저자: 미상 · 외국인
요약 보기
2007년 서브프라임 붕괴를 예견해 큰 수익을 낸 마이클 버리의 사례를 다룬 영상이다. 버리는 2003년부터 서브프라임 모기지 풀(pool)의 대출 기준이 분기마다 악화되는 것을 직접 분석했다. 월가 기관과 신용평가사가 이를 제대로 검토하지 않았다는 점을 지적한다. 2005년 버리는 서브프라임 시장이 2007년에 붕괴할 것으로 판단했다. 이유로는 상환 원금·이자를 내지 않아도 되는 네거티브 아모타이제이션 이자전용 대출의 확산을 들었다. 그는 부실 대출 일부만 나빠져도 모기지담보부증권(MBS)이 휴지조각이 될 것으로 보고 이를 공매도하는 전략을 택했다. 이를 위해 월가에서 신용부도스와프(CDS)를 저렴하게 사들였고, 이는 CDS 시장 초기 참여의 사례로 언급된다. 실제로 2007년 서브프라임 시장이 무너지며 그의 예측은 적중했다. 영상은 이 과정에서 그가 2007년 펀드로 약 7억 2500만 달러를 벌었다고 전한다. 이 사례는 다수가 보지 않는 데이터를 직접 분석하는 역발상 투자의 성공 사례로 제시된다. 영상 자체는 특정 자산에 대한 향후 가격 방향 예측을 제시하지 않는다. 과거 사례 서술이며, 현재 시장에 대한 매수·매도 조언은 없다.
다듬은 글
The first one to see that something was seriously amiss in the burgeoning subprime mortgage market was Dr. Michael Burry, a California physician with only one good eye. He lost the other one to cancer as a child and also suffers from Asperger's syndrome, a condition related to autism that often produces an aversion to social contact.
Uncomfortable dealing with patients, Burry quit medicine and started a hedge fund in Cupertino, spending most of his time in a darkened office glued to his computer screen. Beginning in 2003, he turned to something that no one else in America was doing. Reading and analyzing the pools of risky subprime mortgage loans that Wall Street had been buying up and bundling into highly profitable mortgage-backed securities, which they were selling to investors around the world.
I called up the prospectuses and I read the prospectuses and I looked at these pools. I could see the credit standards within these pools deteriorating just quarter to quarter. First of all you tell that? There was essentially crappier mortgages being put into these pools and it didn't seem investors seem to care and it didn't seem the ratings agencies seem to care.
Do you think many people read these read these prospectuses? I think the lawyers that put them together and to an extent maybe. Do you think the executives at the big Wall Street firms who were issuing these bonds had read them? Or understood them? I don't think they read them, no. But I think that uh there were probably junior analysts that were given the task of reviewing the these issue these documents.
However, I think that um this was a profit center. Um it was a profit center. It was something the organization wanted to do. In effect, Lewis writes, Michael Burry was doing the first real analysis of the creditworthiness of the subprime borrowers and the structure of the complicated Wall Street mortgage securities, the kind of work that was supposed to have been done by bond rating agencies like Standard & Poor's and Moody's so that investors could accurately judge their risk.
What you were doing sounds to me like the job that the rating agencies should have been doing. There's no way the ratings agencies had anywhere near the manpower to look through all that was being issued. Yeah, but you're one guy. And you found it. You You would think that even if they just looked at a sample, maybe they would have come to a realization, but By 2005, Michael Burry had come to the realization that the Wall Street bond market had lost its mind.
It was buying up hundreds of millions of dollars in dicey loans to unqualified buyers who were, in Michael Lewis's words, one broken refrigerator away from default. Burry concluded that the subprime market would collapse in 2007. He notices for the first time that their pools their their mortgage bonds supported by pools of loans.
And most of the loans are what are called negative amortizing interest only loans, which means that you the homeowner and buyer, you borrow the money and you not only don't have to re- repay your principal, you have to you don't even have to repay the interest. And if you just don't pay anything, they just they just add to your loan.
So you can't lose your house. You You can't You can't lose your house, right? In theory, right? And And so he figures we've reached the end of the road in the insanity of lending. They're They're scraping the bottom of the barrel. Now is the time to lay a bet. He's before anybody does. Burry figured out that these mortgage-backed securities would become worthless if just a small percentage of the dicey loans went bad and he wanted to bet against the worst of them.
He decided that the best way to do it would be to get Wall Street to sell him inexpensive insurance contracts on the securities that would pay off big time if they failed. The contracts were called credit default swaps. He conceives that they are going to invent on Wall Street credit default swaps on subprime mortgages, essentially insurance contracts on the bonds before they even do.
And he helps He participates in the creation of this instrument and Michael Burry is the first one in. Burry assumed a lot of people would figure out what he was up to, but very few did. It took 2 years for the drama to play out, but the subprime mortgage market finally collapsed in 2007 just as he had predicted.
So you made a ton of money. Made a ton of money. Much more than I ever imagined you know I'd ever have. We made 725 million, I think, on the funds in 2007. Michael Burry's advantage was he wasn't part of the collective. He would that he was just this guy in a t-shirt and shorts with a glass eyeball and Asperger's syndrome uh looking at the numbers. And uh when nobody else really was.
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