저자: TerrySmith · 외국인
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결론: 펀드스미스의 3단계 전략(좋은 기업 투자, 과도한 지불 회피, 아무것도 하지 않기)이 지표상 여전히 유효하며 인덱스 대비 우수한 실적을 보였다는 주장. [자본수익률·마진] 2021년 보유기업 ROCE 28%(팬데믹 후 회복), 지수 약 14~16%로 두 배 가까운 차이. 매출총이익률 64% vs 지수 45%, 영업이익률 26% vs 15~17%로 모든 면에서 우위라고 강조. [현금전환·이자보상] 이익의 현금전환율 95%(지수는 공급망 문제로 재고 감소 등 일시적 요인으로 높게 나타났으나 향후 반전 예상). 이자보상배율 23배로 재무구조가 보수적이라고 설명. BP vs 로레알 비교로 현금전환율의 변동성 차이를 예시. [밸류에이션] 잉여현금흐름 수익률 2.7%(FTSE 5.4%, S&P 약 3.6%)로 보유종목이 지수보다 약 25% 비싸지만, 성장률(FCF 20% 증가)과 품질을 감안하면 과도하지 않다는 입장. 저평가=싸다는 등식을 거부. [매매·거래비용] 포트폴리오 회전율 5.6%로 낮은 편, 거래비용은 자산의 0.009% 수준으로 극히 적음. 장기 보유 철학 강조. [출연자 전망] 특정 종목·지수의 1~3개월 가격 방향 예측은 없음. 장기적으로 품질 기업 보유가 유리하다는 견해.
다듬은 글
um taking you on investment strategy so how have we done against our three pronged investment strategy which hopefully you're familiar with by now we try to only invest in good companies we try not to overpay when we're buying or holding the shares and then we do the most difficult part which is nothing and how are we doing against those three legs i'll run you through the usual tables that we give you and a couple of extras this time there's our look through ratios this is where we take our portfolio work out five operating financial ratios for it and compare what our companies are doing versus the the indices out there and so that's what we've got here and if you look at it the return on capital our companies last year roc e in the table return on capital employed was 28 a recovery from the prior year when there was a bit of a downturn caused by the pandemic this is highly satisfactory in so far as it's back to where it has been in the long term and you'll see that it's significantly ahead of where the index are whether it's the s p or the ftse over there on the right of the table you see about 14 to 16 returns so to put it in english for every pound of dollar of capital we own in these companies in our portfolio we're getting 28 pence or cents of profit return whereas if you're in the index you're getting about 15 pence our companies are delivering around about twice as much return and i think that's the single most important metric to look at when you look at how companies performing gross margins these are the difference between revenues and cost of goods sold companies take in stuff they take in ingredients or components or services and do something with them and turn them into products and services that they sell this is the markup the difference between the two our companies are at 64 which you'll see is pretty rock solid down the years basically in english they're making stuff for 36 and selling it for 100 if you look over at the index you'll see around 45 percent companies in the index are making things for 55 and they're selling it for 100 clearly it's better to make things for 34 and so 36 rather than sell it for 100 than it is to make it at 55 and sell it i mean one's obviously better than the other it's also something i think we'll come on to uh in the questions again because i'm pretty sure ian's got a couple for us on the inflationary uh outlook at the moment and this i would suggest you is the biggest single defense first line of defense against inflation of a company it's gross margin take out all the other expenses our companies incur selling general and administrative expenses they call them sg a and you get down to the operating profit margin you'll see last year again a bounce back from the pandemic 26 against 23 the year before and it compares with 15 to 17 in the index again very much better than the index cash conversion our companies converted 95 of their profits into cash last year and the index had a particularly good performance you'll see out there producing somewhere in the region of 100 to 124 of profits in cash this is a bit of an unusual feature and the index is performing particularly well at the moment for a couple of rather strange reasons bear in mind this is a ratio and if you make your profits go down more than your cash flow your cash conversion looks good it's not a very good place to be but nonetheless that's how the ratio comes out and the reason that's happening is companies in the index by and large had bigger falls in profitability than our companies did and at the same time because of supply chain difficulties they had an awful lot of stock out so their working capital went down invested in their business so they didn't make as much profit but they converted more of the profit into cash i've got a slide to illustrate that in a moment i think that will reverse as we start to emerge from the pandemic and lastly interest cover so is all this wonderful operating performance that we're getting from our companies being delivered with a lot of uh borrowed money and balance street uh trickery no um our companies last year had 23 times interest cover so their profits compared with what they're paying out in interest and lease rentals was 23 times i mean there these are very strong balance sheet businesses basically you can see they delivered last year 16 times a year before the index not in bad position if you look eight to nine times interest cover is pretty good but clearly these are very conservatively financed companies they're not producing this performance out of financial engineering i said i'll just show you a little illustration on the cash conversion here's two companies to look at bp and l'oreal one of which we own l'oreal one of which we would never own bp and if you have a look you can see some pretty interesting numbers in terms of cash conversion when we made this up it's before we had the full year figures and you can see although l'oreal was doing extremely well 133 for the last 12 months bp shot the lights out 147 which looks great just as a spot calculation but if you take the longer sweep you'll see that the bp1 is highly volatile minus 141 percent if you go back to 2016 uh compared with 147 now and on average as you can see they're just 66 percent cash conversion uh over the last seven or eight years um whereas our l'oreal you can see has got an average of 100 over the last seven or eight years clearly l'oreal is a consistently high cash conversion converter whereas bp is very volatile and we're just getting a piece of volatility which is making the figures look that well at the moment you could also see that that cash conversion if you look back over the eight years bp's net income has gone down very significantly it's quite close to having halved whereas the cash flow has gone down less uh it's not a great way to create value for shell is having your cash flow go down less and it's better than the opposite obviously of having your cash flow going down even faster than the profits but it's not a great leap forward is it to have a greater crash conversion really because the the cash flow falls slower than the profits over a period don't overpay second leg of our strategy this is probably the most vexed part of our strategy over the years people are always worried about whether we're overpaying we worry about whether we're overpaying where are we you see last year we finished here with a free cash flow yield of 2.7 so take the free cash flow that our companies have generated after paying for everything except the dividend which is a distribution from the cash flow that we own and you'll see that it was 2.7 when that is divided by their market value how does that compare with the index well you can see they're 5.4 for the footsie the companies we own are about twice as highly rated have half the yield of the ftse i personally wouldn't worry about that a lot because i think an awful lot of the stuff in the footsie is very poor quality stuff that's not going to produce great long-term returns for you we're still a bit more expensive than the s p you can see there 3.6 percent now um yeah we are more expensive probably about 25 more than the s p um but that doesn't unduly worry me i think because what you've got to ask yourself is yes we are more highly rated but does that's not expensive if the quality of our companies is even more significantly higher than the index than the the rating on the shares would suggest and so i'd ask you to think back to that look through table and think are these companies 25 better than the index 50 yeah when you look at the range of those figures we're about to get you and there's a clue at the bottom of this table you can see the free cash flows on our companies grew 20 last year or as we call it in the analytical uh uh team as a technical term quite a lot um and you know that's that's basically telling you that yeah we are we have got slightly more highly rated companies but they're growing faster than the market and they've got better operating ratios because i think what we're trying to get away from in representing this to you is the idea that lowly rated equals cheap and highly rated equals expensive it depends what you're getting it's like anything else in life that you buy foods don't cost the same as ferraris right and therefore the fact that one is priced lower than the other doesn't in itself tell you anything about the bargain that you're getting do nothing final leg of the strategy here's a table which shows you the t-class shares uh and what we did last year you'll see that our portfolio turnover was 5.6 percent uh well within our band for the last few years nowhere near the the highest turnover we've got and and i'm absolutely certain very significantly lower than the average active fund manager out there and you'll see when we come on to talk about the names on the next slide that as ever there are more names that we traded than the percentage would suggest which offers some people often wonder well i wonder how that could be the answer is very often the things that we sell because we haven't been adding to them and because they maybe haven't performed all that well sometimes they drift down as a percentage of our portfolio so when we sell them there's not such a big impact on things um another sort of indicator of of dealing not with the portfolio turnover percentage which uh tells you something is how much we actually spent on this you can see we spent point zero zero nine of a percent on dealing so basically less than one hundredth of a percent on dealing uh was spent last year uh a bit over two million pounds on on a fund of 27 28 billion pounds the as ever the broking industry will not become rich if everybody runs money like this everybody won't running like this so the broken industry for sure has a great future ahead of it but you can see that we basically don't do very much dealing
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