저자: ChamathPalihapitiya · 외국인
요약 보기
결론: 연준의 긴급 대출 프로그램은 은행 위기를 1년 뒤로 미룬 것일 뿐이며, 2024년 3월 15일 무렵 새로운 문제가 불거질 수 있다고 경고함. 은행 위기 원인: SVB·시그니처·실버게이트는 듀레이션 미스매치(장기채 보유 후 예금 인출 사태)로 무너졌고, 퍼스트리퍼블릭은 예금·대출 포트폴리오 재편 문제, 크레딧스위스는 유동성보다 과도한 공포 심리가 원인이라고 설명. 크레딧스위스 발언 해석: 사우디국립은행장의 '10% 이상 투자 불가' 발언은 앞부분만 인용돼 과장됐으며, 스위스중앙은행 개입 후 패닉은 대부분 진정됐다고 봄. 감독 실패: 연준과 샌프란시스코 연준이 SVB의 위험을 사전에 파악하지 못한 감독 실패를 지적하며 정치권의 책임 규명을 요구함. 벤처캐피털 책임: SVB가 VC에게 저금리 대출·펀드 출자를 제공하고 VC는 투자 포트폴리오사에 예금을 맡기게 하는 얽힌 구조가 문제라고 주장하며, 비공개 이해충돌 공시 필요성을 제기함. 연준 대출 프로그램: 은행 보유 자산을 액면가로 평가해 1년 만기 대출(OIS+10bp, 약 4.9%)을 제공. 미국 상위 4대 은행을 제외한 은행들의 함몰 손실이 약 2조 달러로 추정되며, 상위 4대 은행까지 포함하면 추가 1~2조 달러 규모의 백스톱이 필요할 수 있다고 봄. 1년 후 리스크: 1년 뒤 상환 부담을 해결하려면 금리를 대폭 인하해야 하고, 이는 자산 가격 재팽창을 의미하는 구조적 딜레마가 있다고 주장함. 자산 손실 추정: 10년물 국채 보유 은행은 장부가치 10~15% 손실, MBS는 그보다 더 클 수 있고, 단기물은 손실이 작다고 설명.
다듬은 글
so if the FED takes an emergency posture and says okay guys we want to avert a crisis in a year from now and we're going to cut rates these assets that these Banks own will be worth more which will allow them to repay the loan as far as I can tell all we've done is we've kicked the can down the road for a year but I do think it's important for people to realize this doesn't solve the problem it just means that mark your calendar for a year from now we have a problem on March 15 2024 because all perfect folks that took money what do we do I think sure issues that Credit Suisse are different than the issues at First Republic and the issues at First Republic are different than those other three Banks the other three Banks David that you mentioned signature Silicon Valley Bank and silvergate all had very traditional liquidity crises right we talked about this last week which is duration mismatching where you have depositors who want their money today but you have assets that mature in 10 years and as a result you have huge unrealized losses if you all of a sudden cash them out today versus waiting 10 years I think what's happening at First Republic is really just about making sure that that loan book and the depositors can get parked into a combination set of banks that can take care of the balance sheet so that there are no more liquidity issues at Credit Suisse they have an enormous amount of liquidity what that was was I think a lot of speculation around whether they would default on their bonds or whether they would theoretically need more liquidity but the balance sheet itself was not only liquid but also very solvent so I think that was just more of a panicky reaction to comments from a 9.9 shareholder who just said that they can't put in any more Equity but even then I went back this is the chairman of the Saudi National Bank he was asked on Bloomberg would you give Credit Suisse more money and he had a very reasonable answer but it was snapshotted in a very awkward way the first sentence was under no circumstances would he do that okay now if you stop there you could be panicked but the rest of it made a lot of sense which is he said look in Saudi Arabia if we go above 10 percent we have to go through regulatory approvals domestically and there are regulatory approvals abroad that's a big hill to climb and all of a sudden it no longer becomes a financial investment it becomes a somewhat political investment and so we're very happy at 9.9 that was the totality of a statement but if you just cherry pick the first 45 seconds and ran with it which people on the internet did this is sort of what caused that second level wave Panic at a gsib and then the Swiss National Bank stepped in and I think that that Panic has largely gone okay so what is the real issue the issue again is I think we have had a bit of supervisory failure here right because we all know this in any industry if you let capitalism go totally unchecked shareholders will demand immediate profits today it happens in every industry except in ones where you can basically gamble on future profits and that's what tech does but every other shareholder in every other asset class demands money today and that's the same for banks the problem is the banks are a highly regulated business they are supposed to be supervised by The Regulators and this is a very clear example where why is there not a real-time spreadsheet I mean this is not complicated stuff where assets and liabilities and duration mismatching can be known on a real-time basis where the San Francisco fed Mary Daley should have a report that's escalated to her when svb got over their ski tips which they did in Q4 of 2022 so I think the real question that has to be examined is where were these folks for the last four months when they could have done something not just about this but rules in general for all banks that are not the gcps and I think that's a very important question that politicians need to get to the root of I think the VC the critique is specific to Silicon Valley Bank because I think and this article was in the Wall Street Journal but what it shows is a really complicated intertwined relationship between VCS and Silicon Valley Bank where you know VCS were given very cheap interest rate loans they were given GP call lines of credit they were given LP lines of credit and then those same VCS would be directing their companies to put their deposits inside of svb who would then take those deposits and buy perhaps and buy risk and while the reality is all of this stuff will come to light because I think it will get exposed as we go through Congressional hearings on all of this but I think the I think pointing the finger at VCS in this specific case is somewhat warranted because there was a little bit of people working in lockstep together and there was a a lack of functional responsibility around how to be a true fiduciary so if you come to a board and your founder is 22 years old and you give that person 15 or 20 million dollars I think it makes a fair amount of sense that you are supposed to be the more sophisticated Financial person in that room and if you have incentives that aren't properly disclosed to that CEO and now a set of decisions are made I think that that there should be some accountability for that or at least some exploration of why that happens and in some cases Silicon Valley Bank is a limited partner in all of these funds so imagine a situation you go and start a fund Silicon Valley Bank comes to you and says let me be a limited partner and invest with you let me give you some amount of money I don't know where that money comes from from Silicon Valley yeah well let's be realistic more like 25 50 million 100 million okay there's a lot of them okay so a million kind of is whitewashing this problem so you give them a reasonable amount of money they're like wow I'm I have tremendous loyalty for you thank you well do you need anything else do you need personal loans do you need lines of credit for your business sure why not I take those two and invariably on the back end now your loyalty obviously builds up again nothing none of this is wrong but this is what's happening and then you tell your companies to keep your deposits there maybe the cash management program is not as strong as it would have been if you were more circumspect and you didn't have those incentives to direct people to one institution only in any other part of the market so in the public markets as an example there is such a bar for disclosure okay and I cannot stress this to you enough related party transactions all of this stuff we have to tell everything not just for us but even if our like sister or brother or mother may have a transaction with an entity that we're doing a deal with and it just isn't the case in private markets and so it's not to say that anything untoward happened but when people point the finger at VCS I think they are pointing to this whole set of issues and asking the question shouldn't there have been more disclosure and transparency around it and now that this has come to pass shouldn't we explore it and I think that's what the Wall Street Journal did they started pulling on this sweater thread and my guess is that you're going to find a whole ball of yarn at the end of it so what the FED did this weekend is essentially create a buyer of Last Resort again now how do they do this so all of these Banks basically had assets that they bought for a dollar and are now worth 95 cents and that's what's creating this whole issue or 80 cents or 85 cents you you pick the number but they're not worth the dollar that they bought what the FED basically said is okay give me that asset give me that Bond I will value it at a dollar and I will give you a dollar as a loan and you will pay me interest and the interest rate I think is what's called ois and they added 10 basis points on top so I think it's about 4.9 percent so what it allows all of these Banks and if you take all of the banks that are not the top four in America so the top four are JPMorgan B of A City and well so just ignore those for one second the other end Banks if you look at all of the assets that are underwater because of all the rate hikes that sax talked about and you add up all those losses that is about two trillion dollars and the FED didn't announce that there was a beginning and an end to this program other than saying these would be one-year loans and so I think the exposure for the American banking system at a minimum is going to be this two trillion dollars because now the incentive if you're a banker right now running one of these banks that has not gone under is to immediately go to the Fed put all of those assets to them get a loan and now take that and buy different assets different bonds different U.S treasuries that are yielding much more than what your old treasuries were yielding and I think that's the Arbitrage that we've unfortunately created and the other question now though however is what does that mean for the top four Banks right because if it's 2 trillion for everybody else but the top four what's the gap for the top four that looks like it's somewhere between a trillion and 2 trillion so that's another amount of money we're going to have to cover the FED will have to backstop and then as Friedberg said these checks always come due what do we do in a year because in a year the problem is the only way to make the banks in a position to repay this much money in one year is to cut interest rates so massively that these assets massively inflate and now all of a sudden you're in a position to cover this so it's worth that Delta is because it's about they're down 15 10 in Book value these again it depends on what they bought we don't really know enough details so I don't want to guess but if you own these 10-year treasuries you could be off 10 or 15 if you own mortgage-backed Securities it could be off a little bit more if you own short-term Securities they're off a little bit less you get a loan collateralized by these assets so you're still holding them right
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