기여서 금리 상승 시 자본 손실과 비용 증가가 동시에 발생해 붕괴의 촉발점이 되었다. 예금은 MMF 등으로 이탈하고 있으며 이는 48년 만의 처음 있는 일이라고 언급했다. 단기 처방으로는 SVB 사태 당시 옐런 재무장관의 전 예금 보장을 지지했으며, 유동성 위기가 지급능력 위기로 번지지 않도록 하는 것이 중요하다고 강조했다. 장기적으로는 폴 볼커·로널드 레이건식의 물가 안정과 안정적 가치의 기준(명목 단위 가치 고정)이 필요하다고 주장했다. 이 사태가 다른 은행으로 확산되고 있으며, 채권 평가 손실이 금리가 높게 유지되는 한 계속될 것이라고 경고했다. 투자 측면에서는 안전자산 선호(플라이트 투 퀄리티)가 나타나 연준의 대차대조표 축소 효과를 상쇄하고 있다고 분석했다. 영상은 전반적으로 시스템 리스크와 은행 위기의 구조적 원인을 다루며, 특정 종목에 대한 구체적 가격 전망은 제시하지 않았다.
다듬은 글
we are in a banking crisis uh this uh problem that we're having right now is very isolated just a few Banks you know there there aren't going to be many ramifications you know it's all under control the fed's on it the FDIC is on it um I think all of those variables the credit default swaps inverted yield curve were pointing to two mistakes two mistaken assumptions in the banking system so I'd love to get your reaction to this Kathy Wood the founder and CEO of the investment management firm Arc invest discusses the present banking crisis and various Banks faults that caused it would analyze how Banks pandemic assumptions affected their Investments she explained how Banks put their pandemics torrent of stimulus money in safe Securities including government-backed mortgage Securities and treasuries they were long-term and health majority believing interest rates would not rise soon Banks made two incorrect the sum assumptions the second mistake was not decreasing deposits which has not happened in banking for 48 years yet despite deposits are leaving and going to money market funds or being withdrawn by consumers outside the bank Silicon Valley Bank which struggled to get yield in a zero interest rate world will also be discussed Kathy Wood will discuss the bank crisis and its potential effects emphasizing the system's inherent flaw she also explains the banking crisis and its causes here's more of what she had to say a lot of banks that were being flooded with stimulus payments were taking that money and investing in safe Securities their government-backed mortgage Securities treasuries and everything but they invested long term put in the hell to maturity category and in the case of silicon bank they were getting they were earning really 1.6 percent on that book so what was the Assumption they made they made the assumption that gosh we're probably going to be fighting a depression here and in surely interest rates are not going up anytime soon so that was the first mistake and then the second and and it was a pretty good uh assumption because uh we've never had a 19 now it's a 20-fold increase in interest rates in less than a year if you go back to volcker it was a two-fold increase 10 to 20 percent that shocked the system and uh and and what I like to to say is um you know the system is being shocked because more so than in the early 80s because uh We've we had two weeks ago an inversion in the yield curve of more than 100 basis points so more than 100 basis points uh on four percent is a lot different than more than 100 basis points on a 15 interest rate so I've likened it to the Richter Scale so back then you know if you look at four percent over 15 that's 6.5 on a Richter Scale in terms of earthquake if you look at one percent on on on four percent or 100 basis points on four percent that's uh that's a well what is it that's a 25 uh on the Richter Scale which is four times does does I'd like to get back to that in a minute but before we get to the yogurt I just wanted to I mean to to discussion of the yield curve the second big mistake that Silicon Valley and these other Banks uh made is that deposits would not go down uh we haven't had uh declining deposits in the banking system for I the the latest I've heard is 48.
if you look at M2 we haven't had a negative uh M2 on a year-over-year basis since the 1930s so part of that 85 percent of that is deposits are leaving and going to money market funds or in the case of these watching Silicon Valley Banks uh customers waiting outside the bank these are high-tech investors and they're waiting in lines to go get their money physically when you look at Silicon Valley Bank let me try to describe it to you in a different way Silicon Valley Bank had been in a zero interest rate world for a long long long long long long long time they were struggling to get yield what they did was they went out further and further on the maturity of government bonds true to get any yield whatsoever so they were owning longer and longer maturity instruments there their their liabilities were all short-term and so when the interest rates went up as you said uh if you mark the long-term bonds to Market they had huge Capital losses there uh they then had huge increase in expenses on their things and what it did was it flipped them upside down now the reason they went first so much is they'd had a very steep growth path before they got into this and so other banks that had leveled would not have been nearly as as predictable Catalyst for the crisis as Silicon Valley that there were other sorts of funny things in the Silicon Valley Bank the the owner of the Silicon Valley Bank was on the board of the FED San Francisco fed which I don't think that means anything but there was also an issue of whether the supervisory group at the San Francisco fed did their job correctly I am absolutely certain they did they just went through their checklist they knew what every asset was and they could see how these Mark to Market so that's what sort of triggered Silicon Valley Bank but it's only one uh once that trigger hits cell Valley Bank let me just tell you those bonds don't disappear the bonds don't all of a sudden get a new coupon interest rate they're out there and as long as interest rates stay high the market to market value of those bonds is going to be low and that's just the nature of things uh and when you look at it if you were a deposited in Silicon Valley Bank you too would have been running for the for the fire escape and that's exactly what they were I think it is humorous that multi-billionaire Silicon Valley Executives were standing up with their hands out help me help me you know I think that's a great image and of course uh what happened then was you had the Catalyst occur there and now you see what happens with Credit Suisse and all the it's spreading if you look at Republic Bank you look at Zion's Bank you look at some of these others it's not stopping here because the intrinsic problem is not stopped the asset bonds are still out there they're still at the same nominal yield the liabilities are still out there uh anyone who wants to hold a deposit in a bank is going to get paid competitive deposit rates and so therefore the expenses are going to be higher as long as interest rates stay high or go higher you've got an endemic banking system problem Kathy which I do agree with you on and that endemic Bank banking crisis has to be solved with a core solution not an overnight solution the core solution has to be monetary policy and fiscal policy otherwise it will not be solved we do need a Paul volcker we do need a Ronald Reagan to give us the intrinsic solution to lowering inflation for over periods of time but let me tell you if I had been Janet Yellen on that Sunday night when they made the decision on Silicon Valley Bank I would have done exactly what she did as a short-term palliative to solve the problem I would have guaranteed all deposits at the bank in fact what I would have done where I were the the fed and the treasury in line with their drawing drawing facilities I would have guaranteed all deposit at all banks in the U.S at that time irrespective of size you do not want depositors as a bank to be the most expert expert analyst system with the solvency of the bank and the last thing you want to have happen is you don't want a liquidity crisis to morph into a solvency crisis this is the you know when I saw you reference it on TV the other day and thank you for giving me credit for it but it's uh it's the old adage of of the banking system in the 19th century the in times of Crisis discount freely and that is exactly what the FED is supposed to do in times of Crisis but what we need to have Kathy and what you've you've been The Shining line of doing is we need to have a stable valued new mirror and that's what we need to have as a stable value numerator not a stable quantity numerator but a statement we want the government to set the value of a unit of a numerator and then let the banking system and the other financial markets develop around that stable value the reason you need a stable value is because uh commodity sellers and buyers need to know what the price level is going to be a year from now we need Bond people need to know what the value of it is when the maturity of the asset comes through we need to know what that is and slight missteps in in the balance between values can cause enormous damage to credit markets to invest in markets to to to the monetary systems the reason I think of is that is there's a flight to Quality that people are worried about Banks they're worried about really having their deposits guaranteed by the fed and so as they fly they they go out and buy the bonds themselves rather than holding A bank's assets which then in turn buys the bonds and so they feel much more secure in the value of their assets and so that increased purchases has dominated the supply effect of the FED trying to run off the balance sheet lower their balance sheet which is still very very very very large
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