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Jamie Dimon on Bank Failures, Private Credit Risk, and How JPMorgan Stays Ahead

World Finance Journal · 2025-12-12 · 유튜브 시청 270 · Board Views 7 · International

International

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저자: JamieDimon · 외국인

요약 보기

디몬은 JP모건의 요새형 재무구조(자본 확충·보수적 회계)와 효율성 비율 우위를 강조한다. 사모신용은 2조달러로 빠르게 성장했고 일부 문제 가능성이 있으나 시스템 리스크는 아니라고 본다. 자산가격(밸류에이션)이 높아 상승여력이 제한적이며 신용스프레드도 마찬가지라고 경고한다. 가장 큰 리스크로 사이버 공격을 꼽는다. SVB·퍼스트리퍼블릭 실패는 만기보유 회계와 금리위험 방치가 원인이었다고 설명한다.

다듬은 글

※ 자동 자막 원문(다듬기 전)

01. It's a lot of work, but we obviously have the capability to do that and we have the capability to do WAMU. I think we finished the WAMU consolidations in nine months, all of them. So that within nine months that we're all in the same systems, which allows you to start doing a better job in customer service uh and things like that.

02. So this fortress balance sheet strategy and raising this equity capital and you know having additional margin of safety and conservative accounting in retrospect it seems like the obvious right strategy for running a large financial institution. Why wasn't everyone else copying it? H have people changed and does everyone else run their banks like this now?

03. I think people the people are more conservative today. I think regulars are more conservative today. But again, I go back to people get involved in aggressive accounting. Uh they don't look at stressing their own bank in a real way. Uh you know, you saw people take too much interest rate risk, too much credit exposure, too much optionality risk and and or or sometimes it's new products.

04. So if you look at the financial services, very often it's the new products that blow up. It takes a while. They haven't been through a cycle. And you you had that with equities way back in 1929. You had it with options. You had it with equity derivatives. You had it with mortgages. You had it with G.

05. Even Jinny Mays at one point blew up even though they're government guaranteed. Arguably, you had it with quant and with LT. Quant, it happened with leverage lending. And then people then become more rational how they run these balance sheets. Now they think through the rest. So So I have to ask you, is this private credit today?

06. Say it again. Is this private credit today? I I don't really think so. I I don't think it's $2 trillion. It's grown rapidly. That's an issue. But what happens the other thing about Mark is there's some very good actors in it who know what they're doing. Customers like the product. So I would say well the customers like it and but there also people who don't know what they're doing and it's grown rapidly.

07. So there it may there may be something in there would become a problem one day. I don't think it's systemic. So that two trillion the mortgage market when the time it blew up was I'm going to say n trillion and a trillion dollars was lost. This is you know and it was and trillion dollars was also high trillion dollars back then.

08. Yeah. A lot of these private a lot of these private credits are not leveraged like that but doesn't mean there won't be problems but it's it's slightly different but we you got but you look at the whole system there are other things out there that you know are leveraged that you know can cause problems and of course people take secret leverage in ways you don't necessarily see it.

09. What what are some of these in your mind that are potentially problematic today? Well, I look I I look at when you look at asset price, they're rather high. Now, I'm not saying that's bad, but if we if if today pees were 15 as opposed to 23, I say that's a lot less risk, a lot less to fall and you have some upside.

10. I would say at 23 there's not a lot of upside and there's a long way to fall. And that's true with credit spread. So, I and we look at we stress test everything. We do like a 100 stress tests a week, you know, and to make sure we can handle a wide variety of things. And then the other thing and the biggest risk to me is cyber.

11. I mean, I I think this cyber stuff is, you know, we we're very good at it. We work with all the government agencies. They would say that Jmore. We spend $800 million a year or something on it. We educate people on it. We just do. But it is, you're talking about grids and communications companies and water uh uh and even part of the military establishment.

12. The the protections are not what you need uh if we ever get any kind of war where cyber is involved and China is very good at it and so is Russia. But Russia is mostly criminal which is slightly different. All right, I'm going to pull us back to the story. We're going to fast forward to 2023. We're not really equipped to talk about Yeah.

13. Russia. Uh, it's not what we do at acquired, but but thank um Silicon Valley Bank. Yeah. And First Republic both fail. You're there again. Did you see it coming? What lessons did you learn from how 2008 went that you could apply in 2023? Obviously, you bought First Republic. So, Silicon Valley Bank, you know, they both Silicon Valley Bank for did some very good stuff, but they they both had something something unique that we didn't know at the time.

14. I'm going to call them concentrated deposits, not uninsured because people have misdained that concentrated. And so a lot of venture capital, what happened with Silicon Valley Bank and kind of First Republic is some of these large venture capital companies, call them there hundreds of them, maybe a thousand, told their constituent clients that they invested in who all bankked in Silicon Valley and First Republic, the banks aren't safe, get out.

15. And they all removed their deposits in Silicon Valley Bank, I think they had 200 billion deposits, 200 billion, 100 billion in one day. And that caused the problem. But they also had other problems. They didn't have proper liquidity. Uh they didn't have their collateral post at the Fed and they had taken too much interest rate exposure.

16. And the interest rate exposure was hidden by accounting. It was called held to maturity. But you don't have to mark even treasuries to market. And I always hated held to maturity because uh but it gives you better regulatory returns and stuff like that. But when that held to maturity the t if you said what's the tangible book value of one of these banks?

17. You said it was 100. Well, all of a sudden it was 50 if you just marked that one thing to market and and there's now here now you're into judgment land. At what point if you saw a bank where just that one mark had the tangible book value dropped to 40 or 30 cents to the dollar would you panic? I would have said that's too much risk and you know the regulators helped us because they said rates are going to stay low forever.

18. So these banks bought a lot of 3% mortgages and when you know 3% mortgage when rates went up to 5% you know worth 60 cents on the dollar or 50 cents and that was it. And so both those had they took too much interest exposure known to management and it was known to the regulators and you know uh and fixable.

19. So you know we we knew about a little bit about Silicon Valley Bank. We were trying to compete in that area. So we learned a lot afterwards about how to do a better job for that ecosystem of venture capital. We have a whole campus in Powalto now. We've hired 500 innovation bankers. We cover venture capital companies.

20. We're not as good as they are yet. We're we're going to get there because we're we're organized slightly differently. And we knew First Republic. We were watching it. I had called Janet Yellen that I said that that company's in trouble. And one or two others, if you want to, we'll take a look. We could probably buy it and eliminate the problem.

21. They waited a little bit too long. It was kind of a little melting ice cube. Uh but you can imagine the day we bought it, you never heard about it again. We hedged all their exposures in a couple of days and you know we merged everything in. We wrote everything down and but we did get some good stuff from we actually got some good people.

22. You know the normal thing in acquisition is they're terrible get rid of them or they failed but we also looked at what they did how they dealt with clients maybe clients here. They did a great job with high net worth clients single point of contact you know concier services. So now if you go down Madison Avenue you see things called JP Morgan Financial Center.

23. That's your first JP Morgan branded consumer effort, right? Because it's it's kind of based on that that when you walk in there, we know your small business, we know your mortgage, we know your consumer banking, uh we can get you travel, we can do a whole bunch of different stuff. So very high level uh services.

24. I think we have 20 of them now. But I'd love it. And if it works, you know, in 20 years, we have 300. And so these things are opportunities and I hope it works. You know, you don't always know they're going to work for a fact, but but so far so good. All right. So we're we're effectively caught up to today.

25. And if we're trying to and now we've got the whole story, we've got a lot of context. Obviously, let didn't go into every detail, but if we're now trying to answer Yes. If we're now trying to answer the question, how did you separate from the pack? Why did you become a completely different animal than your whole competitive set?

26. What are the things in your mind that led to this success? Well, I look I I mean I don't I don't know totally first of all you because we skipped over strategy a little bit and this is important for you all that we we have what we do is the same thing that a community bank does other than investment bank global investment banking.

27. Okay. So if you walk into a small community bank they know your business account they know your consumer account. They usually have a trust company. They used to ma they used to call it trust. They'd manage your private affairs. They'd set up a trust for you and they do stuff like that. and their CRM is up here.

28. They don't need a Salesforce CRM because they know everyone in town and they didn't do big-time global investment banking, but the strategy those businesses fit together. They feed each other and so does investment banking. A lot of our middle market clients use investment banking products. A lot of our consumer clients use some FX.

29. So, all of our businesses feed each other. There's no extraneous. We got rid of everything that didn't fit a strategy. And then you start building client businesses and client services, Fortress balance sheet, Fortress accounting, all those various things. And and you know I and I've always talked about so it's it's it's holding a portfolio of things that actually feed each other.

30. They actually fit. Whereas you know city had consumer consumer finance that didn't fit. Life insurance that didn't fit. Property C that didn't they eventually got rid of them all. Sandy just wanted to do more of them. You know he bought American General which did uh truck leasing for God's sake. I mean and you know once you get involved these things it's hard for people to understand the risk in each one of these businesses when but all of ours fit.

31. I don't like hobbies. I don't like things you know we made and we've made plenty of mistakes because you you have to try and test things and then you're always investing for the future. That investment is always people, branches, and technology. And that's true whether investment banking people or consumer bank people or opening consumer branches or I think Doug Doug Pen is here and Troy Roarback who run the global investment bank, but they've opened, you know, commercial banking branches all over Europe and I think you're telling me I mean it's it's it's going great, you know, and it's feeding all other parts of the company.

32. So just sticking to your knitting, constantly investing, you know, not overreacting to the market. You know, markets are like accordians. Uh and then sometimes, you know, it's a if you're strong when others aren't, you have a chance to buy things you want to buy. And then always look at the world from the point of view of the consumer.

33. What do you want? How do you want it? How do you want to get it? Can we provide it to you? Uh uh in a way that makes sense for us too. You know, not going for the last dollar and not nothing like that. And so uh and building teams of people, you know, our people are curious and smart. They have heart.

34. They have soul. They give a damn about uh you know the guards in the company and the receptionists and the you know it's not just about the big- time bankers and people pounding their chest. You know we don't try not to put up with that. And we have big-time bankers. they are exceptional, you know, and uh but the company, you know, serves the clients and we have uh and I think the clients know that when when you really dig in to start analyzing JP Morgan's financials, you kind of see this one thing that jumps right out at you, which is the efficiency ratio.

35. For every dollar that you make compared to your competitors, you get to keep 15 more of that dollar as profit. It's not hard to see how that compounds and how that allows reinvestments. And why is your efficiency ratio so much better than competitors? It's it is literally continuously investing and gaining business at the margin and not stopping and not stop starting.

36. And you know the thing is the thing about margins too is that we we have that margin while investing a lot. It's much easier to have that margin and just you know we can cut billions of dollars of marketing out tomorrow. We can stop opening branches and save a billion dollars next year. We can do a lot of things.

37. Your margins will go up. your growth will go down, your long-term margins will probably get worse. So, we kind of look right through the cycle and we look at the actual economics what we do, not the accounting of what we do. Uh, and you know, we have, you know, we've built it over time. You know, we have great people and great products.

38. And there there's some secret sauce I'm not going to tell you about. We do investor day and we tell everyone everything. And I'm sitting there watching my I never do presentations. I'm watching them do the presentations. I'm saying, "Oh god, we're just giving away too many secrets here." But but so there's secrets as to why the efficiency ratio, you know, I saw Howard Schultz here before, you know, and I'm not supposed to say that probably.

39. Um, it's okay. It's okay. But no, but you look, look what he built over the years, you know, the consistency, the curiosity, the heart, the, you know, branch by branch products. It's just always doing that, knowing you're going to make mistakes, but building the culture that just kind of plows through that.

40. And you all know, I I do use sport. Sports is a great analogy. If you have a a sport team with a bunch of real jerks on it, are they going to be a great team? Almost never. You know, if a if the team members aren't giving it their their best every day during practice, you look at Tom Brady. Every day at practice, he worked

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