저자: HowardMarks · 외국인
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결론: 거시경제 예측(인플레이션·금리·경기침체 시점)은 알 수 없고 투자 행동을 바꾸지도 못하므로, 기업·산업·증권이라는 미시(알 수 있는 것)에 집중해야 한다. 2016년 런던 컨퍼런스에서 참석자들의 질문이 인플레이션 수준, 연준 금리 인상 시점과 폭, 경기침체 여부에만 쏠렸던 경험을 소개했다. 이런 질문이 중요하지 않은 이유: 첫째, 거시 변수는 알 수 없다. 둘째, 설령 전망을 세워도 투자위원회는 결론에 따라 실제 포트폴리오를 거의 바꾸지 않는다. 즉 행동이 따라오지 않는 전망은 의미가 없다. 워런 버핏의 기준을 인용: 정보가 가치 있으려면 '중요해야 하고' 동시에 '알 수 있어야 한다'. 거시는 중요해 보이지만 알 수 없다는 것이 핵심 논지다. 초과수익의 조건은 '지식 우위(knowledge advantage)'다. 거시에 대해 남들보다 더 잘 알 수는 없으므로, 단기 이벤트에 대응하는 거시 기반 트레이딩은 성공하기 어렵다고 본다. 메모에서 중요하지 않은 것으로 꼽은 다섯 가지: 단기 이벤트, 단기 트레이딩, 단기 성과, 과잉 활동(하이퍼액티비티), 변동성. 변동성을 리스크와 동일시하는 통념에는 반대하며, 진짜 리스크는 영구적 자본 손실과 충분히 위험을 감수하지 않아 뒤처지는 것이라고 주장한다. 샤프지수 중심 평가에 대해 버핏의 '들쭉날쭉한 15%가 매끄러운 12%보다 낫다'는 말을 인용하며, 매끄러움을 선호하는 이유가 재무적인지 심리적인지 따져봐야 한다고 말한다. 투자위원회가 대부분의 시간을 단기·거시 논의에 쓰는 현상을 지적하며, 이는 '전문가로서 거시 가설을 세우지 않으면 무책임해 보인다'는 직업적 압박 때문이라고 해석한다. 오크트리에서는 알 수 없는 거시는 무시하고, 알 수 있는 미시(기업·산업·증권)에 집중한다는 원칙을 밝힌다. 가치투자 문헌(버핏 등)에 거시 이야기가 거의 없다는 점도 근거로 든다. 출연자 전망: 특정 자산·시장에 대한 1~3개월 가격 방향 예측 발언은 없음. 거시 예측 무용론과 장기 미시 중심 접근을 강조.
다듬은 글
um you know we had we had a conference in London on June 21st of last year for uh our European and Middle Eastern uh clients and I kicked it off with the discussion of the environment and then took questions and uh then after lunch I got back up and I said and I unscheduled and I said you know what I'm disappointed in the conversation of this morning because the only questions I got were what will inflation be how high will the FED raise rates to reduce inflation will it produce a recession when how bad and how long so inflation rates recession these are not the things that matter first of all we can't know much about these things secondly if we were gonna do anything about if we formed views we probably wouldn't do much about it because I've seen a lot of people discuss I've been on a lot of investment committees as as you described Cyrus and they spend a lot of time discussing the macro forecast but they don't make big changes in response to their conclusions probably because they don't really believe what what they just agreed on but um you know these are not the things that matter and what I said was what we try to do is we try to invest in companies that will become more valuable over time and and dead instruments where the issuer will pay the interest in principal as schedule these are the things that matter um fundamentals fundamentals and you know I I describe by in their uh around 20 16 when or late 15 16.
when the FED started talking about raising rates they kept I believe that they kept rates way too low way too long and then they got into this bind where if they started talking about raising them they had a revolution on their hands but anyway I went through a long period of time and the only question I got was when will the FED start raising rates and I say I think I say in the memo what does it matter if I say March what will you do if I say no no not March May what will you do differently you know and it it goes back to the illusion of knowledge and by the way one of the one of the quotes in that memo uh somebody said you know if people understood how uncertain the world is they wouldn't be able to get out of bed in the morning and so they cloaked themselves in forecasts to make the environment tolerable and so in early 2016 when will the FED start raising rates seemed like an obvious question that one would like to have an answer to but it it doesn't deal with the question of is it possible to obtain an answer to that question and and what would you do if you had the answer uh you know Warren Buffett once said to me as he said many times that for a piece of information to be desirable it has to satisfy two criteria it has to be important and the macro is extremely important in fact in the last 20 25 years it feels to me like it's the only thing people care about anymore but it also has to be knowable and I believe that the macro is not knowable and in the sense that to be superior investors all of us have to have an advantage what I call a knowledge Advantage we have to know something better than somebody else or clearly our investment performance will be average but I don't think it's possible to know more than others about the macro and consequently I don't think that trading which is in response to expectations regarding short-term events I don't think it can be successful and so I start the memo by saying by talking about five things that I think don't matter short-term events short-term trading short-term performance hyperactivity and volatility and you know volatility I mean we first of all most people have subscribed to the view that volatility is risk I don't think so I think that the important risk is the the two most important risks are number one the risk of permanent impairment of capital or the risk of not taking enough risk and underperforming but you know we care so much about volatility and of course a lot of performance is evaluated based on the sharp ratio which is essentially the relationship between return and volatility but why and Buffett says I'd rather have a lumpy 15 than a smooth 12.
and I say in the memo if you'd rather have a smooth 12 than a lumpy 15 you got to think about why is it for financial reasons or is it for uh psychological reasons emotional reasons but I think that um these are the things that shouldn't matter but I think that these are the things that that investment committees in particular spend the vast majority of their time discussing and Howard why why do you think you know it seems to me there's enormous focus on the short term yeah for especially for I'm going to say public stock investors um anybody buying a security why is that I I look we uh most of what we do at Brookfield is private equity of some sort or another and we own things for a long time yeah so I don't understand the short-term thinking what's driving that a great question expanding those two memos is what you just asked why so much time on the on what doesn't matter and why you know look why do you spend your time trying to develop a macro framework uh and maybe if more people spent their time thinking about whether a macro framework can be helpful they would change their behavior but I think I think and I talk about this in the memo about knowledge but I think that um I think most people think you have to most people think it's their job most people think it would be unprofessional or irresponsible to not uh I hypothesize about the rate of growth in the economy and the level of inflation and the outlook for rates and and currencies and commodity prices and that kind of thing and they they consider these things important but they don't grapple with the question of whether they're knowable and so you know at Oak Tree what I say is we ignore the micro which is unknowable and we focus on the macro we focus on the micro which is the knowable companies Industries and securities and if you know this is a value conference which is predicated on I think studying the the micro and if you read most value books or speak to Buffett and people like that there's not a word about the macro um if you if you work really hard studying companies and industries and securities I think you can get an edge that you can't get in trying to forecast economies um and and uh and things like inflation and rates
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