저자: HowardMarks · 외국인
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투자의 핵심은 위험 통제이며, 미래는 불확실하고 무작위성이 커서 결과만으로 의사결정의 좋고 나쁨을 판단할 수 없다. 하워드 마크스는 자신의 책 'The Most Important Thing'의 제목 배경을 설명한다. 투자에서 중요한 것은 위험 통제, 저가 매수, 역발상 등 여러 가지가 있다는 취지다. 나심 탈레브의 'Fooled by Randomness'를 추천하며, 투자에서 운(무작위성)의 역할이 크다고 강조한다. 좋은 결정이 실패하고 나쁜 결정이 성공하는 경우가 흔하다. 기댓값 기반 의사결정은 합리적으로 보이지만, '해야 한다(should)'가 '반드시 일어난다(will)'를 의미하지 않으며 시간이 걸릴 수 있다. 과대평가된 것이 곧바로 하락하는 것은 아니라는 점을 기억해야 한다. 갈브레이스의 말을 인용해 거시 예측의 한계를 지적한다. 대부분의 예측은 최근 추세의 연장(extrapolation)이라 맞아도 돈을 벌지 못하며, 돈을 버는 예측은 급격한 변화를 정확히 맞춘 경우다. 그러나 이런 예측을 일관되게 맞히는 사람은 거의 없다. 찰스 엘리스의 '패자의 게임' 개념을 소개한다. 아마추어 테니스처럼 투자도 승리 샷이 아니라 실수를 피하는 쪽이 유리할 수 있다. 시장은 대체로 효율적이지만 비효율성은 존재하며, 이를 일관되게 활용하기는 어렵다. 따라서 자신이 프로 수준의 승부수를 던질 능력이 있는지 판단하고, 그렇지 않다면 손실 회피 중심의 접근이 낫다는 결론이다. 구체적 종목·지수에 대한 가격 방향 예측 발언은 없다. 이 영상은 2023년 1월 강연 자료 성격이며 투자 권유가 아니다.
다듬은 글
as you know I wrote a book in 2011 called the most important thing and the reason it has that title is because I would find myself in my client's office and I would say you know the most important thing in investing is controlling risk and then five minutes later I would say the most important thing is to buy at a low price and five minutes later I would say the most important thing is to act as a contrarian and so back in 20 oh three I believe I wrote a memo called the most important thing I listed 19 things Each of which was the most important thing and then I used that I couldn't think of a better format for my book so I used the same format in 2011.
interestingly some of the things are different and as you're supposed to show you that that one's thinking should still be alive Fooled by Randomness by NASA Nicholas taleb now who here has read that all right more people than I've read my book uh and uh I think it's very important in investing there's a lot of randomness and if you look at investing as a field without randomness where everything where everything is determinative you'll get confused because you will not draw the proper uh inferences from what you see for example just this brief example you see somebody and they report a great return for the year the scientist the scientists who thinks that the world that the investment world runs like the world of physics might think well great return that means the guy's a great investor but in truth it might be somebody who took a crazy shot and got lucky why because there's a lot of Randomness in the world when I went to Wharton 1963 the first book I remember learning was called decision making under uncertainty by C Jackson Grayson who became as I recall America's first energies are and uh I learned a couple of important things from that book number one that you can't tell from an outcome whether a decision was good or bad it's very important most people don't understand this totally totally counter-intuitive but the truth is in the real world where there's Randomness at work I mean if you build the bridge and it falls down then you must assume that the engineer made a mistake that it was a bad decision to build the bridge that way but in the in the real world of where where ever where there's Randomness um it good decisions fail to work all the time bad decisions work all the time the investment business is full of people who are quote right for the wrong reason made this a bad decision it didn't work out the way they thought but they got lucky and they were bailed out by events so this is very important and this is the basic theme of of Fooled by Randomness celeb's first book since then he has written the Black Swan which became more famous but I don't think it's as good a book and he's written a book called anti-fragile and uh that one didn't get famous um but I think that this book is something everybody should read if you have an interest in numbers investing and how the world works so the book is all about the role played by luck and basically even if you know what's most likely many other things can happen instead this is a very very important and we the reason we don't have many probability distributions that look like this but rather that look like this is because a range of things can happen there's a professor at the London Business School who put it succinctly he said risk means more things can happen than will happen and uh this is again this is profound in my opinion um in the economic world people generally make these decisions based on something called expected value which is to say that you multiply every possible outcome first of all of course you don't think in terms of a single outcome you think in terms of a range of outcomes so you take every if you could if you could iterate over so many you take every possible outcome you multiply it by the likelihood that it'll happen you sum the results and then you get something called the expected value from that course of action and you choose your course of action based on the highest expected value and that sounds like a total totally rational thing as I lived my life from Talking learning about Dimson learning about taleb from learning from my own experience I realized that should is does not equal will lots of things that should happen failed to happen and even if they don't fail to happen they fail to happen on schedule so the thing that the that the economist or the financier things should happen this year may happen in three years you got to live three years to see it happen one of my favorite sayings is never forget the six foot tall man who drowned crossing the stream that was five feet deep on average we can't live by the averages we can't say well I'm happy to survive on average we got to survive on the bad days you got to survive and if you're a decision maker you have to survive long enough for the correctness of your decision to be become evidence and you can't count on it happening right away I always remind people overpriced is not the same as going down tomorrow and if you bear that simple truth in mind I think it helps so so to Leb and the role of luck very important then John Kenneth Galbraith John Kenneth Galbraith for those of you who are not familiar with ancient history was an economist American Economist he was uh a little on on the left side uh he was you know somewhere between free enterprise and socialism but he was he was very very smart but he wrote some very good books and one of them is called a short history of financial Euphoria and one of the things he says is we have two classes of forecasters the ones who don't know and the ones who don't know they don't know now I don't believe in forecasts uh macro forecasts people who forecast interest rates performance of economies performance of stock markets and I don't think that my efforts to be a superior investor and most other peoples are aided by macro forecast am I saying that that the forecaster is never right no I'm not saying that the forecasters are often right last year GDP grew to percent many forecasters forecast that GDP will grow this year at two percent that's called extrapolation and usually in economics extrapolation works usually the future looks like the recent past so usually the people who forecast a continuation of the current are right the only problem is they don't make any money most people forecast to something for this year a growth rate of two something is cooked into the prices of Securities today if the growth rate turns out to be two something everybody who forecasted that will be right security prices will not change much because that to something growth was anticipated and discounted a year or two ago so uh all those people who are right won't make any money so most forecasts most extrapolation works all the time forecasts that our extrapolations work all the time but they don't make any money logically am I saying that forecasting that forecasts never make any money no the forecasts that make money are the forecasts of radical change if everybody's predicting 2.4 percent growth for this year and if it turns out if I predict -2 and it turns out to be -2 or I'd predict 6 and it turns out to be six I'll make a lot of money so forecasts which are not extrapolations forecasts which are radically different from the recent past are potentially very valuable if they're correct of course they're not of any value if they're Incorrect and if they're incorrect they'll they'll cost you a lot of money if if everybody else thinks it's going to be 2-4 and you predict six and it turns out at 2-4 you're probably going to have taken the wrong Investments and lost a lot of money deviant forecasts which turn out to be right are potentially very valuable but it's very hard to make them it's very hard to make them correctly consistently and somebody at lunch mentioned an early memo I wrote called the value of forecasts in one of those I reviewed the history the recent history of the Wall Street Journal poll every six months the Wall Street Journal publishes the results of a poll of economists and uh on you know GDP growth CPI value of a dollar the price of oil whatever it might be a bunch of phenomenon they do it consistently and they they ask like 30 people consistently over time so it shows basically that most of the time when people get it right it's because they predicted extrapolation and nothing changed once in a while something changes radically and invariably somebody predicted it but the problem is if you look at that person's other forecasts over the years you see that that person always made radical forecasts and never was right any other time so of course if you if you're getting your information from a forecaster the fact that he was right once doesn't tell you anything you you wouldn't the the views of that forecaster would not be of any value to you unless he was right consistently and nobody's right consistently in making deviant forecasts so uh so the bottom line for me is that forecasting is not valuable we know we don't know what's going to happen and Randomness will play a big role in what happens and Randomness is by definition unpredictable number three the losers game by Charlie Ellis this is very interesting the erw used to be a big conglomerate and now it's known primarily for credit scores and uh there was a guy named Sai Ramo he was the r it was it was Thompson Ramo Woolridge and he was the r in TRW and very smart and Sai Ramo wrote a book and uh it was about uh winning at tennis who here plays tennis okay this is good because as I go around the world now very few people play tennis anymore what Ramo said is that there are two kinds of winning tennis players if you look at Pete Sampras or uh Nadal or Djokovic how do they win the winning Champion tennis player wins by hitting winning shots he hits shots that the opponent can't return they're either so well placed or so strategic or so fast and hard that the opponent can't return them and if Nadal hits a shot which is not a potential winner than his opponent can probably put it away because it doesn't have enough difficulty on the ball so the the championship tennis player wins by hitting winners the amateur tennis player like Kim and me we win not by hitting winners but by avoiding hitting losers and we believe that if we can just push it back 20 times and just get it over the net 20 times our opponent can only do it 19.
we believe that that we'll outsteady him Outlast him and eventually he'll hit it into the net or off the court we'll win the point but we'll win the point without having hit a winner so there are obviously two styles of tennis the same is true for investing so Charlie Ellis wrote an article called The Losers game he thought amateur tennis is a loser's game it's won by the people who avoid being losers he thought that Charlie thinks or a slot that investing is a loser's game and so the best way to win at tennis is by investing is by not hitting losers now uh I believe also that it's a loser's game not as much as Charlie believes and not for the same reason Charlie believes that that investing is a loser's game uh because the market is efficient and securities are priced right I believe there are inefficiencies I just think it's hard to consistently take advantage of them and you have to be an exceptional person to take advantage of them on a consistent basis the reason that the pro can go for winners is because he is so well schooled and practiced and steady and talented that he knows that if he does this with his foot and this with his hip and this with his elbow and this with his wrist that the ball will go where he wants he doesn't worry about miscues wind sun in his eyes distraction he's so well schooled and in fact you know in in scoring tennis matches they keep track of something called unforced errors and the reason they keep track of them is because they are so fuel the pro doesn't make a lot of unforced Errors we make unforced errors all the time and so we have in order to survive we have to avoid them so the point is if you're going to be an investor you have to decide am I good enough to go for winners or should I emphasize the avoidance of losers in my Approach for us in investing especially because there's Randomness if we do the right thing with our foot and hip and arm and elbow we're not going to get a winner every time
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