저자: HowardMarks및대담자 · 외국인
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첫 줄: 투자의 핵심은 역사 학습과 심리 주기 이해이며, 과거를 무시하면 같은 버블이 반복된다. 역사 무시와 버블 반복: 과거를 무시하면 매번 처음부터 다시 판단해야 하고, 역사를 알면 패턴 인식이 가능하다. 대부분의 호황은 인터넷(1999), 니프티50(1969), 서브프라임 등 새로운 것에서 시작되며, 투자자들은 '이번엔 다르다'는 말로 과거 경험을 무시한다. 국가부채 오판 사례: 1970~80년대 폴커 연준 의장은 국가가 디폴트하지 않는다고 주장했으나, 폴란드는 채무를 30센트에 재조정했다. 리서치 없이 통념을 믿으면 틀린다는 교훈이다. 니프티50 교훈: 1968년 최우량 성장주를 가격 무관하게 매수한 투자자는 1973년까지 대부분의 돈을 잃었다. 좋은 자산이 아니라 지불한 가격이 중요하다. 하이일드(정크본드) 투자: 1978년 마일켄의 하이일드 채권을 접하고 투자, 안정적 수익을 냈다. 좋은 투자는 좋은 것을 사는 것이 아니라 제대로 사는 것이다. 세대 인식: 미국 30세 미만 응답자 중 부모보다 나은 삶을 살 것이라 답한 비율이 매우 낮고, 중국·브라질·터키·인도·멕시코는 훨씬 높다. 학자금 대출(약 1.5조 달러)과 주택 상실 경험이 금융 시스템에 대한 불신을 키운다. 시장 심리: 경제 성장률은 완만하게 변하고 기업 이익은 더 변동성이 크지만, 주가는 심리 때문에 극단적으로 요동친다. 심리의 밀물과 썰물을 이해하고 대응해야 한다. 대상 자산 가격 예측 발언은 없음. 영상은 과거 강연이며 특정 종목·지수에 대한 1~3개월 방향 전망이 포함되지 않음.
다듬은 글
you well Howard it's almost lunchtime you know by your standards here so one I want to thank you for coming and I want to talk for a moment about something that plays very an important element in cycles then you've spent a lot of time writing about it and before I get there one of the great challenges for all of us to contemplate today is this area of trying to understand finance and financial markets and many of you work in that area and I want to challenge each of you today because this is an area Howard and I we might touch on it have focused on together for more than four decades and that challenge is what do people think what is their view there's a quote in this book than Howard gives you from John Kenneth Galbraith talking about how little finance or access to capital or financial markets as you know it how little it plays as people talk about history and what occurred in history over the years and there it comes why don't you tell us about that to start Howard well first of all it's from a book called a brief history of financial euphoria which I read a very long time ago which I recommend to everyone it gives you a good feeling for sick ocala T for the behavior of the herd for the importance of contrarian ISM and and and and it is an honest book in the sense that it is brief and I enjoy that but the point is that in investing in particular one of the outstanding characteristics is shortness of memory and the point is we we know so much from history but if we disregard history we know so little if we disregard history then every time something happens anew we have to start from scratch figuring out what it means if we understand history we can put it in we can do what I call in the book pattern recognition and we can say oh yeah that that's like that I saw that 10 years ago in 30 years ago and and that's it and here's what it comes from and here's what plays out in here's what its gonna result in but most people ignore history most booms and I you know I probably lived through about half a dozen real booms in my 50 years in the business are usually about something new and the Internet in 99 the nifty 50 Xerox in 69 whatever it might be subprime mortgage securities and the people who get excited about it who cut into it who are intoxicated by the positives and willing to ignore the negatives if you if you say to them you know well that kind of that happened 20 and 40 years ago and it ended badly what they say is they used the four worst words in the world it's different this time the rules of the past don't apply the you know yes the average p/e ratio historically has been 16 but now it's 32 and that's okay because the Internet has changed the world and something like that and so it go back one slide though if you will and and what it says is that past experience to the extent that it is part of memory at all is dismissed as the primitive refuge of those who do not have the insight to appreciate the wonders of the present and you know they if you say to somebody in 99 who's buying an internet stock which has no profits and no sales and that you know at a astronomical price they say well you just don't get it you're an old fogey and the point is that the past is relevant and and now you can bring up that next slide Michael because that was a good one thank you and and most of the time it's not different now clearly some of the time it is different but not as often as people think let's talk for a moment about this slide by Reinhart in there was a book written this time it's different and it really related to sovereign debt and credit and so I'm at Berkeley and 65 studying credit and almost all sovereign debt is rated triple-a and it's considered the least risky debt of all and the head of the Federal Reserve Paul Volcker in the 70s is telling everyone that no country ever defaulted ever went bankrupt yet and has absolutely nothing to do with history and I think I want to just underline this point then Howard has made here when you step back in history ask yourself have you done the original research what is common wisdom you know as I listened to Paul Volcker in that period of time at chairman Volcker talking on the speech I remember most howard was one and around 80 or 81 that Poland is not International Harvester both Poland and International Harvester were trading 31 cents on the dollar and his point was Poland as the country countries don't default I don't go bankrupt and of course International Harvester could go bankrupt well he was right but he was wrong International Harvester paid you off a hundred cents on the dollar never missed an interest payment and Poland reorganized its debt and the 30s so for every dollar of debt you got 30 cents of sleep he was right semantically he was just not right financially and so I just want to stress the importance of research and Howard let's go back to the late 1960s early 1970s and when I went to Wall Street we had fixed commissions for stock and the highest compensated people in the financial system were those that were generally equity salesmen because when you bought a stock the charge was 1% if he bought a million dollars worth of stock anta paid ten thousand today that might be $3.75 if he can't negotiate a better deal and so they live during this period of time but when you went there here's a look if you wanted just buy five shares of Berkshire Hathaway and Warren Buffett who's a good friend of Howard and a good friend of mine if you want to buy a stock you can see what you would have paid then and what you've put it pay now so being in that business it's been a tough business to be in once you went into an open market but the issue is if you step back in that point in time the fundamental issue was sales and if you look at the pyramid on Wall Street as Howard and I entered this period of time almost 50 years the power was in sales then it went to training and if you were long and overnight you did a little research to try to figure out what is this thing and so what my focus was and Howard being one of the most representative individuals of this dramatic change that occurred was changing this pyramid let's start with research the fundamental part of investing his research have you done the data so if you've come here today have you checked off anything in the book what these little post-its that you might want to relate to and then we can go to trading can you actually buy it it might be an interesting idea but can you invest and in the case of Howard buying a million dollars of something is not going to affect your portfolios or your clients so the question in trading is they're a big enough market for you to play capital and lastly now you're focused on buying and selling process but the inverting Howard take us back in your own career for a while and talk about why you chose to go to Wall Street how you ended up at Citibank when we met each other well you know I started off my dad was an accountant and I thought I'd be coming out I took actually took hi counting in high school and liked it and I didn't admit that well I was in high school but so I went to Wharton and I figured I take a degree in accounting but then when I got there I started to study finance and I found it more interesting so I shifted over then I went to University of Chicago for a master's degree and that was in accounting and when I got out of there I still didn't know what I wanted to do and applied for six different jobs and six different aspects of finance but I had had a good summer at Citibank the year before I like the people I liked what I did so I went into Investment Research and it was nothing more wasn't a much more conscious decision than that and that was that was 1969 started off in Equity Research and then became director of research and the bank engaged in what was called nifty 50 investing it invested in the best and fastest growing companies in America without regard to price because if the official dictum was if it's good enough and fast-growing enough it's worth any price which is kind of the opposite of what I think you believe Michael and if you bought the nifty 50 the day I got there in 68 and if you hold it diligently until 73 you lost almost all your money in the best companies in America and there's a lesson in that of course that that it's not what you buy it's what you pay for but then in 78 because that exercise with which I was associated with so unsuccessful it was time for me to find the new job I was lucky I didn't get canned and I switched to the Baden Department in order to manage money and then in August of 78 I got a call from the head of the bond department and he said there's some guy name's Milken or something out in California and he deals in these things called high-yield bonds and can you figure out what that means now you know we take it for granted today we all know what they mean and actually high-yield bonds are quite mainstream today but in those days they were an obscure corner that very few people know about they were called junk bonds and so I said about trying to study them I met with Mike in November of 78 and then came out here to California in to visit with him in January 79 for the first time and now I'm investing in the worst companies in America and I'm making money steadily and safely and there's a really important lesson in that that in good investing is not a matter of buying good things but buying things well now what I want to maybe paraphrase what you've said I'm not sure you're investing in the worst companies in America what you're investing in well I use that as a figures many great companies that have the wrong capital structure but okay and so once again as we focus on this I want to take us back to the beginning and what's focus for you your children your grandchildren in a recent poll in the United States of people under 30 they asked the people under 30 will you have a better life than your parent set and so maybe we could just you know pull up that slide here for a moment and have you reflect on what percent of people under 30 in America thought that they would have a better life than their parents at what date in the last few months okay so you've picked your we're not going to embarrass you here but if we look at the answer you'll see it's a very low percentage and if you go to Western Europe you'll see a very low percentage there was no country over 30 percent but as you travel the world if you're in China it's 78% and in your Brazil in spite of everything that's occurred and Turkey is more than 50 percent higher than the United States as is India and other countries and if you go to Mexico today that net numbers probably in the 80s and so the question is why do people feel that way how do they feel 90 percent are optimistic of the future in Mexico and so they have a much different view of the world and so one of the challenges for finance and we're going to talk about it today as we talk about these cycles is that why do 50 percent of people under 30 think socialism might be a good idea they obviously haven't been studying what's occurred in Venezuela as you've destroyed an entire country the country with the most reserves and you say yourself well why do people feel this way well the average person in America what is its interaction with the financial system one a student loan and the burden of student loan that's now approaching one-and-a-half trillion that is confining them as they think about their life and second a mortgage whether they or their parents and during this period of time which we will talk about they almost lost their home or they lost their home so what is the financial system doing for them and this connection but let's go back to a county Howard in many ways accounting is the language understanding a balance sheet reading those footnotes etc but you outline in the book a few things that you felt were fundamentally required to be an investor understand cycles accounting was one but while we talk about a few of those well I think I think everybody knows you have to understand the counter you have to know finance you should know something about history but the most important thing which they don't teach you in business school psychology and if you if you go back and look at the past if you look at a graph of the economy for the last 50 years it kind of looks like this it's got an upward trend and very modest divergence from the trend sometimes they you know the trend is the two is a 2% trend line sometimes it's up three and sometimes one in extremes it's up or or down one or two very modest volatility if you look at company results companies have leveraged financial and and operating and their profits go like this if they if the economy's up 2% profits go up ten if the economy is up 20% profits go up 30 and and and so forth and so the the and if the economy's down to then for a typical company maybe the profits will be down 15 so the graph of profits is much more volatile than the graph of the economy and then if you look at a graph of the stock market it looks like this why what's the difference in the difference in psychology and you know richard fineman the great physicist said that physics would be much harder if electrons had feelings we walk in the room we turn on the light switch the lights go on every time we don't even wonder about it I wonder if they're going to go on this time but the the the that's because the electrons go in this pattern they never go there they never say no we're on strike they never forget the move they always do what they're supposed to do but but people have feelings and people rarely do what they're supposed to do and they often react in the extreme to the events that that develop and those extreme reactions cause this extreme volatility they overreact to things and sometimes they don't react at all and sometimes they don't react as they should so I think that if you want to exist in the investment world and you want to you can just buy and hold good things if if they wanted to take that approach but if you want to improve upon that I think it's very important to understand the ebb and flow of psychology and enact accordingly
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