저자: JeremyGrantham · 외국인
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결론: 그랜섬은 미국 주식·채권·주택·원자재에 걸친 역사상 최대 규모의 자산 버블이 진행 중이며, 붕괴 시 부의 착각(perceived wealth) 손실이 과거보다 훨씬 클 것이라고 경고한다. 버블 규모 비교: 2000년 닷컴(펫닷컴 등 수억 달러 규모)보다 현재 밈주식·투기 종목은 수십억 달러 규모로 훨씬 크며, 1929·2000년보다 극단적이라고 주장. SPAC 지수는 고점 대비 20% 이상 하락했다고 언급. 자기조정 메커니즘: 시장은 결국 제자리를 찾지만 시간이 걸리고 과정이 고통스럽다. 2000년 사례로 투기 종목이 먼저 무너지고(펫닷컴 등 -80%), 이후 TMT 전체(-50%), 나스닥 -82%까지 확산됐다고 설명. 버블 판단 근거: 1929·2000·2007 모두 고점 시점에 당국과 시장이 펀더멘털이 최고라고 믿었다. 연준은 자산 버블을 인지하지 못하고 상승 시 '부의 효과'만 자랑하며 하락 시 책임을 지지 않는다고 비판. 현재 버블 자산: 미국 채권(역사상 가장 비싼 채권시장), 미국 주식(역사상 가장 고평가), 주택(2006년 고점과 중위소득 대비 배수 동일), 원자재(골드만 비에너지 지수가 2011년 고점과 동일). 3.5개 자산군이 동시에 버블인 것은 처음이라고 주장. TINA 논리 반박: 대안이 없다는 주장은 행동심리 설명일 뿐 정당화가 아니며, 1989년 일본 주식도 PER 65배를 'Tina'로 정당화했다가 붕괴했다고 언급. 과거 경험: 1968~69년 소형주 버블에서 큰돈을 벌었다가 9개월 만에 대부분 잃은 경험을 공유. 투자 대안: 가장 덜 나쁜 선택은 신흥국 가치주(저성장·저평가). 신흥국은 S&P500 대비 격차가 역사적 최대 수준이며 과거 사례상 유리. 미국 저성장 가치주도 2010~2020년 최악의 10년·최악의 1년을 겪어 역사적 최대 괴리. 현금 20~30% 보유로 향후 저가 매수 기회 대비 권고. 향후 10~20년간 S&P500은 부진, 신흥국은 연 11~12%p 상회할 것으로 전망. 출연자 전망: S&P500 장기 부진(하락 또는 횡보 취지), 미국 주식·채권 고평가 및 붕괴 경고, 신흥국 가치주 장기 보유 추천.
다듬은 글
even when we we reach a period of pessimism the potential unraveling in terms of perceived wealth is much greater this time than it will have ever been before I think since I said that we could take out the rivaling 1929 and 2000 I think we've gone way past that there are examples of large-scale craziness and meme investing etc for which there is simply no parallel in 1929 even or or 2000 2000 had pet.coms and and they were kind of glorious but they were scores of millions or a few hundred million we have crazy things now that are billions and in some cases we were the most impressive speculation I think there is nothing like that at scale even adjusted for current dollars in 1929 and and we are down 80 percent which is a fairly fearful decline but along with us the next tier speculative stocks also came down the SPAC index is down over 20 percent so doesn't that tell you that the market is essentially kind of a self-correcting mechanism I mean you're still ahead of the game with the investment right doesn't that encourage you that in fact that the market kind of recognizes that these extremes have been reached and and that we are seeing a correction in some of the most speculative parts of the market I I think you've nailed it the market is a self-correcting mechanism but it's a little wonky in the time it takes sometimes it corrects pretty quickly and sometimes it corrects uh incredibly slowly and and that's the problem but if you go back to 2000 which is the current the previous leader in speculation let's say what happened there is the market pitched it peaked in March of 2000 and between March and September pet.com basically went out of business the internet stocks basically went down 80 percent but the whole.com the whole TMT Bubble Burst and the industry which had been 30 of the market uh declined by 50 percent right the s p was unchanged and you could have said during that five month six month window oh isn't that healthy they're selling they're selling the flakiest pet doctors they're buying a Coca-Cola what's not to like about that that's exactly what happened and I I like to think of them as the kind of pessimism termites and they they add through the craziest first and then the junior growth stocks and then the intermediate growth stocks and then finally Cisco which was for eight minutes or so the biggest company in the world by market cap and they were all down collectively fifty percent and so for the s p to be flat in September it meant that the balance of the market was up 17 so that looked incredibly healthy but then the termites reached the broad market and the entire 70 percent rolled over and fell 50 in two years and the NASDAQ was down 82 percent the thing about the underpinnings is they always look terrific in 1929 the market didn't Peak when they thought the underpinnings were terrible they peaked when the Market's enthusiasm for the underpinnings was approximately the highest it had ever been in history in 2000 in March the world uniformly including the boss of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan they all thought the system had never been better at the top of the housing bubble in 07 banagi and the boys thought the U.S housing market had never declined unquote it merely reflected a strong U.S economy the underpinnings were great they have never gotten it right Federal Reserve in particular has never had a clue about asset bubbles it doesn't even address it they act as if they don't exist except on the upside they occasionally take credit for the wealth effect helping the economy along and it does right there is an income effect and it does help the economy along and Greenspan Bernanke and Yellen all took credit explicitly for helping the economy along what they never did is they never took discredit for the reverse side the market has been reverting mechanism and eventually it goes back to a fair price and when it went back in 2001 2002 it had a dreadful negative income effect when the housing market collapsed and it took the equity Market with it it had a double pronged negative effect on the economy so it had a much bigger uh impact on the economy than had occurred in 2000 and this time we're really playing with fire because this time unlike 2000 we have an overpriced bond market Jim Grant would argue the most overpriced in 4 000 years we have in my opinion and that of many other bubble students the most overpriced U.S Equity Market in history we have a housing market that three weeks ago reached the same multiple of median family income as it did in 2006 at the peak of the housing bubble and we have Commodities that have recently run amok so that the Goldman Sachs index of non-energy which is food and metals which are pretty important have just equaled the peak of 2011 which was said to be one of the super cycle commodity of that so this is the first time we've ever risked three and a half asset classes bubbling at the same time if even when we we reach a period of pessimism the potential unraveling in terms of perceived wealth is much greater this time than it will have ever been before you quoted uh Robert Schiller Nobel prize-winning Economist about the fact that you know that he said that even though his indices are showing the market you know at extreme valuations that that really when you look compared to the bond market which is you said um is very expensive that stocks don't seem so overpriced what is your response to those kinds of arguments I think the the interest rate argument is an explanation of how we get there in behavioral terms it is not by any stretch of the imagination of justification you don't justify anything by taking the the most overpriced asset in the history of man the bond market and saying compared to that we are merely very overpriced and therefore relatively cheaper that is very cold comfort Solomon Brothers an important firm at the time of in 1989 went around a head Squad justifying the Japanese stock market which was approaching 65 times earnings we were told at the time the the data was represented as 65 times earnings that's had never previously sold over 25.
and so that was to say the least The Real McCoy and this team went around pointing out that the raids in Japan were so low that 100 PE would be fair of course the collapse that followed in in land and bonds and and stars was Cosmic and right there in 1989 and it still hasn't recovered it still hasn't reached the 1989 level and either that real estate market or their stock market reminds us of the cardinal rule and that is the bigger the bubble the most ingenious the argument and the bigger the bubble the most extended and painful uh uh the decline there is a thesis I'm sure you've heard it that Tina there is no alternative and so again because you know for most uh in most money managers for most individual retirement accounts the choices have traditionally been stocks and bonds some mix of the two and therefore if if bonds are you know if interest rates are at zero that stocks look pretty attractive as an alternative so you know what is the alternative is there no alternatives to stocks for long-term investors that that argument is pretty easy to get one's brain around this is the most broad as I said asset bubble of all time with three and a half of the four major asset classes clearly in severe bubble territory right and thinking that you have no alternative uh but pick between one of the four bubbles is a pretty Grim way to view live I I get the idea women so pick a bubble they'll all go together probably and you will suffer a lot of pain and the intellectual content of that argument that they were all bubbles so we had to pick the least bad one it will resonate in your head as as the market unravels a dozen to 15 years of flat Market with earnings doing okay and rotation within the market everything would work out fine and every portfolio manager I almost ever met has felt in in market bubbles that that could happen it just right it does the market abhors long sideways movements as we all know it either goes up more than you think or down more than you think you can always hold out hope for an extended sideways movement but it it never seems to arrive let me just say by the way I have enormous sympathy for participating in a bubble right when I was young in 1968 69 we had a spectacular a mini bubble in tiny stocks and they all quadrupled and made us rich and then they all blew up together and most of them went out of business and I was just out of business school and I made a small fortune almost enough to think about retiring to England and then in the space of about nine months I lost everything back to two thousand dollars and was lucky to cover my my leverage and get out without a huge debt it was thoroughly exciting probably the most exciting time I've ever had in investing so I completely sympathize nobody who is Young and investing and making money is going to listen to some old Kaja tell his War stories about when he got wiped out I get that so there's nothing that I can say that will will cause anyone to change their behavior the power the psychological power of a bubble to suck everybody in is prodigious and and we've known that since the Tulip bubble and it will never stop but there are ways to handle it and that's what I'm going to get to Next in my introduction to you I mentioned a number of kind of prescient calls that you have made over the years one of them of course was calling the market bottom uh in in March of 2009 basically to the day and you wrote a piece entitled reinvesting when terrified uh telling clients to get back in the Market at that point at this juncture it seems like we are in exactly the opposite situation should you be you know writing a piece de-investing uh or disinvesting when terrified and and you know what do you recommend for individual investors who maybe aren't that young and would suffer terrible consequences long-term uh from the bursting of these bubbles you suggested me an interesting title disinvesting when euphoric that's a better title than I came up with yes a disinvesting when euphoric it feels psychologically difficult as reinvesting when terrified they both catch the spirit of the exercise well right I would look around and ask the question what is the least bad and the least bad is Emerging Markets it's a little overpriced absolutely but it is it is at one of its three points of Maximum difference to the S P 500 and each of the other two examples worked out wonderfully well in favor of Emerging Markets conversely when Emerging Markets was at a peak which it was in 07 it sold at a premium PE to the s p you can have very bad things happen which they did but Emerging Markets is relatively very cheap and pretty much close to fair value and the other thing is value versus growth uh low growth stocks have been pummeled by high growth stocks for the decade ending in in 2019 and then in the year 2020 they had the worst year by far ever so you had the worst decade followed by the worst year and the ratio of value or low growth to high growth was also at the co-equal highest widest it had ever been with the 1974 and the outcome after 1974 for Value was wonderful so I would look at the intersection of those two ideas if you could buy the value stocks in the Emerging Market Universe which after all which you can right which you can and it includes some very high growth potential countries like China and collectively they will have a higher growth rate than the developed World almost certainly and they sell at a huge discount I would say they are modestly cheap in an s p world that is extremely overpriced and you could lock them away for 10 years or 20 years and and really expect a decent return which I would recommend and since there is no hope of persuading people to actually get out of stocks that would be the best I could offer but for those three people out there who have a will of Steel I would say also have a cash reserve of 20 or 30 percent as much as you can psychologically bear to take advantage of much cheaper prices sometime in the not too distant future low growth Emerging Markets as much as I could stand all right and a cash Reserve as much as I could stand and um if you had 70 30 30 cash and seventy percent uh cheap emerging markets that would be a pretty resilient portfolio I have no doubt for the next 10 or 20 years though I think the s p of course will underperform just as it had a tough time from 2000 to 2010 where it had a negative return and Emerging Markets incidentally Beat It by 11 or 12 percent a year compounded
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