저자: HowardMarks · 외국인
요약 보기
결론: 마크스는 완만한 경기침체를 예상하며, 채무 레버리지가 큰 시장에서 주식·후순위채 투자자가 손실을 볼 가능성이 크다고 본다. 경기 전망: 일반적인 boom-bust 사이클이라기보다 완만한 침체가 예상되며, 과거 10년 넘는 회복기는 가장 길었지만 가장 느렸다. 지난 10여 년(2009~2021) 평가: 저금리·저인플레·낮은 부도율 속에서 자산 보유자는 행복했지만, 이런 호황기는 위험 감수를 부추겼다. 과거에는 적자 기업 채권 발행이나 기술·소프트웨어 LBO가 어려웠으나 이후 가능해져 많은 부채가 쌓였고, 이는 시험대에 오를 것이라고 봤다. 투자 전략: 오크트리는 스스로를 저가 매수 투자자로 규정하며, 부실채권 펀드의 35년 연평균 무레버리지 수익률은 22%다. 다만 저가 매수 기회는 매도자가 절박해질 때 생기므로 최근 13년은 기회가 부족했다. 시장 온도: 시장 참여자의 심리(환호인지 공포인지)를 읽는 것이 중요하며, 부동산 쪽은 아직 절박함 단계에 이르지 않았다고 본다. 유동성 자산은 가격이 급락하지만 사모자산은 거래가 멈춰 있다가 누군가 팔아야 할 때 가격이 하락한다. 사모 평가 문제: 작년은 주식·채권·60/40 포트폴리오 모두 역사적으로 최악 수준이었으나 사모 자산은 평가손을 거의 반영하지 않았다. 공개시장 변동성이 과도하다고 보며, 사모 자산을 공포 섞인 공개시장 가격에 맞춰 평가할 필요는 없다고 주장한다. 개별 종목·지수 언급: 없음. 자산별 가격 방향 예측 발언도 없음.
다듬은 글
what do you think this is bunny what do you think this is are well a plain vanilla recession typical cycle how does Oak Tree are you think well I think I think it's going to be a moderate recession you know and by the and by the way that's one of the many forecasts I don't believe but but I you know nobody thinks it's going to be an economic cataclysm among other things you know if you the normal description of a cycle is Boom bust we didn't have a boom in the real economy we had the longest economic recovery in history of exceeding 10 years during the during this period I'm talking about but it was also the slowest so we didn't have a boom where we where you had access but perhaps we're in leverage Finance you know and so uh so uh Equity investors will lose money and and Junior debt holders will lose money uh I think that's what's going to happen so uh are you excited uh you know for the um you know yeah transitioning from uh a decade where growth uh did well and value did not and uh feels like we're rounding into the perfect opportunity Zone for Oak Tree well you know I don't want to jinx us but no but the truth is that that the period I describe look if you look at 09 through 21 you had low and declining interest rates thanks to no inflation you had a healthy economy stimulated by the Fed you had a paucity of defaults and bankruptcies you had no real fear the greatest fear was the fear of missing out nobody was afraid of losing money uh you had happy asset holders eager buyers easy access to Capital so you put that together that's that's a pretty glowing period and uh and of course the trouble is that that uh idyllic periods like that encourage risk-taking right so people push up their ltvs and uh and try to limit their equity and they and they become willing to engage in and riskier assets you know and one of the interesting uh Hallmarks of the last 15 years was you know prior to 15 years ago I think you couldn't issue a bond for a company that lost money 15 and in the last 15 years it became possible prior to 15 years ago the private Equity industry for the most part would not invest in technology or software and then they said well maybe it's okay and and uh and so you have a lot of tech and software that was the subject of lbos for which a lot of debt was raised and you know these things will be tested Buffett says it's only when the tide goes out that we find out who was swimming naked and the tide the tide we believe the tide will go out so so we're uh we're very optimistic the 13 years I'm talking about were a tough period well it was a great period for asset owners and borrowers it was a terrible period for lenders and bargain hunters which is what we are at Oak tree that's what we consider ourselves to be and you know the distressed debt funds 35-year record uh gross return of 22 a year unlevered now if you can make 22 percent a year on unlevered investments it gives you a sense for the bargains we were able to secure that's how you make that kind of money the value investor his goal is to buy things for less than their worth makes perfect sense yeah very most commendable right but the trouble with that is that it requires the cooperation of somebody who's willing to sell an asset for less than their worth and that happens in the bad times that's happens when people say you know uh I bought it at 100 it's 50 now I got to get out or before I lose the other 50.
you know and things will never get better and that was not the case in the 13 years so we had a hard time accessing Bargains and the the funds in that category for example had the worst stretch ever now they all earned at least 10 which not the worst thing in the world but it was far from our long-term average now we think we have a shot at the long-term average again because we think that there will be motivated sellers for Sellers and you know that those are the people you want to buy from so you're saying that we're entering the 20 zone for us yes I think so really I think well I think so and are we there now or you think we're getting we're not there yet right the there you need desperation uh and how will we know that when we see it we'll we'll be buying a lot you I actually argue for for an activity that I describe as taking the temperature of the market you have to assess the mood uh of the market participants are they happy and celebrating and you know putting down orders at the Ferrari dealer or are they you know hunkering down and you know telling their wives they can't go shopping and and uh we'll know you know you'll we'll know when people are are suicidal I don't think our real estate guys are quite there yet no well you and I were talking before we started about denial and I didn't say that and well look and what happens in illiquid assets you know what what happens in the in the liquid markets the listed markets is that prices collapse what happens in the private markets is that there are no transactions right right because the buyer wants a price which is commensurate with current conditions and the seller hasn't accepted that yet right so so obviously there's no meaning in the mind there's no transactions and and usually after a while uh somebody has to sell for any of a variety of reasons and and uh that's when the prices of private assets decline yeah look there's been there's been a big discussion of uh last year was one of the worst years on record for the stock market and the first or second worst uh year on record for the bond market and maybe the worst year on record for the 60 40 mix of stocks and bonds and yet most private investors didn't mark down their portfolios much if anything so this there's been a discussion of the propriety of that relationship and every private asset owner has an explanation for why they haven't marked them down I've heard a few and I and I and I I want to inject interject here that that they're not all nuts because we the argument is that private uh assets have not shown enough volatility but I would submit that uh public assets exhibit too much volatility and you know you when you mark your private portfolio the decision rule can't be put set a price which is commensurate with the with the Doomsday thinking that's prevailing in the public markets that's not that's not the right idea either so that
댓글 0