저자: MartinShkreli · 외국인
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브리지워터(레이 달리오)가 세계 최대 헤지펀드로 대략 450억 달러의 수익을 투자자에게 안겼다고 소개. 브리지워터의 '급진적 투명성' 경영철학(회의 녹화, 솔직한 비판 문화)과 달리오 원칙서를 설명. 헤지펀드 대부분이 실적 부진으로 폐쇄되며, 운용자산이 커지면 큰 손실 한 번이 누적 수익을 지울 수 있다고 지적. 주식이 아닌 매크로 전략과 리스크 패리티(자산 배분·리밸런싱) 개념을 다룰 예정. 영상 내 특정 자산에 대한 1~3개월 가격 방향 예측 발언은 없음.
다듬은 글
Bridgewater is is a hedge fund that I think is is of some interest uh it's the world's largest hedge fund um it's 150 billion dollars in assets um so if you think about them charging say 1% um per um year that's a billion dollars a year that they make just for um operating their hedge fund and if they charge 10 or 20% incentive fee you can add that up if they made say 10% that's 15 billion 20% of that is three billion um and they've done that for many years so in any event that's why ralo they the principal uh of the fund the guy who started the fund in 1975 um is one of the richest people in the world but what's interesting about Bridgewater is they're very different from any other hedge fund they don't trade stocks uh they might trade a little bit just by sort of by accident but in general they're not trading stocks and we'll talk about what it means to be uh macro hedge fund but when I started in hedge funds I would have found a fund like Bridgewater very confusing I would have said well what why how can they not be trading stocks what is there other than stocks and I think that that's one of the things that we're going to focus on in this um in this uh chat so one of the things that makes Bridgewater a little bit different from everyone else is something uh a lot about their operating philosophy whether or not this is actually impacted their investing results I'm not so sure I think a lot of people aren't so sure but they definitely have an interesting operating philosophy and they call it uh radical transparency and so basically this concept of radical transparency is is one where um at Bridgewater's offices everything is taped uh every everything is uh uh every discussion is is it is people call it cult sometimes um everyone sort of um they have this policy where you just sort of have to apply on things and be sort of uh radically honest about whether you feel like uh ideas are good or bad so you can you can call you're expected to call your peers you know I don't think for the sake of disparagement but for the sake of transparency you're supposed to say things like well I think this is a terrible idea because you're failing to understand this this is your flaw and your hypothesis and you're supposed to be willing to do that without any sort of fear of punishment or retribution for you know being sort of emotionally um um hurtful sometimes with respect to these decisions and the ideas that we should rise above our emotional tend enes to be hurt when someone calls your idea a bad idea and uh focus on the result which is more important um than um perhaps the the emotional impact so um a good a good quote from Rio's so-called principles is how big of an impediment is psychological pain to your progress and if you stop and think about that psychological aspect of of becoming a better investor maybe a better executive or whatever it is you do a better student even or better are parent um psychological pain is extremely uh uh damaging a lot of people uh they made 45 billion not 45 trillion uh no one's made 45 trillion um the uh psychological pain is is the biggest impediment I think to all of our own progress and I'm glad that Doo is more gifted with words than perhaps I am but um the idea that um we Str we are Our Own Worst Enemy is something I've said many times in this series and that we struggle to to progress because of our own inborn and ingrained psychological problems um particularly the fear of of psychological pain the idea that you could be wrong the idea that you could be very wrong the idea that you could have been doing something for 15 years or 20 years and have been dead wrong about what you were doing that's something that that's um really painful and so um you can see all of rayo's principles on actually his this website principles.
comom which is uh something encourage you to go and read it's somewhat autobiographical it's somewhat um instructive and I think you'll enjoy it very much um and there's just a couple of quotes there but you can kind of see um some of them here let's go and visit this briefly just to sort of check it out and uh see what it's all about so if you go to my most fundamental life principles you can kind of see um things like I worked for what I wanted not for what others wanted me to do um I wrestled with my realities reflected on the consequences of my decisions and learned and improveed from this process some of it is again a lot of biographical this sort of traces back his his history uh and life um truth more precisely an accurate understanding of reality is the essential foundation for producing good outcomes and again this is sort of why I sat there and made the spreadsheet about um uh the markets you know there there's this ostensible truth we're given by the world that's stocks go up over the long run and we've built all these massive structures like mutual funds and 401ks around this so-called truth but the reality is it's not true um which is really enormous and even if it is true to a very small extent like say the markets generate three or 5% returns and if you want to twist the numbers and torture them to the way back in the beginning and the founding of this country again you're just torturing your your your bias even further to prove a point but if you really wanted to believe that um at the end of the day what I pointed out with respect to inflation and taxes truly undermine the argument by at least 50 to 75% so in any event um you can see that uh what doio is is offering up here is that you can look at The Superficial layer of the truths that we're given but I think that the real good results come from challenging really trying to challenge um uh these foundations and I think that for my own just sort of grounded home my own sort of experience in hedge funds was it was sort sort of um difficult for me to succeed in hedge funds and I think difficult for most hedge funds that's why most hedge funds don't last very long in fact out of most hedge funds uh that have ever been started almost all of them have been closed due to lack of performance and the very few that have performed well some of them have done it by doing illegal things some of them have done it by exploiting things that have disappeared some of them shouldn't be in business um some of them have negative results even though they manage billions of dollars so I think that the reality is that my own um sort of Coming to Terms of the fact that the financial Marketplace isn't a great place to make a lot of money it is certainly not edifying psychologically to trade pieces of paper um index uh funds I don't think outperform anything uh maybe they outperform hedge funds but they certainly in it of themselves are not um I think a good returning instrument so anyway this sort of examination that Ray doio encourages this fundamental examination of the truth is um or this accurate understanding of reality certainly led me to stop investing in in managers of Assets in other words uh drug assets like having a healthcare hedge fund it it made more sense for me to actually manage those assets directly and that was a better way to sort of procure return or alpha or whatever you want to call it than anything else and so he's got a lot of cool kind of thoughts here and this has got to be hundreds of pages um and you can see that there are these kind of uh management principles do not feel bad about your weaknesses or those of others so he's like this a very darwinian and Cutthroat approach and I think like I've said I can teach you about how to um forecast cash flows and do that really carefully but it's all meaningless unless you pair it with this sort of psychological um perspective and rubric that allows you to be sort of um efficient and capable of discharging some of those things that I've taught in the last lessons do not feel bad about your mistakes those of others love them create a culture in which is it okay it is okay to make mistakes but unacceptable not to identify analyze and learn from them a lot of these uh are important don't don't tolerate dishonesty intellectual dishonesty is is the most important kind of dishonesty plain old dishonesty um is obviously intolerable but intellectual dishonesty is the one that we're we're mostly focused on logical unemotional discussions record almost all meetings and share them with the relevant people this is uh this is maybe the most um difficult uh of all uh this idea that they they record these meetings and make you watch them over again I think there's a lot of people that um uh have trouble with this um one there's some practicality um aspect to it but the second is I actually think that the time drain from doing that is is less productive than uh than um uh than actually doing it but that's just my two cents um so anyway um I'll uh I'll let you read this at your own Leisure but I do think uh here's the Jesus one teach your people to fish rather than give them fish uh of course uh We've read that uh before so anyway that's that's a little bit about Ray Doo again the most successful uh by dollars hedge fund on the planet in history r ray doia hedge fund Bridgewater has made more money actual dollars $45 billion for his investors that's more than any hedge fund in history I think Bill amman's hedge fund has actually lost money for his investors since Inception and part of this is due to the the growth of assets under management with assets under management growing um uh you end up uh these returns are are important for instance I guess I can show you what I mean here what often happens in hedge funds and this has happened I think to a lot of funds maybe green light Capital would be an example is that your returns look a little let me get a thicker brush here I like it thick um so this is your let's say this is your assets under management and it sort of goes like uh this or I don't know make it a little more logarithmic and let's say this is something like 10 billion and this is I don't know this is sort of like 100 million maybe 1 billion here so the dur for the bulk of this fund's existence the it's been a sub1 billion fund and then it kind of becomes this really big hedge fund because of various her mentalities let me just take my uh time to block some people here all right so um so let's say this is return annual return and let's say this is say 30% some good really good return this is 10% this is 0% this is actually negative a negative return what often happens here is you'll have this like really good return until the the fund hits this critical AUM so even a couple of years in this territory say down 10% would produce an actual down1 billion dollar for investor years while these 30% years uh in the 100 to a billion dollar range that's only say $300 million so can one one bad year at 10 billion can wipe out your entire uh track record of returns you can see how that works and they say two bad years and you really have done your investors a huge disservice a lot of hedge funds have sort of that sort of happened um to them but bridgew has has thankfully uh um evaded that so so what is a macro style Hedman we're going to talk all about what do they do if they're not trading stocks what the heck are they trading um and one of the things that um they go through is something called risk parody um and this is sort of a strategy that they I wouldn't say pioneered but they definitely um they definitely um pioneered it in some ways uh they didn't invent it but they I think they put it to to practice more than others so um this is a paper written not by Bridgewater actually but by uh aqr aqr is a quantitative hedge fund it's a little bit different from Bridgewater but they do have some similarities and this is a 12-page paper that I suggest you print out and read um it's 11 pages if you exclude that and maybe 10 pages or nine pages if you exclude maybe even eight pages uh if you exclude all the disclaimers and whatnot but you can see that uh um there is a uh discussion about risk parity it's basically an asset allocation concept one of the concepts of risk parity as you can see is sort of embodied in this concept here which is just basically at what point do we have our portfolio here's expected return and risk at what point do we have our portfolio 100% in in these really safe Securities here's the safest security of all treasury uh um uh inflation protected securities so are or bonds issued by a sovereign entity in this case the treasury Department our United States government least risky security because what they are is they're bonds without the inflation return so you're really talking about yields that are very very very very small um sub 1% usually and then you've got uh normal bonds and these can be any kinds of bonds right they don't have to be treasuries they could be corporate bonds and here is a mixed portfolio where you have 60% stocks 40% bonds and here's like a really risky portfolio of 100% stocks and he's even riskier 100% Emerging Markets Equity so the question is what kind of return do we expect so one of the ways that people um employ uh risk parody which I I don't um I really don't um endorse but it's it's sort of something that's worked it's this it's this rebalancing concept um so let's say um let's say you open your fund up and and it's year one and assume all else is equal and and equities have recently dropped 10% we're going to we're sort of just do Equity performance bond performance and then we're going to do um uh Equity exposure and bond exposure so obviously in year zero your hedge fund wasn't around and let's say the ideal mix is going to be 6040 you can see the equity's dropped so you might think and I I think this is a fallacy but you might expect that Equity performance is likely to to go up so instead of the 6040 let's see there in year one you might actually have a 7030 allocation because you've gotten the juice out of the bonds so you might expect um a 70 30% risk waiting so I don't know they say next year equities drop again it's a big recession let's say bonds I don't drop 5% and so you didn't do too great by the way because you lost 7% on the equities and I don't know you lost 1.5% on the bonds so in this year you you're down uh 88.5% but maybe your average maybe you beat your average fund your average fund might have been down 9% or 8% I don't know so let's say in the next year um you know you're you become even more um you know you expect equities will do even better and lo and behold there's a big Rebound in in the markets uh equities go up say bonds go down another 5% and you have this great year where you return I don't know 16% and so this is the idea then then you might say okay you know what I've had a lot of equities I've been Overexposed versus my 6040 so I'm going to go down to a 50% 50% and your hope is that obviously your your sort of trading off the expected return with risk and that's sort of the basic idea of of risk Varity and this is one uh way that people implement it and you can see here uh in in this paper by aqr kind of how how people do that and the actual implementation of risk parity is different from maybe what I just described and and how others do it but that's one way to think about it so let's turn our attention to sort of um macroeconomics and
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