Warren Buffet & Charlie Munger: The Dangers of Short-Term Thinking in Investing

요약 보기

단기 사고와 회전율 증가가 시장에 해롭다고 주장. 채권·주식 보유자의 상당수가 하루 단위로 매매해 충격에 취약해졌고, NYSE 회전율은 40년 전 15~20%에서 100% 이상으로 상승. 버핏은 1962년 파트너십 운영 경험과 1998·2002년 사례를 들어 비이성적 대중행동을 강조. 멍거는 정규분포 기반 5시그마·6시그마 리스크 모델이 시장 붕괴를 과소평가한다고 비판하며, 금융학의 수학적 모델이 실제 효용이 없을 수 있다고 주장.

다듬은 글

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01. Hi, um I'm Stanley Coup from Hong Kong. My question is um about the proliferation of short-term mindset to investing as more as more money is being placed under absolute return mandate. Um these managers as you just said respond to the same response um and uh and product trades uh um issues. So with credit spread on yeah I should say risk premium on various products declining across the board and um correlation across markets increasing um can we read into it and say whether it's healthy or not healthy for the economy or the markets and um c can we arguably say the portfolio insurance dynamics is already in place today.

02. Well, I think you put your finger on it and I, you know, we do think it's unhealthy. Obviously, if you take there's no way I'm precisely measuring this, but I'm quite certain I'm right. If you take the degree to which say B either bonds or stocks, the the percentage of them that are held by people who could change their minds tomorrow morning based on a given stimulus, whether it be something the Fed does or whether it be uh some kind of an accident in financial markets, the percentage is far higher.

03. There is an electronic herd of people around the world managing huge amounts of money who think that a decision on everything in their portfolio should be made basically daily or hourly or by the minimum and that has increased turnover on the f on the New York Stock Exchange and I don't know the exact figures but I think it was down around the 15 or 20% range 40 years ago and it's increased it to 100% I believe plus now.

04. So, and certainly in the bond the bond market, the turnover of bonds has increased dramatically. People used to buy bonds to own them and they buy bonds to trade them. And there's nothing evil about that, but it just means that the participants are playing a different game. And that different game can have different consequences than in a buy and hold environment.

05. And I do think it it means that if it if you're if you're trying to beat the other fellow on a day-to-day basis, you you're watching news events very carefully, you're watching the other fellow very carefully. And if he you think he's about to hit that key, you know, you're going to try and hit the key faster if that if if that's the game you're playing and if you're getting measured on results weekly.

06. So I I I think that you have described the conditions that will lead to a result that that we've been talking about expecting at at at some point. It's not new to markets though. I mean markets do crazy things over time. Every time when Charlie and I were at Solomon, they'd always talk to us about five sigma events or six sigma events.

07. And that's fine if you're talking about flipping coins, but it doesn't mean anything when you get human behavior involved. And uh people do things that and intelligent people do things, very intelligent, educated people do things that are totally irrational and they do them in mass. And you saw it in 1998, you saw it in 2002, and you'll see it again and you'll see it.

08. It's more likely to happen when you have people trying to beat currency, bond, stock markets day by day. It's I think it's a fool's game, but but uh you know it it may be what's required to attract money. When I set up my partnership, I told the partners, you know, you'll hear from me once a year. And I even thought in 1962 I put the partnerships together and in May of 1962 the market got terrible and I actually thought of sending all my partners a letter and then sending it down to Brazil to have it re-shipped back up just to sort of test them out.

09. But uh [clears throat] so how they felt about things but you know I had a few with bad hearts. I decided it wasn't worthwhile. Charlie. [clears throat] Yeah. When people talk about sigas in terms of disaster potentialities in markets, uh, they're all crazy. They got the idea that [clears throat] bad results in markets would be predicted by Gaussian distributions.

10. And the way they decided on that outcome was it made everything so easy to compute. They don't follow Gaussian distributions. You have to believe in the tooth fairy to believe that. [clears throat and snorts] And the disasters are bigger and more irritating than Gaus would have predicted. It was easier to teach as well.

11. It was easier to teach, too. Yeah. I I once asked this distinguished medical school professor why he was still doing an obsolete procedure and he said it's so wonderful to teach. There's more of that in there's more of that in finance departments than you might think. Uh it it's very discouraging to learn advanced mathematics and uh you know how to do things that that none but the priesthood can do in your field and then find out it doesn't have any meaning you know I mean and and what you do when confronted with that knowledge after you've invested these years to get your PhD you know and you and you maybe you've written a textbook and a paper or two uh having a having a revelation that that stuff has no utility at all and really has counter utility. Uh I'm not sure, you know, too many people can handle it well.