저자: MichaelBurry · 외국인
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결론: 마이클 버리는 단기 수익률보다 5년 이상 장기 성과로 평가받아야 하며, 기술주 옵션 보상 구조는 주주 가치를 훼손할 수 있다고 경고한다. 펀드 성과: 2001년 1분기 Scion Value Fund는 7.81% 상승, S&P500은 12.21% 하락. 설립 후 5개월간 펀드 +14.96%, S&P500 -18.82%로 약 33.79%p 초과수익을 기록했다고 밝혔다. 변동성과 세금: 변동성이 곧 위험은 아니며, 집중투자와 비유동성 투자는 위험을 정의하지 않는다고 주장한다. 세금 손실 매도 후 1월 반등에서 일부 보유주를 너무 오래 들고 있다가 수익을 반납한 점을 실수로 인정하고, 세금을 이유로 이익 실현을 미루지 않겠다고 밝혔다. 시장 전망: 대형 기술주 다수는 여전히 고평가 상태이며, 기대 수준이 현실화되려면 추가 하락이 필요하다고 본다. 투자 기회는 주로 저평가된 소형·비유동 종목에 있다고 판단한다. 펀드는 가치가 있는 곳으로 편향될 것이라고 밝혔다. 옵션 보상 문제: 기술 기업의 주식옵션 보상은 비용으로 잡히지 않아 순이익이 과대 표시된다. 예시로 Adobe는 옵션 관련 세금 혜택으로 역산한 보상비용이 약 3.57억 달러로 추정되며, 이를 반영하면 순이익이 약 3300만 달러 수준으로 줄어든다고 주장한다. 다수 기술기업의 주가 수준이 주주 가치 대비 과도하다고 평가한다. 옵션 재가격 조정과 희석이 주주 부담으로 이어져, 이러한 경영진 아래의 주식은 기대만큼 회복되기 어렵다고 본다. 투자자 유치: 펀드 신규 가입은 분기 단위로 바뀌며 최소 투자금은 25만 달러로 상향된다. 이는 운용 규모 확대에 따른 비용 비율 관리를 위한 조치다. 대상 자산 예측: 개별 종목·지수에 대한 1~3개월 가격 방향 예측은 없고, 장기 가치투자 관점만 제시됨.
다듬은 글
scion value fund a series of scion funds llc april 3rd 2001. dear fellow members during the first quarter of 2001 the scion value fund fund appreciated 7.81 after deducting accrued and actual expenses and fees the s p 500 index experienced a net loss of 12.21 during the period since its inception the fund has appreciated 14.96 net of fees and expenses while the s p 500 index has recorded a loss of 18.82 during the same time period as a result since inception five months ago the fund has outperformed the s p 500 by 3 379 basis points or 33.79 percentage points this performance was not without volatility i however allow me to be quite stern on this subject volatility does not determine risk i guide the fund to a net long position by investing in a concentrated manner and by frequently taking relatively illiquid positions in undervalued situations the goal here is long-term capital appreciation with the emphasis on long-term therefore while the fund may yield surprising results over short time frames this phenomenon neither concerns me when the results seem cause for lament nor lifts me when the results seem cause for celebration i urge the same reactions in you thus i will advise that whatever numbers you see before you on your capital account statements they should not be compounded into the future indefinitely i fully expect and recommend that members of this investment vehicle judge my performance over a period of five years or greater not five months or less this will prove to be the most fruitful and enjoyable manner in which to participate in the fund tax policy one facet of my style and my investment manner is extremely well suited to finding and profiting from tax loss losers during november and december and writing them through january in the past this has been a successful activity and i have occasionally found some longer term holds within the group never have i had the success i had this past january however and i did not react well to it in context here's the context tax loss selling takes many poorly performing stocks to even more extreme lows nearly every year during the late fall mutual funds must realize such losses by october thirty first and others have until december third however in many cases these stocks represent businesses under significant duress aside from a moderate january bump as selling pressure is alleviated and as stockholders once again buy into these stocks one would not expect such despised stocks to truly reflect in short run any realization of longer term or hidden value with the clarity of hindsight i see now that my stocks bought amidst the vicious sell-off of mid-december were no match for the vicious sell-off of mid-march while nearly all remained above the purchase price the amount of short-term profits given back to the market this quarter remains wholly unsatisfactory most unsatisfactory results are not without reason and this one is no exception i failed to clearly re-establish the tax policy of the fund after it was subtly suggested that paying taxes was something to avoid although this thought was far from startling i allowed it to persuade me to hold on to a few extremely profitable positions too long this feeling is not uncommon in the market today but i did know better and i did break with a long-standing tax policy that has contributed significantly to my success as a portfolio manager in order to ensure we do not have a repeat allow me to clarify the fund's position on taxes i am a tax paying u.s citizen and hence i am in the same boat as many but not all of you i also have more of my net worth in the fund than any other member and in dollar terms it is the largest as well however i will not let the prospect of taxes on gains prevent the achievement of those gains to recap january saw a rapid run-up in the value of your investment in the fund one competitive advantage of mine has been taking advantage of the fast times to raise cash for the next slow time to rotate into less appreciated securities and occasionally to short into speculative excess this can result in my investment strategy producing higher profit higher turnover and yes higher taxes in the past it has done so in the future i expected to do so for now i must simply point to one opportunity sorely missed to one achievement not yet accomplished on your behalf and to taxes unfortunately drastically reduced market overview q1 2001 when i stand on my special issue intelligent investor ladder and peer out over the frenzied crowd i see very few others doing the same many stocks remain overvalued and speculative excess both on the upside and on the downside is embedded in the frenzy around stocks of all stripes and yes i am talking about march 2001 not march 2000 in essence the stock market represents three separate categories of business they are adjusted for inflation those with shrinking intrinsic value those with approximately stable intrinsic value and those with steadily growing intrinsic value the preference always would be to buy a long-term franchise at a substantial discount from growing intrinsic value however if one has been playing the buy and hold game with quality securities one has been exposed to a substantial amount of market risk because the valuations placed on these securities have implied overly rosy scenarios prone to popular revision in times of more realistic expectation this is one of those times but it is my feeling that the revisions have not been severe enough the expectations not yet realistic enough hence the world's best companies largely remain overpriced in the marketplace the bulk of the opportunities remain in undervalued smaller more illiquid situations that often represent average or slightly above average businesses these stocks having largely missed out on the speculative write-up have nevertheless frequently been pushed down to absurd levels owing to their liquidity during a general market panic i will not label this fund a small cap fund for this may not be where the best opportunities are next month or next year for now though the fund is biased towards smaller capitalization stocks as for the future i can only say the fund will always be biased to where the value is if recent trends continue it would not be surprising to find the stocks of several larger capitalization stocks with significant long-term franchises meet value criteria and hence become eligible for potential addition to the fund where the value isn't with many large cap technology sector stocks falling out of favor one might be tempted to jump into the fray and find a bottom this is all well and good but there is a flaw at the first assumption here all stocks including technology stocks must find a floor in terms of fundamental value an expected return to the stockholder before they find a near a defining floor in price in most all cases the floor will be much lower than popular opinion might indicate and much lower than fair value investors ought to take care to be coldly realistic in their appraisals following is an outline of a problem that a lot of technology-related companies face and that makes their stocks in general overvalued unlike nearly every other industry technology companies as they are generally grouped these days compensate their employees in a manner that hides much of the expense of the compensation from the income statement of course the subject here is options compensation with the most prevalent type of option called non-qualified stock options the difference between the price of the stock and the price of the options when exercised accrues to the employee is income that must be taxed because it is considered compensation not according to gop generally accepted accounting principles but according to the internal revenue service irs so the irs gives companies a break and allows them for tax purposes to deduct this options expense that employees receive as income the net result is an income tax benefit to the company of roughly 35 of the sum total difference between the exercise price of the company's non-qualified options during a given year and the market price of the stock at the time of exercise since got does not recognize this in the income statement the cash flow statements record this tax benefit from exercise of stock options as a positive adjustment to net income after all the company included neither the cost of the options nor the income tax benefit on the profit loss statement hence the correction to cash flow so cash income is understated by net income right wrong when evaluating u.s companies conservative investors ought to assume that if the irs can tax something then it is a real profit and if they allow one to deduct something then it is a real cost in a rising market the net income tax benefit can be quite large but it only reflects roughly 35 of the actual cost of paying employees with options how does it cost the company because the company must either issue new stock at a severe discount to prevailing market prices or buy back stock at prevailing market prices in order to provide stock at a discount for employees exercising their options the cost is borne by shareholders who suffer from significant dilution the per share numbers worsen while the absolute numbers improve after all issuing stock at any price is a positive event for cash flow if not for shareholders adobe systems for instance is widely regarded as a good company with a decent franchise a bit cyclical maybe but a member of the nasdaq 100 and the s p 500 it is widely held by institutions looking at its annual report for 2000 one sees that the income tax benefit for options s-u-p-p-l-i-e-d 125 million dollars or roughly 28 of operating cash flow fair enough let's move to the income statement divide that 125 million dollars by a corporate tax rate of around 35 percent and one gets an amount of 357 million dollars that's the amount of employee compensation that the irs recognizes adobe paid in the form of options but that does not appear on the income statement plugging it into the income statement as an expense drops the operating income less investment gains and interest from 408 million dollars to 51 million dollars tax that and you get net income somewhere around 33 million dollars and an abnormally small tax payment to the irs that 33 million dollars is a good proxy for the amount of net income that public shareholders get after the company's senior management and employees feed at the trough for this 33 million dollars roughly one-tenth of the reported earnings shareholders were paying 8.7 billion dollars around the time of this writing shareholders of such firms as siebel systems oracle and zillings were paying near infinite multiples on last year's earnings as a similar exercise shows that these firms paid employees more money in options compensation than their entire net income last year many and probably most technology companies are therefore private companies in the public domain existing for themselves not for their shareholder owners of course it is a shell game a prolonged depressed stock price for dot whatever reason including a bear market would cause a lot of options to become worthless and would likely require the company to either start paying more in salary or often worse to start repricing options at lower prices even if neither action is taken operating cash flow takes a hit in truth this type of activity might be expected from companies that were often created with the help of venture capitalists who viewed public shareholders as an exit strategy not as a group that deserves to benefit from improving company results and prospects the significant implication here is that shareholders cannot count on these sorts of companies for proper corporate governance they have demonstrated that they will ask shareholders to bear the burden during good times and that they will reprice options during bad times thereby taking from shareholders both on the way up and on the way down such an argument has very significant implications for the valuation of many popular stocks in a coldly calculating market rather than a speculative one the stocks of companies governed with so little respect for shareholders will suffer it is not limited to adobe siebel or zlink cisco intel microsoft and many of the greatest technology related wealth creators of the last decade are in the same boat now that the bubble is burst it is not my expectation that we will see any lasting rebound in the stocks of companies in the hands of such reckless management teams indeed it is quite certain that public expectations regarding these companies stocks will not be met volatility revisited because expenses are relatively fixed higher amounts of assets dilute the expense ratio therefore in keeping with the goal to lower the expense ratio efforts must be made on occasion to raise new capital while attempting to raise new capital recently your manager has recently had a colorful experience that is fairly illuminating with regards to the hallowed ground on which most investors consider volatility i delivered a short talk at the bank of america alternative investment strategies symposium in los angeles last month i had a good slot immediately after the keynote speaker and at about nine o'clock in the ama room of about 200 wealthy potential clients heard me state unequivocally that risk is not defined by volatility but rather by ill-conceived investment the corollaries as i pointed out were that portfolio concentration and liquidity do not define risk that simple statement i am told had not just a few of those in the room shaking their heads the very pleasant gentleman who spoke after me then proceeded to delineate how frequently his portfolio moved with a magnitude greater than one percent on a daily basis i think the number was quite impressive for an institution that measures itself by such things somewhere around 25 days in the past two years or so and this he proclaimed minimized volatility and thus risk he seemed a decent fellow and if you wish me to provide his name and number i would be happy to do so not that he necessarily needs the business perhaps it is not so surprising that your portfolio manager sat relatively alone at his lunch table while the second fellow was quite popular by and large the wealthiest of the wealthy and their representatives have accepted that most managers are average and the better ones are able to achieve average returns while exhibiting below average volatility by this logic however a dollar selling for 50 cents one day 60 cents the next day and 40 cents the next somehow becomes worth less than a dollar selling for 50 cents all three days i would argue that the ability to buy at 40 cents presents opportunity not risk and that the dollar is still worth a dollar the stock market is full of dollars selling for much more than a dollar a dollar that consistently sells at 1.1 times face value may even be respected for the consistency of this quality earning it the right to have that premium these are not the investments your portfolio manager chooses for the fund a wildly fluctuating dollar selling for 40 or 50 or 60 cents will always remain more attractive and far less risky as for my loneliness at the lunch table it has always been a maxim of mine that while capital raising may be a popularity contest intelligent investment is quite the opposite one must therefore take some pride in such a universal lack of appeal policy matters while i will continue to attempt to raise new capital it dot will not be my policy to compromise the fund's current policies to do so you have all accepted the fund on its own terms and first and foremost it is my intention to protect your capital and enhance your returns be assured that i eat my own cooking the vast majority of my net worth aside from money set aside for modest living expenses is in the fund if i compound my own investment in the fund at a rate of 20 annually excluding fees for 30 years i will have over 250 million dollars if i can do 25 will have nearly 1 billion dollars this is how i think about your investment it is also why i do not think in terms of monthly or quarterly snapshots of performance although i do understand that after five years or so you would expect to see a favorable trend i intend to provide it to this end i will change the schedule of new investment to a quarterly basis may first will be the last start date on which new investment in the fund may be initiated on the monthly schedule from then on the fund will accept new investors on the 1st of july the 1st of october the 1st of january the first of april and so forth i will retain the right to allow investments at other times but only as a rare exception in the face of overwhelming justification members may continue to add to their holdings on a monthly basis also the minimum initial investment in the fund for future investors will be raised to 250 000 as of the july 1 2001 investment date current members and those with planned investment during april for a may 1 start are exempt from this new minimum please feel free to call me if i have not been clear or if you need further clarification on a matter discussed above sincerely michael j bury scion capital llc
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