저자: 미상 · 외국인
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마이클 버리가 2008년 주택 버블을 예측하고 베팅한 과정을 설명하는 내레이션 영상이다. 결론은 주택시장 붕괴 예측과 그에 따른 베팅이 버리의 대표 사례라는 것이다. 버리는 가치투자자로서 주택 부문의 레버리지, 집값 상승 가정, 사회 전반의 주택 소유 열풍을 보고 금융 붕괴를 예상했다. 이 영상에서는 구체적인 종목이나 가격 목표가 제시되지 않는다. 역사적 배경으로 정부의 모기지 증권화(1970년대), 레이건 시기 관련 법 제정, 1982년 변동금리 모기지 합법화가 소개된다. 이 제도들이 저신용자 대출 확대로 이어졌다고 설명한다. 1990년대 서브프라임 보험 시장의 급성장, 클린턴의 국가주택소유전략, 1999년 글래스-스티걸법 폐지(그램-리치-블라일리법)가 민간 시장의 확장 능력을 키웠다고 설명한다. 2001~2003년 금리 급락과 집값의 소득 추세 이탈이 주요 배경으로 제시된다. 그린스펀의 '전국적 버블은 일어나지 않는다'는 발언도 언급된다. 2005년 전후 서브프라임 이자만 납부형 대출과 페이먼트 옵션 ARM 같은 극단적 티저금리 상품이 확산되었다고 설명한다. 이는 집값 상승을 전제로 한 상품이었다. 버리는 2007년경 티저금리 만기 도래와 함께 주택 가격이 급락하고 소비와 고용이 연쇄적으로 무너질 것으로 보았다고 설명한다. 이후 그가 어떻게 베팅했는지는 영상 내용에서 구체적으로 다루지 않는다. 출연자 전망은 과거 사건에 대한 해설이며, 현재 시점의 자산 가격 방향 예측은 없다.
다듬은 글
michael berry who becomes a household name after his winning bats against the mode gage crisis was featured in the film the big short since then his fame has skyrocketed to level unseen before from blocking horns with the biggest forces to being a guiding light to the novice investors today he is reigning the wall street heart with a multi-million dollar portfolio the 2008 financial crisis was one of the worst economic disasters ever the economy went into recession it caused the biggest recessions since the great depressions of 1930s in the early 2000s michael berry had realized that many subprime home loans were in danger of defaulting and he had started betting against the housing market various actions attracted the attention of a few more bankers and other opportunities in today's video we tell you how michael barry predicted the 2008 housing bubble but before we start subscribe to our channel and hit the bell icon to never miss a video from us now let's begin michael barry's activities assigned capital and he thought of himself as a value investor soon his attention was caught by the growing importance of the housing sector the amount and type of leverage the generations owed acceptance and societal assumptions that the prices always went up and the very broad societal participation was greater than 60 and owning homes all this called out to him this was not just a case where a few early adopters made a lot of money or a few venture capitalists had acted badly the entire economy depended on home price appreciations the slope home price appreciations consumer spending jobs securities markets all of it he could see financial armageddon as housing with the main trigger point in predicting when and how the collapse would occur barry's main focus was again on the actions of the government and the response of the private sector all this was much in keeping with his studies earlier in chicago the whole idea of an american dream being related to owning a home has been around for nearly a century and nearly every modern president has promoted it in one way or another with a name program perry said the government has helped return the gis after world war ii by providing homes and the government was the first to securitize mortgages in the early 70s privately securitized mortgages followed shortly thereafter thanks to corneiri president regan would sign the secondary mortgage market enhancement act which among other things allowed insurance companies and pensions to invest in these securitized mortgages also a short time later reagan signed a law that had made these types of products much more tax efficient to be more clear the securitization of mortgages means that there is actually virtually no limit on the number of mortgages that can be originated by an institution they just get sold through wall street to investors very sad all this was considered harmless and it was a good thing for the american dream to almost all concerns for decades but the desire to satisfy these dreams needed a tool something that would make home loans themselves much more affordable for those without income credit or assets to afford one back in 1982 again the depository institutions legalized adjustable rate mortgages for the very first time these adjustable rate mortgages would in various forms be the primary mortgage product at the heart of the collapse of our economy two and a half decades later but the adjustable mortgages did not take off immediately they really did not take off until more additional regulatory and legislative changes in the 1990s and early 2000s had jump-started the market for affordability products in the mortgage space the general point was to increase the pressure on banks to make more loans to less credit worthy customers and they did subprime insurance bloomed about five to six times during the 90s and there was a mini crisis thereafter bill clinton had a name for this drive and he named it as the national home ownership strategy in the year 1999 the gram leech bliley ack repealed the glass-steagall act of 1933 and officially removed the increasingly leaky separations between the activities of the wall street banks and the depository banks all these freed banks to experiment and to expand into new lines of business none more faithful than the experiment with derivatives and subprime asset-backed securities the private market therefore gained the capability to amount a massive response to the all government's effort to stimulate housing during the 90s people had to deal with the stock market crash the federal reserve had also stepped in cutting the discount rate at a change at charge lenders from six percent to roughly one percent in order to stay off recessions other key short terms interest rates also followed from the year 2001 to 2003.
the american home prices which had largely moved in line with the household income over the decades suddenly accelerated up and away from the household income trend line the home prices had good reasons for such deviations from 2001 through 2003 rapidly declining the short-term rates to lows not seen since the aftermath of the great depressions had included a boom in adjustable rate mortgages a homeowner's dollar went further during the teaser rate period and still home prices rose unnaturally the rest would be low as long as home price appreciations were strong under this paradigm thanks to refinancing options it was a positive feedback loop with the full blessing of the us government amidst all the early fears that the housing market was getting ahead of itself in 2003 fed chairman alan greenspan had assured everyone that national bubbles and real estate simply do not happen barry had served and surveyed the national trends in housing at that time he wondered whether common sense ought to rule against the applications of pre-decent to the unprecedented mr greenspan went on to advise in 2004 that they were underutilizing the new types of adjustable rate mortgages and in 2005 he allowed specifically the technologies used by subprime lenders to get subprime borrowers into homes tragically for all the federal reserve actually had the authority to block any landing activity it deemed deserving of such treatment but it had absolutely no will to do so in any event by 2003 mortgage rates had stabilized at 40 years lows and importantly plain vanilla adjustable rate mortgages had already come into widespread use this was a big problem for public lenders with a growth mandate and they needed to stimulate more loans volume despite stable mortgage rates and inadequate income growth at this point if home prices were to rise significantly they would have to float almost entirely on the back of the type and quality of mortgage credit provided to the buyer critically the interest rates alone would no longer determine affordability barry noted for his investor that the countrywide financial a very large national mortgage lender had reported subprime mortgage originations up by 158 year-over-year despite a 24 decline in the overall loan organizations evidence was therefore manifest the banks were chasing bad credits inclusive of housing speculators the only questions that came to his mind was how far could they go ominously from jump in his mind he would mark the point of maximal price in the asset and he imagined that the top in the housing market would be marked by a mortgage in which home buyers of subprime quality were enticed to buy with teaser rate monthly payments near to zero he was very aware that the lenders would take this to the nth degree thanks to the securitizations of any loans the bank did not want to keep the loans the bank did not want to keep they could always sell through wall street to investors who were simply revenues for yield importantly because subprime mortgages were being turned into securities there were some mandatory regulatory filings and this is how he educated himself on the stature at times barry felt that he was the only one reading these things by the summer of 2005 these documents had revealed that interest-only mortgages had taken a substantial share in the subprime market only a year or so later after they were introduced to that market more than forty percent of subprime originations were passing through wall street on their way to the investors this was up from ten percent a year earlier simultaneous second lien mortgages ramped up significantly the top would soon be fast upon us as a subprime interest only adjustable rate mortgages started to touch maximum sales channel penetrations he saw the introductions of yet another more extreme teaser rate mortgage called the payment option the arm or cash flow arm in this new type of mortgage was never seen before in a widely standardized format the borrower could basically pay next to nothing each month and the unpaid interest would simply negatively amortize into the growing mortgage balance ramp and cash out refinancing had already made the home a magical atm for most americans and now housing has its credit card barry had been waiting for peak credit such as a mortgage product would only exist as long as home price appreciation was a central assumption and home price appreciations was not long for this world barry knew this because by 2005 as early as in 2005 you could see these mortgages being packed into securitization here at those two those are between subprime and prime not all of these though were sold not home prices starve p credit and would fall and fall steeply as mortgage and refinancing options crumbled away according to barry the crisis in his view would start in 2007 by which time teaser rate periods on the vast majority of these new types of mortgages which expire or reset for a population of homeowners trapped in mortgages they could no longer afford or on the way down housing would take consumer spending jobs everything with it a positive feedback loop of a very damaging variety was set up seeing the economy on the verge of collapse barry did the logical thing and he sought to profit from it that's it for today's video thank you for watching if you enjoyed it please like share and subscribe to our channel michael gary explained to stay up to date as to how and when the famed investor is placing his bets see you in the next video
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